1Just as with regard to a Festival, which is overridden due to an offering of an individual, as voluntary offerings of individuals are sacrificed on Festivals, and nevertheless murder does not override it, as the court does not execute one liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment on a Festival, with regard to an offering of an individual, which overrides a Festival, is it not logical that murder should not override it? Therefore, unlike the explanation of Abaye, the court should not take a priest to execute him in the event he is liable to receive capital punishment if this will result in the offering of an individual not being sacrificed.
2Rava clarifies: This works out well according to the one who says that vow offerings and gift offerings of individuals are not sacrificed on a Festival. Since the offerings of an individual do not override a Festival, there is no place for this a fortiori inference. But according to the one who says that vow offerings and gift offerings of individuals are sacrificed on a Festival, what is there to say? Why would one not make the above a fortiori inference?
3Rather, Rava says that Abaye’s explanation of the verse is incorrect according to all opinions. It is not necessary to say that the inference is incorrect according to the one who says that vow offerings and gift offerings of individuals are sacrificed on a Festival, as according to that opinion one cannot justify the verse of “from My altar” at all, as there is no distinction between the offering of an individual and a communal offering, as both override a Festival. Accordingly, court-imposed capital punishment should not override either type of offering.
4But even according to the one who says that vow offerings and gift offerings of individuals are not sacrificed on a Festival, in which case Abaye’s explanation is possible, this is difficult. But isn’t it written: “From My altar”? The term “My altar” indicates: My altar, the offering that is designated to Me. And what offering is this? It is the daily offering. And yet, the Merciful One states: “You shall take him from My altar, that he may die.” Accordingly, the verse is not stated specifically with regard to an offering of an individual.
5§ The mishna teaches that in cases of monetary law, and likewise in the cases of ritual impurity and purity, the judges commence expressing their opinions from the greatest of the judges. Rav says: I was among the quorum of judges in the school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and they would commence from me, i.e., I was first when ascertaining the opinions of the judges. The Gemara questions this statement: But we learned in the mishna that the judges commence expressing their opinions from the greatest of the judges, and Rav was one of the junior judges of that court.
6Rabba, son of Rava, says, and some say that it was Rabbi Hillel, son of Rabbi Valles, who says: The counting of the vote in the court in the school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is different, as all of their deliberations and the counting of the vote would commence from the side benches, where the least significant judges sit. This was because Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was held in such high esteem that once he expressed his opinion, no one would be so brazen as to contradict him.
7And with regard to the greatness of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, Rabba, son of Rava, says, and some say that it was Rabbi Hillel, son of Rabbi Valles, who says: From the days of Moses and until the days of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi we do not find unparalleled greatness in Torah knowledge and unparalleled greatness in secular matters, including wealth and high political office, combined in one place, i.e., in a single individual.
8The Gemara asks: But was there not such a person? Wasn’t there Joshua, who was unparalleled in both domains? The Gemara answers: During his time there was Elazar, who was Joshua’s equal in Torah knowledge. The Gemara asks: But wasn’t there Pinehas, who outlived Elazar? The Gemara answers: There were the Elders, who were equal to Pinehas in Torah knowledge.
9The Gemara further objects: But wasn’t there Saul, who was unparalleled in both domains? The Gemara answers: There was Samuel, who was Saul’s equal in Torah knowledge. The Gemara asks: But didn’t Samuel die in Saul’s lifetime, leaving Saul the leading figure in both domains? The Gemara answers: We meant to say that from the days of Moses until the days of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi there was no other single individual who reigned supreme in Torah and greatness for all the years that he was the leader of the Jewish people.
10The Gemara asks: But wasn’t there David, who was both the greatest Torah authority and the most powerful temporal authority of his day? The Gemara answers: There was Ira the Yairite, who was David’s equal in Torah knowledge. The Gemara objects: But didn’t Ira the Yairite die in David’s lifetime? The Gemara answers: We meant to say that there was no other single individual who reigned supreme in Torah and greatness for all the years that he was the leader of the Jewish people.
11The Gemara asks: But wasn’t there Solomon, who was unparalleled in both domains? The Gemara answers: During his day there was Shimi ben Gera, who was Solomon’s master in Torah knowledge. The Gemara objects: But didn’t Solomon kill him at the beginning of his reign (see I Kings, chapter 2)? The Gemara answers: We meant to say that there was no other single individual who reigned supreme in Torah and greatness for all the years that he was the leader of the Jewish people.
12The Gemara further objects: Wasn’t there Hezekiah, who was both the leading Torah scholar of his age and also the king of his people? The Gemara answers: There was Shebnah in that generation, who was Hezekiah’s equal in Torah knowledge. The Gemara asks: But wasn’t he killed in the war against Sennacherib? The Gemara answers: We meant to say that there was no other single individual who reigned supreme in Torah and greatness for all the years that he was the leader of the Jewish people. The Gemara asks: But wasn’t there Ezra, who was the greatest Torah Sage of his day and the leader of the Jewish people? The Gemara answers: There was Nehemiah, son of Hacaliah, who was his equal.
13Rav Adda bar Ahava says: I also say a similar statement, that from the days of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and until the days of Rav Ashi we do not find unparalleled greatness in Torah knowledge and unparalleled greatness in secular matters, including wealth and high political office, combined in one place, i.e., in a single individual. The Gemara asks: But was there not such a person? But wasn’t there Huna bar Natan, who lived during the time of Rav Ashi and enjoyed both great Torah scholarship and great wealth? The Gemara answers: Huna bar Natan was subordinate to Rav Ashi, who was his superior in both domains.
14§ The mishna teaches that in cases of capital law, the judges commence issuing their opinions from the side benches, where the least significant judges sit. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Aḥa bar Pappa says: The verse states: “Neither shall you answer in a cause [ al riv ]” (Exodus 23:2), and the Sages interpret: Neither shall you answer after the Master [ al rav ], i.e., do not dispute the opinion of the greatest among the judges. Therefore, were the judges to commence issuing their opinions from the greatest of them, and he would say that the accused is liable, no judge would acquit him.
15Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The source of this practice is from here: When David decided to punish Nabal the Carmelite, the verse states: “And David said to his men: Every man gird his sword. And every man girded his sword, and David also girded his sword” (I Samuel 25:13). That was a case of capital law, and David, the greatest among them, was last.
16Rav says: A person may teach his student the relevant material and then judge cases of capital law with him, and this student can participate in the deliberations and serve as one of the judges. The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita ( Tosefta 7:2): In cases of ritual purity and impurity, if two of the judges are a father and his son, or a teacher and his student, the court counts them as two opinions. By inference, in cases of monetary law and cases of capital law, and cases of laws involving the punishment of lashes, as well as court proceedings concerning sanctification of the month and the intercalation of the year, if two of the judges are a father and his son, or a teacher and his student, the court counts them as only one opinion, as it is assumed the son or student will merely echo the opinion of his father or teacher. This contradicts the ruling of Rav.