1With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where, after appraising the damage, the court comes to collect from the one who caused the damage, but he does not have money available to pay for the damage he caused. And the tanna’im disagree in a case where the superior-quality land of the injured party was equal in quality to the inferior-quality land of the one who caused the damage, and the one who caused the damage also has land of superior quality. With regard to such a case, Rabbi Yishmael holds: We appraise the value of the land of the injured party, and therefore the one who caused the damage can pay with his inferior-quality fields, which are equal in quality to the best fields owned by the injured party. And Rabbi Akiva holds: We appraise the value of the land of the one who caused the damage and have him pay with his fields of superior quality.
2What is the reason of Rabbi Yishmael? The word “field” is stated below, toward the end of the verse: “Of the best of his own field, and of the best of his own vineyard, shall he pay” (Exodus 22:4). And the word “field” is also stated above, at the beginning of that same verse: “If a man shall cause a field or vineyard to be eaten, and shall put in his beast, and shall feed in another man’s field.” Just as the field which is stated above belongs to the injured party, so too, the field stated below belongs to the injured party.
3And Rabbi Akiva holds: When the verse says: “Of the best of his own field and of the best of his own vineyard shall he pay,” it means from the best of the one who is paying, i.e., from the best fields belonging to the one who caused the damage.
4And how would Rabbi Yishmael respond to this? The verbal analogy between the two instances of the word “field” is effective, and the straightforward meaning of the verse itself is effective. The verbal analogy is effective, as we said. It serves to teach that when it says that he pays from the best of his field, it means from land equal in quality to the best field owned by the injured party. And the straightforward meaning of the verse itself is effective, as it serves to teach a different halakha , namely, that if the one who caused the damage has superior-quality land and inferior-quality land, and his inferior-quality land is not as good as the superior-quality land belonging to the injured party, the one who caused the damage pays the injured party from his best land, i.e., from the superior-quality land that he owns.
5§ The baraita teaches that Rabbi Akiva says: The verse comes only to allow injured parties to collect compensation from superior-quality land belonging to the one who caused the damage, in the event that he has no money or movable property. And by means of an a fortiori inference one can derive that the Temple treasury collects from superior-quality land.
6The Gemara asks: What is the a fortiori inference from ordinary damage to damage involving the consecrated property? To which case does this refer? If we say that our ox, i.e., an ox belonging to a Jew, gored an ox that is consecrated property, there is a difficulty, as the Merciful One states: “And if one man’s ox hurts another’s ox” (Exodus 21:35). This teaches that the halakha applies only if the ox hurt an ox belonging to another Jew, but not if it hurt an ox that is consecrated property. In the latter case no damages are collected.
7Rather, we say that the a fortiori inference is not referring to a case of damage, but rather to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate one hundred dinars for Temple maintenance, and the inference teaches that if the one who took the vow has no money, then the Temple treasurer comes and collects the hundred dinars from his superior-quality land.
8The Gemara challenges this understanding: The Temple treasurer should not be treated any better than an ordinary creditor, and, as stated in the mishna, the halakha of a creditor is that he collects only from intermediate-quality land. And if you would say that Rabbi Akiva holds that even a creditor can collect the money owed him from superior-quality land like payment for damages, there is still a difficulty; the a fortiori inference can still be refuted in the following manner: If an ordinary creditor can collect the money owed him from superior-quality land, this is because the Torah enhanced his power with regard to payment for damages, as a common person can collect payment for damages caused him by another’s ox. But can you say the same about the Temple treasury, with regard to which the Torah weakened its power with regard to payment for damages, not allowing it to collect such compensation?
9The Gemara rejects this: Actually, we can explain that we are dealing here with a case where our ox gored an ox that is consecrated property, and Rabbi Akiva holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya with regard to this issue, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: If an ox that is consecrated property gored an ox belonging to a common person, the Temple treasury is exempt from liability. By contrast, if an ox belonging to a common person gored an ox that is consecrated property, whether the ox that gored the other ox was an innocuous ox [ shor tam ], i.e., an ox with no consistent history of causing damage with the intent to injure, or it was a forewarned ox [ shor muad ], i.e., an ox whose owner was forewarned because his ox had already gored another ox three times, the ox’s owner pays the full cost of the damage.
10The Gemara asks: If so, from where do you know to say that Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael disagree about a case where the superior-quality land belonging to the injured party is equal in quality to the inferior-quality land belonging to the one who caused the damage, and the one who caused the damage also has land of superior quality, as the dispute was previously interpreted by Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov? Perhaps everyone, including Rabbi Akiva, agrees that we appraise the value of the land of the injured party, and here they disagree with regard to the dispute between Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya and the Rabbis.
11The Gemara explains this suggestion: As Rabbi Akiva holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya, that in the case of damage caused by the ox of a common person to the property of the Temple treasury, compensation is collected from superior-quality land belonging to the one who caused the damage. And Rabbi Yishmael holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, that the owner of the ox bears no liability.
12The Gemara rejects this suggestion: If it is so that this is the disagreement, then what is the meaning of Rabbi Akiva’s statement: The verse comes only to allow injured parties to collect compensation from superior-quality land? This indicates that Rabbi Akiva disagrees about how to understand this verse. And furthermore, if the subject is the Temple treasury, what is the meaning of: And by means of an a fortiori inference one can derive that the Temple treasury of consecrated property collects from superior-quality land. And furthermore, didn’t Rav Ashi say: