1You therefore say in response: The vocalization of the Torah is authoritative, and the verse prohibits cooking the young goat in its mother’s milk.
2Rather, everyone agrees that the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative. But in actuality, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis disagree with regard to this: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the phrase “the court shall condemn” is referring to other judges, in addition to the three that were derived from the earlier verse, leading to a total of five, whereas the Rabbis hold that the term “shall condemn” means these judges, i.e., those who have already been mentioned, and therefore there are only three.
3And with regard to Rabbi Yehuda ben Roetz, who applied the principle: The vocalization of the Torah is authoritative, to the question of the duration of the ritual impurity of a woman who gave birth to a female, it can be explained that the Rabbis do not disagree with him, as everyone agrees that the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative.
4With regard to Beit Hillel, who hold that a single presentation of blood is sufficient to atone even when bringing a sin-offering, this is not because they hold the traditional consonantal text is authoritative. Rather, their opinion is as it is taught in a baraita : The verse states with regard to the sin-offering brought by a ruler: “And the priest shall make atonement for him” (Leviticus 4:26), and with regard to a sin-offering of a goat brought by an ordinary person: “And the priest shall make atonement for him” (Leviticus 4:31), and with regard to a sin-offering of a lamb brought by an ordinary person: “And the priest shall make atonement for him” (Leviticus 4:35), repeating this term three times. This repetition is due to the following logical inference:
5Could this halakha not be derived through an a fortiori inference? There is stated a term of blood below, in the verse written with regard to a bird brought as a sin-offering (see Leviticus 5:9), and there is stated a term of blood above, in the verse written with regard to an animal brought as a sin-offering (see Leviticus 4:25, 31, 35). Just as with regard to the blood that is stated below, when it is presented with one presentation it has effected atonement, so too with regard to the blood that is stated above, when it is presented with one presentation it has effected atonement.
6Or perhaps go this way, offering a different explanation: There is stated a term of blood in the verse written with regard to the external altar, i.e., in the verse written with regard to a sin-offering of an ordinary person that is brought on the external altar in the courtyard (see Leviticus 4:25), and there is stated a term of blood in the verse written with regard to the inner altar, i.e., with regard to a sin-offering of the community or the High Priest, the blood of which is sprinkled on the incense altar inside the Sanctuary (see Leviticus 4:7, 18). Just as with regard to the blood that was stated concerning the inner altar, i.e., if one of the presentations is lacking it has not accomplished anything and the offering is not valid, so too, with regard to the blood that was stated concerning the external altar, if one of the presentations is lacking it has accomplished nothing.
7The Gemara analyzes the two possibilities: Let us see to which of the two comparisons this is more similar. It can be claimed: We derive a halakha stated with regard to the external altar from a halakha stated with regard to the external altar, but we do not derive a halakha stated with regard to the external altar from a halakha stated with regard to the inner altar.
8Or go this way: We derive a halakha stated with regard to a sin-offering whose blood is to be sprinkled on the four corners of the altar from the halakha stated with regard to a sin-offering whose blood is to be sprinkled on the four corners of the altar, and this sin-offering consisting of a bird, which is not a sin-offering of the type whose blood is to be sprinkled on the four corners of the altar, cannot prove that the halakha is similar with regard to a sin-offering whose blood is to be sprinkled on the four corners of the altar.
9Since there are two legitimate inferences, the halakha cannot be decided through a logical inference. Therefore, the verse states: “And the priest shall make atonement,” “And the priest shall make atonement,” “And the priest shall make atonement,” three times, due to the logical inference. The verses are interpreted as follows: “The priest shall make atonement,” even though he presented only three presentations, and then a second verse repeats: “The priest shall make atonement,” even though he presented only two presentations, and then a third verse repeats: “The priest shall make atonement,” even though he presented only one presentation. This interpretation is the source of Beit Hillel’s opinion.
