1But didn’t we learn in a mishna ( Terumot 11:8): If one poured oil or wine of teruma from one vessel to another and turned the vessel on its side and drained out the last bits of liquid inside, this is teruma and must be given to the priest? This indicates that the last remnants of the liquid in the vessel belong to the one who receives the oil or wine, not the owner, i.e., the seller. Why, then, does the mishna here teach that the last remnants belong to the seller?
2Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said to Rabbi Elazar: But wasn’t it stated with regard to that mishna that Rabbi Abbahu says: Due to of the despair of the owner, who relinquishes his right to such a small amount of wine or oil, the Sages touched upon it and ruled that any remnants extracted from the vessel belong to the seller? By contrast, with regard to teruma , which is forbidden to non-priests, the despair of the buyer is irrelevant, and therefore anything that remains in the vessels is teruma .
3§ The mishna teaches: And a storekeeper is not obligated to drip three drops. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the sale occurs on Shabbat eve as nightfall arrives, one is exempt from dripping these three drops. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is Rabbi Yehuda referring to the first clause of the mishna, and if so his ruling is lenient, as the mishna states that one must drip three drops and he states that on Shabbat eve one is exempt from doing so? Or perhaps he is referring to the latter clause and is stringent, as the mishna teaches that a storekeeper is always exempt, whereas Rabbi Yehuda rules that this is the halakha only on Shabbat eve?
4The Gemara answers: Come and hear a resolution of this dilemma, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: On Shabbat eve at nightfall a storekeeper is exempt because the storekeeper is busy. This proves that Rabbi Yehuda was referring to the latter clause of the mishna, i.e., he exempts the storekeeper from dripping the drops only on Shabbat eve.
5MISHNA: With regard to one who sends his son to a storekeeper with a pundeyon , a coin worth two issar , in his hand, and the storekeeper measured oil for him for one issar and gave him the second issar as change, and the son broke the jug and lost the issar , the storekeeper must compensate the father, as he gave the jug and coin to one who is not halakhically competent. Rabbi Yehuda exempts him from liability, as he holds that the father sent his son in order to do this, i.e., to bring back the jug and coin. And the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yehuda with regard to a case when the jug is in the hand of the child and the storekeeper measured the oil into it that the storekeeper is exempt if the child breaks the jug.
6GEMARA: Granted, with regard to the issar and the oil, one can explain that they disagree over this matter: As the Rabbis hold that the father sent his son to inform the storekeeper that he needed oil but did not intend for the storekeeper to send the oil with the boy. For this reason, if the storekeeper gave the child the oil he is liable for its loss. And Rabbi Yehuda holds that he sent his son so that the storekeeper would send him back with the oil, and therefore the storekeeper is exempt from liability. But if the child broke the jug, why do the Rabbis hold that the storekeeper is responsible for it? It is a deliberate loss on the part of the father, as he entrusted the jug to his young son, who is not responsible enough to care for it.
7Rav Hoshaya said: Here we are dealing with a proprietor who sells jugs, and the father sent his son with a jug in case the store owner might want to buy it. And this is a case where the storekeeper took the jug in order to examine it, and the ruling is in accordance with a statement of Shmuel. As Shmuel says: With regard to one who takes a vessel from a craftsman in order to examine it and buy it if he chooses, and an accident occurred while it was in his possession and it broke, he is liable to pay restitution for the vessel. He has the halakhic status of a borrower, and therefore he bears financial responsibility for the loss.
8The Gemara asks: Shall we say that the opinion of Shmuel is subject to a dispute between tanna’im ? Since Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with the Rabbis, his opinion evidently differs from that of Shmuel. Rather, Rabba and Rav Yosef both say that the disagreement in the mishna should be explained as follows: Here, we are dealing with a storekeeper who sells jugs, and the father sent his son to buy from him a jug filled with oil. And Rabbi Yehuda follows his line of reasoning, as explained above, that the father sent his son to bring back the merchandise, and the Rabbis follow their line of reasoning, that the father sent the son to inform the storekeeper what he needed, but not to carry it back.
9The Gemara asks: If that is so, say the last clause: The Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yehuda in a case when the jug was in the hand of the child, and the storekeeper measured the oil into it, that the storekeeper is exempt. Why would the Rabbis rule that the storekeeper is exempt? But you said that the father sent his son only to inform the storekeeper of his order, but he did not intend for the storekeeper to give anything to his son. Rather, Abaye bar Avin and Rabbi Ḥanina bar Avin both say that the disagreement in the mishna should be explained as follows: With what are we dealing here?