1Rather, it must be that the uncertainty in the case of the sounding of the shofar concerns whether a particular individual is a man or a woman, e.g., a tumtum , whose sexual organs are indeterminate. Although a woman is not obligated in the mitzva of sounding the shofar, a tumtum is in fact obligated, despite the uncertainty of sex. It is therefore possible to derive from the sounding of the shofar that if one slaughters a koy , an animal whose status as a domesticated or undomesticated animal is uncertain, on a Festival, one covers its blood.
2The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Yosei, who does not accept this refutation, conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as he says: One who is definitely a woman may also sound the shofar on Rosh HaShana. As it is taught in a baraita concerning the verse that discusses a burnt offering: “Speak to the sons of Israel…and he shall place his hands upon the head of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 1:2–4). The verse indicates that the sons of Israel place their hands upon the head of an offering, but the daughters of Israel do not place their hands.
3Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: It is optional for women to place their hands on the head of an offering before it is slaughtered. Even though women are not obligated to place their hands, doing so is not considered to be performing labor with a sacrificial item, an act normally prohibited, despite the fact that one performs the placing of the hands by leaning with all of his weight on the animal. Similarly, Rabbi Yosei holds that although women are not obligated in the sounding of the shofar, it is optional for them to sound it, and it is not considered a desecration of the Festival.
4Ravina said: And even according to what the Sages said, that a woman may not sound the shofar on Rosh HaShana but a tumtum is nevertheless obligated due to uncertainty, there is a refutation to their claim as well. One cannot derive from this that the obligation to cover the blood of a koy overrides a Festival. What is notable about the sounding of the shofar? It is notable in that its definite obligation overrides Shabbat in the Temple, as it was sounded in the Temple even when Rosh HaShana occurred on Shabbat, and it is therefore understandable that its uncertain obligation overrides a Festival as well. Can you say the same with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood, which does not override Shabbat in any instance?
5The Gemara continues its analysis of the baraita : Rabbi Elazar HaKappar the Distinguished responded with another refutation to Rabbi Yosei’s a fortiori inference: One cannot infer from the mitzva of circumcision that an uncertain obligation to cover the blood of a koy does not override a Festival. What is notable about circumcision? It is notable in that it is not in effect on Festival nights. Can you say the same with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood, which is in effect on Festival nights? The Gemara asks: Does Rabbi Elazar HaKappar mean to say that the mitzva of circumcision is not in effect only on Festival nights, but it is in effect on other, non-Festival nights? Isn’t circumcision always performed during the day?
6The Gemara responds: Rather, Rabbi Elazar HaKappar meant the following: What is notable about circumcision? It is notable in that it is not in effect at night as it is by day. Can you say a similar halakha with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood, which is in effect at night as it is by day? Rabbi Abba said: This a fortiori inference drawn by Rabbi Yosei is one of the matters with regard to which Rabbi Ḥiyya says that there is no refutation for them, and Rabbi Elazar HaKappar the Distinguished successfully responded with a refutation.
7MISHNA: In the case of one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a bird and it is discovered to be an animal with a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [ tereifa ]; and in the case of one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a bird for the sake of idol worship; and in the case of one who slaughters a non-sacred animal or bird inside the Temple courtyard or a sacrificial bird outside the Temple courtyard; or in the case of one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a bird that was sentenced to be stoned, e.g., for killing a person; in all these cases, even though it is prohibited to eat any of these animals or birds, Rabbi Meir deems one obligated to cover their blood, and the Rabbis deem one exempt from doing so because, in their opinion, slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted for consumption is not considered an act of slaughter.
8One who slaughters an animal or bird and it became a carcass by his hand, i.e., the slaughter was performed incorrectly, and one who stabs the animal or bird, and one who tears loose the windpipe and the gullet, are exempt from covering the blood, as no act of slaughter took place, and one is obligated to cover blood only after a valid slaughter.
9GEMARA: With regard to the dispute in the mishna about whether an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted renders one obligated to cover the blood, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the redactor of the Mishna, saw as correct the statement of Rabbi Meir, that ineffective slaughter is considered an act of slaughter, with regard to the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day, and taught that halakha in the mishna (81b) using the term: The Rabbis, so that it would be accepted. And he saw as correct the statement of Rabbi Shimon, that ineffective slaughter is not considered an act of slaughter with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood, and taught that halakha in the mishna here using the term: The Rabbis.
10The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Rabbi Meir holds that ineffective slaughter is considered an act of slaughter in the case of a mother and its offspring? Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: He derives his opinion by means of a verbal analogy of the terms slaughter and slaughter, from the case of sacrificial animals slaughtered outside the Temple. The verse states with regard to a mother and its offspring: “It and its offspring you shall not slaughter [ lo tishḥatu ] in one day” (Leviticus 22:28), and the verse states with regard to sacrificial animals: “Or that is slaughtered [ yishḥat ] outside the camp” (Leviticus 17:3).
