1since the entire verse is superfluous. The verse’s description of how the father and mother bring their son out appears to be unnecessary, and therefore each element in the verse limits the halakha in a precise manner. When a verse is not superfluous, it is not strictly interpreted.
2§ The mishna teaches that after the rebellious son is brought before the elders of the city, he is admonished before three people. The Gemara asks: Why do I need him to be admonished before three people? Two witnesses should suffice, as in all other matters of halakha . Abaye says: This is what the mishna is saying: He is admonished before two people, who serve as witnesses, and he is flogged before three people, who constitute a court.
3The Gemara asks: Where is it written that lashes are administered to a stubborn and rebellious son? There is no explicit mention of lashes in the verse. The Gemara answers: It is as Rabbi Abbahu said in another context, as Rabbi Abbahu says: We learned the meaning of the word “chastise” as stated with regard to a defamer: “And the elders of that city shall take that man and chastise him” (Deuteronomy 22:18), by means of a verbal analogy from the word “chastise” stated with regard to a rebellious son (Deuteronomy 21:18). And the meaning of the word “chastise” in the latter verse is derived from the word “son” that appears in the same verse. And the meaning of the word “son [ ben ]” with regard to a rebellious son is derived from the similar word “ bin ” stated with regard to lashes: “Then it shall be if the wicked man deserves [ bin ] to be flogged” (Deuteronomy 25:2). Consequently, the chastisement mentioned with regard to both a defamer and a rebellious son involves flogging.
4The mishna teaches: If he sins again, he is judged by a court of twenty-three judges, which must include the three judges before whom he was brought initially, as it is stated: “This son of ours,” this is the son who was already flogged before you. The Gemara asks: But isn’t that verse needed for the derivation mentioned earlier: “This son of ours,” but not blind people, who cannot point to their son and say “this”? The Gemara answers: If so, that these words serve only to teach that the original judges must also be present, the verse should have written: He is our son, which would indicate: He who was already flogged before you. What is the meaning of: “This son of ours”? Conclude two conclusions from it: That the three original judges must also be present at the second trial, and that the son of blind parents cannot become a stubborn and rebellious son.
5MISHNA: If the rebellious son ran away before he was sentenced, and afterward, before he was caught, his lower beard grew around, he is exempt from the death penalty. Once his lower beard grows around his genitals, he can no longer be judged as a stubborn and rebellious son. But if he ran away only after he was sentenced, and afterward, by the time he was caught, his lower beard had already grown around, he is liable to receive the death penalty. Once he is sentenced to death his sentence remains in force.
6GEMARA: Rabbi Ḥanina says: If a descendant of Noah blessed, i.e., cursed, the name of God, and afterward he converted to Judaism, he is exempt from punishment, since his trial procedure changed, and the death penalty to which he is subject also changed. A descendant of Noah is tried by a single judge, and he can be sentenced to death on the basis of the testimony of a single witness even without having been forewarned; whereas a Jew is tried by a court of twenty-three and can be executed only on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses, and this only after having been forewarned. A descendant of Noah is killed by the sword for this transgression, whereas a Jew is killed by stoning.
7The Gemara asks: Shall we say that the mishna supports him: If the rebellious son ran away before he was sentenced, and afterward, before he was caught, his lower beard grew around, he is exempt from the death penalty? What is the reason for this exemption? Isn’t it because we say: Since his legal status has changed, his liability has also changed?
8The Gemara rejects this claim: No, it is different here, with regard to a stubborn and rebellious son, as were he now, after he grew his lower beard, to perform the same actions that render one liable as a rebellious son, he would not be fit for execution, and therefore he is exempt. This is different from a gentile who cursed God’s name and then converted, as even if he cursed God after having converted, he would still be liable to receive the death penalty.
9The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the latter half of the mishna: But if he ran away only after he was sentenced, and afterward, by the time he was caught, his lower beard had already grown around, he is liable to receive the death penalty. This indicates that even though his legal status has changed, he is nevertheless executed. The Gemara rejects this argument: There is no proof from here; you speak of a case where he was already sentenced to death. Once he was already sentenced, he is considered a dead man and his verdict can no longer be changed.
10The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof from what was stated in a baraita : If a descendant of Noah struck and killed another gentile or engaged in intercourse with the wife of another gentile, and he then converted to Judaism, he is exempt. But if he did this to an Israelite, killing a Jew or engaging in intercourse with the wife of a Jew, and then converted, he is liable. But why should this be so? Let us say that since his legal status changed, his liability changed as well, and therefore he should no longer be subject to the death penalty. The baraita indicates that this rationale is not accepted.
11The Gemara refutes this proof: There is no comparison between the cases, because in order to nullify one’s death penalty we require a change both in his trial procedure and in the specific death penalty to which he is subject. But this descendant of Noah, though his trial procedure changed, the death penalty to which he is subject did not change.
