1If Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi had not taught that ruling in the Mishna, from where would Rabbi Ḥiyya, his disciple and redactor of the baraitot , have known it? Since the source of the unattributed ruling in the baraita is certainly the dispute recorded in the mishna, its lack of attribution in the baraita only reflects the fact that Rabbi Ḥiyya ruled in accordance with that opinion, but that cannot be used to indicate that it is the accepted halakha .
2Rabbi Naḥum questioned the principle that the halakha is always in accordance with an unattributed ruling in a mishna and said to Rabbi Ḥiyya: Didn’t we learn in a mishna ( Kelim 13:8): A comb made for combing beaten flax in preparation for spinning, from which its teeth were removed and only two of its teeth remained in it, is still suitable for combing. It is therefore considered a utensil and will become ritually impure if it comes in contact with ritual impurity. However, if only one tooth remained, so that the comb was no longer suitable for combing, it is no longer considered a utensil and so will remain ritually pure even if it comes in contact with ritual impurity. And with regard to any of the teeth that were individually removed on their own, since they do serve a purpose, e.g., they may be embedded and used as hooks, they are considered utensils and can become ritually impure.
3A comb made for combing wool from which every other one of its teeth were removed, so that no two consecutive teeth remained in place, is no longer suitable for combing and so will remain ritually pure. If three teeth remained in it in a single place so that it could still be used for combing, then it could become ritually impure. However, if one of those teeth was the external frame of the comb itself, then it could not function as a comb, and so it will remain ritually pure. If two of the teeth were removed and made into small pincers, then they could become ritually impure. Alternatively, if one of the teeth was removed, and it was prepared in a manner that made it suitable for use in cleaning an oil lamp or for stretching ropes, then it would be considered a utensil and could become ritually impure.
4Rabbi Naḥum posed his question: But we maintain that the halakha is not in accordance with that mishna. This would seem to contradict the principle that the halakha is always in accordance with an unattributed opinion. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to Rabbi Naḥum that the principle applies to all cases apart from this mishna, as with regard to this particular mishna there are Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish who both say: This is not an authoritative mishna, and so it cannot be relied upon for a halakhic ruling.
5The Gemara asks: What is the reason to say that the mishna is not authoritative? Rav Huna bar Manoaḥ said in the name of Rav Idi, son of Rav Ika: It is because the first clause of that mishna contradicts the latter clause, as it teaches: A comb used for wool from which every other one of its teeth were removed is no longer considered a utensil, and so it will remain ritually pure. This implies that were two teeth to remain in it in one place, it could become ritually impure. And then the mishna continues and teaches: If three teeth remained in it in a single place it is still considered a utensil and so it could become ritually impure. This indicates that if there are three, yes, it could become ritually impure, but if there are two, no, it would not become ritually impure.
6The Gemara asks: But what is the difficulty? Perhaps this ruling that if two teeth remain it is considered a utensil is referring to the internal teeth, found in the middle of the frame, while that ruling that it is not considered a utensil is referring to the outer teeth, which are adjacent to the frame of the comb, which makes them unsuitable for use.
7Rather, the difficulty with the mishna is from here, as it teaches: And any of the teeth that were individually removed on their own, since they can serve a useful purpose they are considered utensils and can become ritually impure. And the implication is that this is true even though the tooth was not prepared for that purpose. But say the latter clause as follows: If one of the teeth was removed, and it was prepared in a manner that rendered it suitable for use in cleaning an oil lamp or for stretching ropes, then it would be considered a utensil and could become ritually impure. The implication is that if it was prepared for use, then yes, it would be considered a utensil, but if it was not prepared for use, then no, it would not be considered a utensil.
8Abaye said: But what is the difficulty? Perhaps this ruling, that further preparation is not required before it is considered a utensil, is referring to a case where the teeth were removed with their base, which allows them to be used immediately for various functions, whereas that ruling, that it is considered a utensil only once it is prepared for use, is referring to a case where the teeth were removed without their base and therefore require further preparation before they can be used.
9Rav Pappa stated an alternative resolution: But what is the difficulty? Perhaps this ruling that further preparation is not required is referring to a case where the teeth were narrow, whereas that ruling that it is considered a utensil only once it is prepared for use is referring to a case where the teeth were thick.