11Accordingly, just as there, with regard to one who slaughters an offering outside the Temple it is a case of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted, as one is prohibited from deriving any benefit from such meat, and it is nevertheless considered an act of slaughter to render one liable for slaughtering it outside the Temple, so too here, in the case of a mother and its offspring, an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is considered an act of slaughter, and one is liable.
12The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Shimon, what is the reason he holds that an ineffective slaughter is not considered an act of slaughter? Rabbi Mani bar Pattish said: Rabbi Shimon derives his opinion from the verse: “Slaughter [ tevo’aḥ ] and prepare; for the men shall dine with me at noon” (Genesis 43:16). Just as there, the verse is referring to an act of slaughter that is fit to render the meat permitted, so too here, in the case of a mother and its offspring, only an act of slaughter that is fit to render the meat permitted is considered an act of slaughter.
13The Gemara suggests: And as for Rabbi Meir as well, let him derive from “ tevo’aḥ ” that only an effective slaughter is considered an act of slaughter. The Gemara responds: According to Rabbi Meir, one derives the halakha with regard to a term of sheḥita from another instance of a term of sheḥita , and one does not derive the halakha with regard to the term of sheḥita from the term of teviḥa .
14The Gemara asks: Being that both terms refer to slaughter, what is the difference which one is used; didn’t the school of Rabbi Yishmael teach a verbal analogy with regard to leprosy of houses: The verse states: “And the priest shall return [ veshav ] on the seventh day” (Leviticus 14:39), and another verse with regard to the priest’s visit seven days later states: “And the priest shall come [ uva ] and look” (Leviticus 14:44). This returning and this coming have the same meaning and one can therefore derive by verbal analogy that the halakha that applies if the leprosy had spread at the conclusion of the first week applies if it had spread again by the end of the following week.
15The Gemara responds: This statement of the school of Rabbi Yishmael applies only where there are no other terms that are identical to it from which one could derive a verbal analogy. But if there is another term that is identical to it, we derive the verbal analogy from the term that is identical to it. Accordingly, Rabbi Meir derives a verbal analogy from the instance of sheḥita that appears with regard to sacrificial animals that are slaughtered outside the Temple.
16The Gemara suggests: And as for Rabbi Shimon as well, let him derive from the case of sacrificial animals that were slaughtered outside the Temple that ineffective slaughter is considered an act of slaughter. The Gemara responds: Rabbi Shimon holds that one derives the halakha with regard to the slaughter of non-sacred animals from another instance of the slaughter of non-sacred animals, and one does not derive the halakha with regard to the slaughter of non-sacred animals from an instance of the slaughter of sacrificial animals. The prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day is stated primarily with regard to non-sacred animals (see 78a).
17The Gemara continues: And Rabbi Meir would respond: Is this to say that the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day does not apply to sacrificial animals? Rather, since the prohibition also applies to sacrificial animals, one can derive its halakha from the case of sacrificial animals that were slaughtered outside the Temple. The Gemara comments: This is what Rabbi Ḥiyya was referring to when he said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi saw as correct the statement of Rabbi Meir with regard to the halakha of a mother and its offspring, and taught it in the mishna using the term: The Rabbis.
18§ The Gemara resumes its discussion of the dispute in the mishna: What is the reason that Rabbi Meir holds one is obligated in the mitzva of covering the blood in a case of ineffective slaughter? Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Rabbi Meir derives this from a verbal analogy between the terms pouring and pouring, from the case of a sacrificial animal that was slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard. One verse states with regard to covering the blood: “And he shall pour out its blood” (Leviticus 17:13), and one verse states with regard to sacrificial animals slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard: “He has poured blood” (Leviticus 17:4). Accordingly, just as there, with regard to offerings slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, it is a case of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted but is nevertheless considered an act of slaughter, so too here, with regard to covering the blood, an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is considered an act of slaughter.
19The Gemara continues: And Rabbi Shimon would respond: It is written with regard to covering the blood: “An undomesticated animal or bird that may be eaten” (Leviticus 17:13), indicating that the verse is referring specifically to slaughter fit to render the meat permitted for consumption. And Rabbi Meir holds: That phrase comes to exclude a ritually impure bird from the mitzva of covering the blood. And Rabbi Shimon would respond: What is the reason an impure bird is not included in the mitzva of covering the blood? It is because it is not fit for consumption. If so, a tereifa should also not be included in the mitzva of covering the blood, since it is also not fit for consumption.
20The Gemara comments: And this is what Rabbi Ḥiyya is saying when he said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi saw as correct the statement of Rabbi Shimon with regard to the halakha of covering the blood, and taught it in the mishna using the term: The Rabbis.
21§ Rabbi Abba says: