1a modifier, meaning that this board is not referred to by a unique name. But if it has a modifier, even though it is not ten handbreadths higher than the courtyard, and even though the board did not have an area of four cubits, it is still considered to be a separate domain, and it would therefore not be an effective divorce.
2§ It was taught in the mishna that if he throws a bill of divorce to his wife while she is in his house, she is not divorced, even if the bill of divorce is with her in the bed, i.e., he throws it onto the bed in which she is sitting or lying. Rava says: They taught this only in a case where he throws the bill of divorce to her and it is with her in his bed. But if he throws the bill of divorce to her and it is with her in her bed, then she is divorced.
3This is also taught in a baraita : Rabbi Eliezer says: If he throws the bill of divorce to her when she is in his bed, she is not divorced; if he throws it to her when she is in her bed, she is divorced.
4The Gemara asks: And if he throws the bill of divorce to her in her bed, is she divorced? But the bed is like vessels of a buyer that are in the domain of the seller, since the bed that belongs to her is in the house of the husband. Can you conclude from here that even if the vessels of a buyer are in the domain of the seller, the buyer acquires anything that is deposited into his vessels? This issue is disputed elsewhere. Some hold that when a vessel of the buyer is in the domain of the seller, the vessel cannot serve to acquire an item on behalf of the buyer.
5The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to state this halakha in a case where the bed is ten handbreadths high, as then the bed is considered to be its own domain. The Gemara challenges this: But there is the place on which the legs of the bed are standing; the legs are standing in the husband’s domain. The Gemara answers: People are not particular about the place of the legs of the bed since it is so small. Therefore, since the bed is considered to be its own domain, it is not considered to be within the domain of the husband.
6§ It was taught in the mishna that if the husband threw the bill of divorce into her lap, or into her basket, then she is divorced, even if she is in her husband’s house at that time. The Gemara asks: Why is she divorced? Is this not like a case of the vessels of a buyer that are in the domain of the seller, with regard to which there is a dispute concerning whether the vessels can serve to acquire an item on the buyer’s behalf?
7Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The mishna is referring to a case where her basket was hanging from her body, and therefore it is not considered to be within the domain of the husband. And so Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Oshaya says: The mishna is referring to a case where her basket was hanging from her body. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: If it was tied to her then that is enough, even though it is not hanging from her body.
8Rav Adda bar Ahava says: The mishna is referring to a case where her basket was placed between her thighs and is therefore in the place where she is sitting, and since her husband is not particular about the place in which she is sitting, it is considered her domain. Rav Mesharshiyya bar Rav Dimi says: The mishna is referring to a case where her husband was a basket seller, and therefore is not particular about the place where the basket is since his whole courtyard is full of baskets, and it is therefore considered to be her domain.
9Rabbi Yoḥanan says: There is no need for these explanations, since the place of her lap belongs to her, and the place of her basket belongs to her. Rava said: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement? Because a person is not particular, not about the place of his wife’s lap, nor about the place of her basket, it is as though he transferred ownership of the place to her for her use.
10This is also taught in a baraita : If he threw the bill of divorce to her into her lap, or into her basket, or into anything that is like her basket, then she is divorced.
11The Gemara analyzes the wording of the baraita : What is included by the expansive term: Anything that is like her basket? It serves to include the basket [ taska ] from which she eats dates, as he is not particular about its place as well.
12MISHNA: If he said to his wife: Take this promissory note, and it was a bill of divorce, or she found it behind him and he did not tell her what it was but she reads what is written in it and discovers that it is her bill of divorce, it is not a valid bill of divorce until he says to her: This is your bill of divorce.
13If he gave it to her in her hand and she was sleeping, and he then woke her, and when she reads what is written in it, she finds that it is her bill of divorce, it is not a valid bill of divorce until he says to her: This is your bill of divorce.
14GEMARA: Apropos the mishna’s statement that if she found the bill of divorce behind him, it is not a valid bill of divorce until he says: This is your bill of divorce, the Gemara asks: And when he says to her: This is your bill of divorce, what of it? Why is it considered to be a valid bill of divorce if it was not given to her in the proper manner, being that it is as though he told her: Take your bill of divorce from where it is placed on the ground?
15And Rava says that if one says to his wife: Take your bill of divorce from where it is placed on the ground, it is as though he didn’t say anything and it is not a valid bill of divorce, since a woman is divorced only when the bill of divorce is given to her by her husband. The Gemara answers: Say that the bill of divorce was not placed on the ground behind him, but rather she pulled it out from behind him. In other words, the bill of divorce was tucked into his belt and she pulled it out. Consequently, she received the bill of divorce from him.