10And concerning Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis, who disagreed with regard to the number of walls required in a sukka , it is with regard to this that they disagree: Rabbi Shimon holds that the basic requirement of placing roofing [ sekhakha ] on the sukka does not need a verse to teach that it is required, as it is implied by the word sukka . Consequently, the word sukkot appears two times in the text beyond the initial mitzva, teaching a requirement for four walls, and there is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai that reduces the minimum size of one of the walls to a handbreadth. And the Rabbis hold that the requirement of placing roofing does need a verse. Therefore, one of the four derivations is used to teach that requirement, and only three walls remain, one of which is reduced to a handbreadth.
11And with regard to Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis, who disagreed about the issue of a quarter -log of blood that emanated from two corpses, it is with regard to this that they disagree: Rabbi Akiva holds that “bodies” in plural indicates two. Consequently, a quarter -log of blood that emanated from two corpses also renders one impure. And the Rabbis hold that “bodies” in plural indicates a general halakha , and no derivation can be made with regard to blood that emanated from two corpses. Both opinions, however, agree that the vocalized text of the Torah is authoritative.
12The Gemara asks: And does everyone actually hold that the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative? But isn’t it taught in a baraita : With regard to the number of compartments in the phylacteries of the head, the verse states: “It shall be for a sign upon your hand, and for totafot between your eyes” (Exodus 13:16), with the word totafot spelled deficient, without a second vav , in a way that can be read as singular; and again: “They shall be for totafot between your eyes” (Deuteronomy 6:8), spelled as a singular word; and again: “They shall be for totafot between your eyes” (11:18), this time spelled plene, with a second vav , in a manner that must be plural? There are four mentions of totafot here, as the third one is written in the plural and therefore counts as two. Consequently, it is derived that the phylacteries of the head must have four compartments. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.
13Rabbi Akiva says: There is no need for this proof, as the requirement of four compartments can be derived from the word totafot itself: The word tat in the language of the Katfei means two, and the word pat in the language of Afriki also means two, and therefore totafot can be understood as a compound word meaning: Four. The baraita therefore indicates that Rabbi Yishmael holds that not the vocalization but rather the tradition of the manner in which the verses in the Torah are written is authoritative.
14Rather, the explanation that everyone holds that the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative must be rejected, and it must be explained that the Sages actually do disagree whether it is the vocalization of the Torah or the tradition of the manner in which the verses in the Torah are written that is authoritative. And in order to explain the unresolved problem with regard to the baraita about the prohibition of cooking a young goat in its mother’s milk, the explanation is that this statement, that they disagree as to whether the vocalization or the tradition is authoritative, applies where the vocalization of the word differs from the tradition of the manner in which the word is written. But in this case the words milk [ ḥalev ] and fat [ ḥelev ] are written in an identical manner, as there is no difference in the writing at all, only in the way they are vocalized. Therefore, all agree that the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative.
15The Gemara asks: But the words: “Shall see” and “shall appear” are written in an identical matter, and nevertheless the Sages disagree about which reading is authoritative. As it is taught in a baraita : Yoḥanan ben Dahavai says in the name of Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima: One who is blind in one of his eyes is exempt from the mitzva of appearance, i.e., the obligation to appear in the Temple and to sacrifice an offering on the three pilgrimage Festivals, as it is stated: “Three times in the year all your males shall appear [ yera’eh ] before the Lord God” (Exodus 23:17). According to the way in which the verse is written, without vocalization, it can be read as yireh , meaning: Shall see, instead of yera’eh , meaning: Shall appear. This teaches that in the same manner that one comes to see, so he comes to appear, i.e., to be seen: Just as the usual way to see is with both of one’s eyes, so too, the obligation to appear applies only to one who comes with the sight of both his eyes.
16It is therefore apparent that even when there is no difference in the way the words are written, some say that the tradition, not the vocalization, is authoritative. Rather, Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: The reason all agree that there is a prohibition to cook a young goat in its mother’s milk and not in its mother’s fat is that the verse states: “You shall not cook a young goat” (Exodus 23:19). The verse teaches that the action the Torah prohibited is in the manner of cooking, which is generally done in a liquid such as milk and not in a solid substance such as fat.
17§ The Sages taught in a baraita : Cases of monetary law are adjudicated by three judges.