10Rather, the reason that the mishna is not accepted as authoritative is not due to some difficulty in the formulation of the mishna, but because those who are exact in their rendition of the tradition conclude this mishna with: This is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. In other words, this mishna is not unattributed but presents the minority opinion of a single Sage, and it is for this reason that it is not accepted as authoritative.
11§ Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin sent a message from Eretz Yisrael with regard to the halakha cited in the mishna: One may betroth a woman, but not marry her, within three months of her previous marriage; and so one acts in practice.
12And so Rabbi Elazar would teach us in the name of Rabbi Ḥanina the Great that the three months are counted as follows: One counts the majority of the days of the first month, and the majority of the third month, and the entire middle month.
13Ameimar permitted one to betroth a woman on the ninetieth day itself. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: Didn’t Rav and Shmuel both say that she needs to wait three full months, excluding the day on which the husband died and excluding the day on which she is betrothed? It is apparent that it is still prohibited to betroth a woman on the ninetieth day itself. Ameimar said to him: That which you heard, that the days of the husband’s death and of the betrothal are not included, was stated only with regard to a nursing woman, as it was Rav and Shmuel who both said: A nursing woman needs to wait twenty-four months before being betrothed, excluding the day on which the baby was born and excluding the day on which she is betrothed.
14The Gemara asks: Wasn’t there an incident concerning a certain person who prepared a betrothal feast on the ninetieth day following the death of the woman’s first husband, and Rava caused him to forfeit his feast by prohibiting the betrothal on that day? The Gemara answers: That feast was actually a marriage feast, but had it been a betrothal feast it would have been permitted.
15The Gemara summarizes: The halakha is that a nursing mother needs to wait twenty-four months, excluding the day on which the baby was born and excluding the day on which she is betrothed. And if she was widowed but was not nursing, then she needs to wait only three months, excluding the day on which her previous husband died and excluding the day on which she is betrothed.
16§ The mishna states that Rabbi Yosei says: All women may be betrothed within three months except for a widow, due to the mourning period she must observe for her deceased husband. Rav Ḥisda questioned the mishna’s ruling and said: Based on an a fortiori inference, it should be permitted for a woman to be betrothed during the thirty-day mourning period for her husband: If during another period of mourning, which the Gemara will specify, when it is prohibited to launder clothes, it is permitted to be betrothed, then during the thirty-day mourning period for a husband, when it is permitted to launder clothes, isn’t it logical that it should also be permitted to be betrothed?
17The Gemara explains the cases involved: What is the period of mourning to which Rav Ḥisda is referring? As we learned in a mishna ( Ta’anit 26b): During the week in which the Ninth of Av occurs, it is prohibited to cut hair and to launder clothes, but on Thursday it is permitted in deference to Shabbat. And it is taught in a baraita : Prior to this time the public reduce their activities, refraining from business transactions, from building and planting, and they may betroth women but may not marry them, and they may not make a betrothal feast. The Gemara assumes that the baraita is referring to the days immediately preceding the Ninth of Av. Accordingly, during the days prior to the Ninth of Av it is prohibited to launder clothes, but it is permitted to be betrothed. It was upon this period of time that Rav Ḥisda based his a fortiori inference.
18To defend Rav Yosei’s ruling in the mishna, the Gemara explains: When that baraita is taught, it is taught with regard to the period prior to the period that is prior to the Ninth of Av, i.e., the days prior to the week in which the Ninth of Av occurs. It is only then that it is permitted to be betrothed, but during the week in which the Ninth of Av occurs it is prohibited. Therefore, the basis of Rav Ḥisda’s a fortiori inference is undermined.
19Rava said: From the period prior to the period that is prior to the Ninth of Av, a challenge to Rabbi Yosei’s ruling can also be advanced based on an a fortiori inference, as follows: If in a period of mourning when it is prohibited to conduct business transactions, it is permitted to be betrothed, then during the thirty-day mourning period for a husband, when it is permitted to conduct business transactions, isn’t it logical that it should also be permitted to be betrothed?
20The Gemara accepts the conclusion of this a fortiori inference and therefore concludes: Do not say that Rabbi Yosei says: All women may be betrothed within three months; rather, emend his statement to say: All women may be married within three months except for a widow. However, even Rabbi Yosei agrees that it is permitted for a widow to be betrothed during this period.