16The Gemara challenges this: If she pulled it out, it is also not a valid bill of divorce, since it is required that the directive: “And gives it in her hand” (Deuteronomy 24:1), be fulfilled, and in this case it is not fulfilled, since he did not give it to her; rather, she took it. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a case where he bent [ da’arak ] his waist over toward her and she pulled it out, and by extending his waist to her, it is as though he gave the bill of divorce to her.
17This is also taught in a baraita ( Tosefta 8:1): If he said to his wife: Take this promissory note, or if she pulled it out from behind him, read it, and saw that it is her bill of divorce; it is not a valid bill of divorce until he says to her: This is your bill of divorce. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Actually, it is not a valid bill of divorce until he takes it from her and gives it to her again, and says to her: This is your bill of divorce.
18The baraita continues: If he gave it to her in her hand, and she was sleeping, and he then woke her, and when she reads what is written in it, she finds that it is her bill of divorce; it is not a valid bill of divorce until he says to her: This is your bill of divorce. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: It is not a valid bill of divorce until he takes it from her and gives it to her again, and says to her: This is your bill of divorce.
19The Gemara notes: And it is necessary to mention this dispute in both cases. As if this dispute would have been stated only with regard to the cases in the first clause, one could assume that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is saying his opinion specifically with regard to the cases in this clause, because she is subject to being divorced, since she is awake and able to receive a bill of divorce, even though he did not tell her that this is a bill of divorce. But if he gave it to her in her hand and she was sleeping, she is not subject to being divorced since while she is sleeping she is a person who lacks the halakhic competence required to receive a bill of divorce. Therefore, one could say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi concedes to Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar that giving the bill of divorce while she was sleeping is totally not valid. It was therefore necessary to mention that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi disagrees in this case, as well.
20And if this dispute would have been stated only with regard to this case, where she was sleeping, one could assume that specifically with regard to this case Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar is saying that he must give her the bill of divorce a second time. But in the other case, in which she was awake, one could say that he concedes to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Therefore, it is necessary to mention this dispute in both cases.
21Rava says: If he wrote a bill of divorce for her, and he placed it in the hand of her slave when he is sleeping and she is guarding him, it is a valid bill of divorce. Within the context of the halakhot of divorce, a slave has the same status as land, in the sense that both belong to their owner. Therefore, when the husband places the bill of divorce in the slave’s hand, it is as though he placed it into her courtyard. If her slave was awake, it is not a valid bill of divorce because he is like a courtyard that is not consciously secured by her. Since he guards himself, he therefore does not acquire it on her behalf.
22Rava continues: If he is sleeping and she is guarding him, it is a valid bill of divorce. The Gemara asks: But why; isn’t it true that the slave is like a mobile courtyard, and a mobile courtyard does not acquire items on behalf of its owner?
23And if you would say that a case in which he is sleeping is different because he is currently not moving, but didn’t Rava say: In any case in which if he would be moving he would not acquire items, then even if he is standing or sitting, he also does not acquire items? The Gemara concludes: And this halakha that Rava said, indicating that it is a valid bill of divorce, applies only where the slave is bound and sleeping, since in that case placing the bill of divorce in his hand is like placing it in her hand.
24MISHNA: If the woman was standing in the public domain and her husband took the bill of divorce and threw it to her, if it fell closer to her, she is divorced, and if it fell closer to him, she is not divorced. If it is equally balanced, there is uncertainty as to whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced. And the same halakhot apply with regard to betrothal.
25And the same halakhot apply with regard to a debt. If his creditor said to him: Throw the payment for my debt to me, and he threw it to him and the money fell closer to the creditor, the creditor acquired the payment. The debtor is absolved of his obligation to pay even if the money did not reach the creditor’s hand, e.g., it was stolen or lost after it was thrown and before the creditor was able to take it. If it fell closer to the debtor and the money was lost, the debtor is still obligated to pay. If it was equally balanced and was lost, the two of them divide it, i.e., the debtor owes half of the amount.
26GEMARA: The Gemara clarifies that which was taught in the mishna: What is considered closer to her, and what is considered closer to him? Rav says: If it fell within four cubits of her, this is what was meant by the mishna’s statement: Closer to her; if it fell within four cubits of him, this is what was meant by: Closer to him.
27The Gemara asks: What is considered midway? Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak says: Such as when the two of them were standing within the same four cubits.
28The Gemara asks: And let us see which of them preceded the other into these four cubits, and the four cubits would then be considered as belonging to that person. And if you would say that both of them came simultaneously, but isn’t there a principle that it is impossible to be so precise? It is not possible that both events occurred at exactly the same time, and it is certain that one of them arrived there before the other.
29Rather, Rav Kahana said: Here we are dealing with a case of precisely eight cubits, where his four cubits are adjacent to her four cubits,