1that we are not concerned about the minority of cases. Only a minority of fetuses are male inheritors, as roughly half are female, and some are stillborn. Therefore, the majority of fetuses will not become male children. And if you wish, say that actually he holds that we are concerned about the minority. However, we make an arrangement for the slaves, in accordance with what Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said.
2This is as Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: With regard to minor orphans who came to court to divide up their father’s property, the court appoints for each of them a steward [ apotropos ], and he selects for them a fine share. When the orphans have grown up, they may object to the manner in which the property was divided and redistribute it. And Rav Naḥman himself said that when they have grown up they may not object, as, if they may object, what good is the power of the court? Here too, an appointed steward selects a share of the inheritance on behalf of the fetus, and this share does not include any of the slaves. Therefore, the slaves may partake of teruma . However, if all of the children are females, this arrangement is impossible because if the fetus is a son all the property belongs to him.
3Based on the use of Rav Naḥman’s ruling to explain Rabbi Shimon’s opinion, the Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rav Naḥman’s opinion is corresponding to one side of a dispute between tanna’im , as the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Shimon. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No; it is possible that everyone in the dispute accepts Rav Naḥman’s ruling, and here they disagree only with regard to whether we are concerned about the minority, as previously suggested, in a case where the arrangement was not made.
4It was taught in the previous clause of the baraita that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, says in the name of his father: If the priest left behind a daughter, she enables the slaves to partake of teruma ; however, a son does not enable them to partake of it. The Gemara asks: What is different about a son, who does not enable them to partake, due to the fetus’s share, as it owns a share of the property if it is a male? A daughter should not enable them to partake either, due to the fetus’s share.
5Abaye said: Here we are dealing with a case of an inheritance of insufficient property that is enough only to sustain the daughters until they come of age. With regard to this case, the Sages instituted that the daughters receive their sustenance while the sons get nothing. This is also a case where there is a surviving son together with the daughter.
6Therefore, no matter what, the slaves do not partake of teruma . If this fetus, with which she is pregnant, is a son, it is no better than this son who already exists. Just as the existing son does not inherit the insufficient property, the same applies to the male fetus. If it is a daughter, it does not yet receive a share of the inheritance. This can be explained: Why does the daughter partake of the inheritance? It is by virtue of a rabbinic ordinance. Therefore, as long as the fetus has not emerged into the atmosphere of the world, the Sages did not establish that it should receive the inheritance. Consequently, the slaves partake of teruma by virtue of the existing daughter, as only she inherits them.
7The Gemara asks: In what manner did you establish the baraita ? You established it as referring to insufficient property. However, say the latter clause of the baraita : Lest the fetus be found to be a male, and daughters do not receive any of the inheritance where there is a son. Yet according to Abaye’s explanation, on the contrary, the insufficient property is the daughters’, whether or not there are any sons. The Gemara answers: In the latter clause we have come to a different case, in which there is sufficient property.
8The Gemara raises another objection to Abaye’s explanation: Does an inheritance of insufficient property belong to the daughters? Didn’t Rabbi Asi say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If the male orphans proceeded to sell the insufficient property, although by rabbinic ordinance it is designated for the daughters’ sustenance, what they sold was sold. Apparently, the Sages did not expropriate the properties from the male inheritors, but merely designated them for the daughters’ sustenance. How, then, can the sons’ ownership be disregarded with regard to the slaves’ partaking of teruma ?
9Rather, what is the meaning of the word daughter in the context of the ruling that is taught by Rabbi Yishmael? It means female and is referring to the mother of the fetus. She enables her slaves of usufruct property to partake of teruma , as her husband’s heirs have no share in them, whereas the son does not enable the slaves of guaranteed investment to partake, due to the fetus’s share. The Gemara asks: If so, this is the same as Rabbi Yosei’s statement in the first clause. What was added by Rabbi Yishmael? The Gemara answers: Indeed, the entire baraita is taught by Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei. There are not conflicting versions of Rabbi Yosei’s opinion. Rather, Rabbi Yishmael is clarifying that he is the author of that baraita .
10MISHNA: With regard to the fetus of a divorcée or a widow whose husband left her pregnant; and a man whose married brother died childless [ yavam ]; and betrothal; and a married deaf-mute; and a nine-year-and-one-day-old boy who engaged in intercourse with a woman; if any of these men are Israelites and the woman is the daughter of a priest, they disqualify her from partaking of teruma . But if she is an Israelite and they are priests, they do not enable her to partake of teruma .
11Likewise, in the case of a boy with regard to whom there is uncertainty as to whether he is nine years and one day old and uncertainty whether he is not, who engaged in intercourse with a woman; and in the case of a boy who betrothed a woman, with regard to whom there is uncertainty as to whether he has grown two pubic hairs and is considered an adult and uncertainty whether he has not grown, they too can disqualify the woman from partaking of teruma and cannot enable her to partake, as in the previous cases.
12If the house fell upon a man and upon his brother’s daughter, to whom he was married, and it is unknown which of them died first, her rival wife performs ḥalitza and does not enter into levirate marriage. Entering into levirate marriage is not possible, as, if the wife died after her husband, the surviving wife would be rendered the rival wife of a forbidden relative, since the yavam is the father of the wife who died. This status prevents the creation of a levirate bond between him and the surviving wife as well. On the other hand, ḥalitza is necessary in case the wife died before her husband, thereby allowing the creation of a levirate bond between her rival wife and her father, the yavam .
13GEMARA: It is taught in the mishna that the fetus disqualifies its mother from partaking of teruma and does not enable her to do so. The Gemara explains: If she is the daughter of a priest married to an Israelite, and her husband died and left her pregnant, the fetus disqualifies her from partaking of teruma , as it is stated: “But if a priest’s daughter be a widow, or divorced, and have no child, and is returned to her father’s house, as in her youth, she may eat of her father’s bread” (Leviticus 22:13). The phrase “as in her youth” excludes a pregnant woman, whose body has changed from her youth. If she is an Israelite woman married to a priest, the fetus does not enable her to partake, as one who was born enables others to partake of teruma , whereas one who is not yet born does not enable others to partake.
14It is taught in the mishna that the same principle applies to a yavam . The Gemara explains: If she is the daughter of a priest who has a levirate bond to an Israelite, he disqualifies her, as it is stated in the verse cited above: “And is returned to her father’s house,” which excludes a widow waiting for her yavam , who has not returned to her father’s house, as a levirate bond was created with her yavam . If she is an Israelite woman with a levirate bond to a priest, he does not enable her to partake of teruma , as the Merciful One states in the Torah: “The purchase of his money, he may eat of it” (Leviticus 22:11), and this woman is his brother’s acquisition. The bond with her yavam ensued from his late brother’s marriage to her, not through any action of his own.
15The mishna teaches that the same principle also applies to betrothal. The Gemara explains: If she is the daughter of a priest betrothed to an Israelite, he disqualifies her,