12The Gemara raises a difficulty: Granted, with regard to the case of a murderer, this answer is understandable, as initially, while he was still a gentile, he was subject to death by the sword, and now that he is a Jew he is still subject to death by the sword. Consequently, there is no change in the punishment to which he is subject. But with regard to the case of one who engaged in intercourse with a married woman, initially when he was still a gentile he was subject to death by the sword, but now that he is a Jew he is subject to death by strangulation. Accordingly, there is a change both in his trial procedure and in the type of capital punishment to which he is subject.
13The Gemara answers: The case of a married woman mentioned here involves a man who engaged in intercourse with a betrothed young woman, so that in both this case, where he engaged in intercourse with her when he was still a descendant of Noah, and in that case, where he did so when he was already a Jew, he is subject to death by stoning. Since there was no change in the type of capital punishment to which he is subject, he remains liable and is executed.
14The Gemara raises an objection: But the baraita teaches the case where he did this to an Israelite, i.e., engaged in intercourse with the wife of a Jew, similar to the case where he engaged in intercourse with the wife of another gentile. Both cases seem to be addressing identical circumstances, and the unique halakha governing a betrothed young woman exists only for Jews, not for descendants of Noah. Accordingly, the baraita must be discussing the case of a fully married woman.
15Rather, the lenient punishment is included in the severe one. If initially, when he was a gentile, he was liable to receive a more severe punishment, and now that he is a Jew he is liable to receive a more lenient punishment, the lenient punishment is included in the severe one, and he remains liable to receive the lenient punishment. By contrast, if the punishment that he is now liable to receive is more severe, he is exempt from all punishment.
16The Gemara raises a difficulty: This works out well according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that death by the sword is more severe than death by strangulation. Therefore, if a descendant of Noah engaged in intercourse with a married woman, so that he was subject to death by the sword, and then he converted to Judaism, so that his sentence was lightened to death by strangulation, he is still executed. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says that death by strangulation is more severe than death by the sword, what can be said? The convert should now be exempt from all punishment.
17The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with the opinion of the tanna of the school of Menashe, who says: Any death mentioned in connection with the descendants of Noah is nothing other than death by strangulation, and not death by the sword. Accordingly, if a descendant of Noah engaged in intercourse with a married woman, and he then converted, his punishment did not become more severe with his conversion; rather, it stayed the same, death by strangulation, and he is still executed.
18The Gemara challenges: Granted, with regard to the case of a married woman, this answer is understandable. Initially, when he was still a descendant of Noah, he was subject to death by strangulation, and now, after his conversion, he is subject to death by strangulation. But as for a murderer, initially, when he was still a descendant of Noah, according to the tanna of the school of Menashe he was subject to death by strangulation, but now, after his conversion, he is subject to death by the sword. The Gemara explains: The lenient punishment is included in the severe one, and according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, death by strangulation is more severe than death by the sword. Consequently, he is executed.
19The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that the following baraita supports Rabbi Ḥanina: If a betrothed young woman sinned by committing adultery, and afterward she reached her majority, at which time she was brought to trial, she is sentenced to death by strangulation like any other betrothed grown woman who commits adultery. What is the reason that she is not sentenced to death by stoning, the punishment imposed upon a betrothed young woman who commits adultery? Is it not that since her legal status changed, her liability changed as well? And all the more so here, in the case of the descendant of Noah who converted, where he changed completely from a gentile to a Jew, his sentence should change. The Gemara rejects this argument: No proof can be derived from here, as doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say to the tanna who taught this baraita before him: Emend your version of the baraita and teach: She is sentenced to death by stoning.
20MISHNA: A stubborn and rebellious son is sentenced to death not because of the severity of the transgression that he already committed but on account of his ultimate end, because a boy of his nature will grow up to lead an immoral life, and it is better that he should die while he is still innocent, before causing excessive harm, and not die after he becomes guilty. This is because the death of the wicked is beneficial to them, because they can no longer sin, and it is also beneficial to the world, which is now rid of those who do it harm. Conversely, the death of the righteous is detrimental to them, as they can no longer engage in the performance of mitzvot, and it is also detrimental to the world, as the righteous are now absent from it.
21By way of association, the mishna continues: The wine and sleep of the wicked are beneficial to them and beneficial to the world, as when they are sleeping or under the influence of wine, they do not cause harm to others. And, conversely, the wine and sleep of the righteous are detrimental to them and detrimental to the world, as wine and sleep prevent them from engaging in their good deeds.
22The dispersal of the wicked, so that they are not found in close proximity to each other, is beneficial to them, as they are less likely to provoke each other to sin, and it is beneficial to the world. The dispersal of the righteous is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world. The assembly of the wicked in one place is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world, while the assembly of the righteous is beneficial to them and beneficial to the world. The tranquility of the wicked is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world, while the tranquility of the righteous is beneficial to them and beneficial to the world.