1The Gemara asks: But there is the prohibition for priests to contract ritual impurity from a corpse, which is a prohibition that is not equally applicable to all, as only priests are bound by this prohibition, and the reason that this command applies only to male priests is that the Merciful One writes: “Speak to the priests the sons of Aaron, and say to them: None shall defile himself” (Leviticus 21:1), from which it is inferred: The sons of Aaron and not the daughters of Aaron. Therefore, were it not for this specific derivation, I would say that women from priestly families are also obligated to avoid becoming ritually impure. What is the reason for this? Is it not due to the principle that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, that women are equated to men with regard to all punishments in the Torah, including those that are not equally applicable to all?
2The Gemara rejects this proof: No, that initial assumption, that the daughters of priests might be obligated to avoid ritual impurity, is not due to the halakha that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, but rather it is something that we learn through tradition from the words “they may not take.” This phrase teaches that women are included in the marital prohibitions of the priesthood, and we might therefore have thought that they are included in all halakhot pertaining to priests.
3There are those who say a different version of this answer: With regard to that verse about taking, it was necessary for him to mention this explicitly, for it might enter your mind to say: We should learn this halakha from the prohibition of impurity and conclude that just as only male descendants of Aaron are prohibited from contracting ritual impurity, the restrictions of marriage also apply only to men. The verse therefore teaches us, with the words “they may not take,” that this is not the case.
4The Gemara relates: Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, arrived at the town of Hintzevu, to the place of Rav Idi bar Avin. The townspeople asked them: Is it prohibited for daughters of priests who are fit to marry priests to marry men disqualified from the priesthood or not?
5Rav Pappa said to them: You learned it in a mishna ( Kiddushin 69a): People of ten types of lineages ascended from Babylonia: Priests, Levites, and Israelites, ḥalalim , converts, and freed slaves, and mamzerim , Gibeonites, children of unknown paternity [ shetukim ], and foundlings. With regard to Priests, Levites, and Israelites, they are permitted to marry into one another’s families; Levites, Israelites, ḥalalim , converts, and freed slaves are permitted to marry into one another’s families; converts, freed slaves, and mamzerim , Gibeonites, shetukim , and foundlings are permitted to marry into one another’s families; whereas the tanna does not teach that priestesses, i.e., daughters of priests, are permitted to marry a ḥalal . This must mean they are forbidden to them.
6Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to him: There is no proof from here, for he teaches the halakha anywhere that these men may marry those women, and there is also a parallel case where these women may marry those men. With regard to the case of a priest, however, since if he wants to marry a ḥalala this is prohibited to him, the tanna does not teach this halakha . Consequently, there is no proof from this mishna that daughters of priests who are fit to marry priests are warned against marrying men disqualified from the priesthood. They came before Rav Idi bar Avin and told him about the question and their debate about the matter. He said to them: Children, this is what Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Daughters of priests who are fit to marry priests are not warned against marrying men disqualified from the priesthood.
7§ We learned in the mishna that secondary forbidden relatives, whose status is established by rabbinic law, are sometimes forbidden to the husband and sometimes to the yavam . The residents of the town of Biri inquired of Rav Sheshet: Is a woman who is a secondary forbidden relative of the husband but not a secondary forbidden relative of the yavam entitled to a marriage contract from the yavam or not? The Gemara clarifies the sides of the dilemma: Perhaps, since the Master said that in a levirate marriage, the payment of her marriage contract is due from the property of her first husband, and this woman, who was a secondary relative of her first husband, does not receive a marriage contract from him, she consequently does not have the right to one from the yavam either.
8Or perhaps, since there is a principle in levirate marriage that if she does not have a marriage contract from the first husband, e.g., he died without leaving behind any property, the Sages instituted a marriage contract for her from the second one, we should say that she has a marriage contract from the yavam ?
9Rav Sheshet said to them: You learned it in a baraita : Payment of her marriage contract is due from the property of her first husband, and if she was a secondary forbidden relative of the husband, she does not have one even from the yavam . This baraita clearly answers the question.
10The Gemara asks: Can it be concluded by inference from the baraita that there is a case of a woman in a levirate marriage who does have a marriage contract from the yavam ? The Gemara answers: The baraita is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: Payment of her marriage contract is due from the property of her first husband, and if she does not have anything from the first husband because he died without property, they instituted a marriage contract for her from the second one. And if she was a secondary forbidden relative of the husband, she does not have one even from the yavam .
11Rabbi Elazar inquired of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Do women in cases like a widow married to a High Priest and a divorcée or a ḥalutza married to a common priest have rights to payment for their sustenance from their husbands, or do they not have a right to sustenance? The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of the case under discussion? If we say that she is dwelling under his roof, he stands in a position where he is obligated to arise and divorce her. In such a situation, does she have a right to sustenance? It is obvious that she does not. The Gemara clarifies: No, it is necessary to ask this question with regard to a case where he went overseas and therefore is not present to divorce her, and in the meantime she borrowed money for her sustenance and ate. What is the halakha in that case?
12Is it correct to say that sustenance is a stipulation in the marriage contract, and since she has a marriage contract she also has a right to sustenance, and therefore the husband must pay her debt? Or perhaps there is a difference between the cases: Concerning a marriage contract, which gives her motivation to take the money and leave him, she has rights to it, as the Sages wanted to motivate her to seek divorce and end the prohibited marriage. However, with regard to sustenance, we are worried that if he provides for her sustenance, perhaps she might tarry with him, as she would have no reason to rush the divorce, and consequently she does not have rights to it. He said to him: She does not have a right to sustenance.
13The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that she does have a right to sustenance? The Gemara answers: When that baraita is taught, it is referring to sustenance she receives after his death. At that point, she is no longer in violation of a prohibition, while the obligation to sustain her remains intact.
14Some say a different version of the discussion, which is that he said to him: It is taught in a baraita that she has a right to sustenance. He replied: He stands in a position where he is obligated to arise and divorce her. He should not be required to provide for her sustenance. He again asked: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that she has a right to sustenance? He responded: When that baraita is taught it is referring to the period after his death.
15The Sages taught: A widow married to a High Priest, or a divorcée or a ḥalutza married to a common priest has the right to receive payment for her marriage contract; and for the produce of her property that her husband used; and sustenance; and she gets back her worn clothes and other objects she brought to the marriage; and she is disqualified as a ḥalala from marrying a priest; and her offspring is disqualified from the priesthood as a ḥalal ; and the court forces him to divorce her. A woman who is a secondary relative prohibited by rabbinic law has neither a marriage contract; nor payment for the produce of her property; nor sustenance; nor does she get back her worn clothes; and she is fit to marry a priest and her offspring is fit for the priesthood; and the court forces him to divorce her.
16Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: For what reason did they say that a widow married to a High Priest has a marriage contract? Because he is disqualified from the priesthood by his marriage to her, as a priest who marries a woman forbidden to him is barred from the Temple service until he divorces her and agrees not to remarry her, and she is rendered a ḥalala and disqualified from the priesthood by intercourse with him, and any place where he is disqualified and she is disqualified,