1One who leaves the marriage union through a bill of divorce is required to wait three months before remarrying.
2The Gemara asks: What is Shmuel teaching us by telling us all of this? We already learned it all in Yevamot (108a): In the case of one who refuses to continue living with a certain man, he is permitted to her relatives and she is permitted to his relatives, and she is not disqualified from marrying into the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce, then he is forbidden to her relatives and she is forbidden to his relatives, and she is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood.
3The Gemara answers: It was necessary for him to mention that if she receives a bill of divorce, she is required to wait three months before remarrying, as we did not learn that halakha in the mishna. Once Shmuel mentioned the difference between one who refuses to continue living with her husband and one who is divorced, he mentioned the other differences between the two cases.
4The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this dispute between Rav and Shmuel is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im , as the baraita teaches: Rabbi Eliezer says: The act of marriage by a minor girl is nothing, i.e., has no legal impact, when she is married off not by her father, and her husband is not entitled to any lost article that she finds, and not to her earnings; and he is not able to annul her vows; and he does not inherit from her; nor does he become impure for her if he is a priest. The principle is that her legal status is not that of his wife in every sense, only that she requires a refusal in order to leave the marriage.
5Rabbi Yehoshua says: The act of marriage by a minor girl is something, i.e., has legal impact, and her husband is entitled to any lost article that she finds and to her earnings; and he is able to annul her vows; and he inherits from her; and he becomes impure for her, even if he is a priest. The principle is that her legal status is that of his wife in every sense, except for the fact that she leaves this union through refusal and does not need a bill of divorce.
6Shall we say that Rav said that she does not receive payment of her marriage contract in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that her marriage did not take effect, and that Shmuel said that she does receive payment of her marriage contract in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who holds that her marriage did take effect?
7The Gemara rejects this: According to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, everyone agrees that a minor girl’s marriage has no legal standing and, as Rav said, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract.
8When they disagree, they disagree in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. Shmuel is in accordance with the literal opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. And Rav says that when Rabbi Yehoshua said there that a minor girl has a legal status of his wife in every sense, it was only with regard to her obligations toward him. But with regard to his obligations toward her, since according to Torah law they are not married, the Sages could not obligate the husband to pay her anything.
9§ The mishna teaches that a girl who refuses to continue living with her husband, a woman who is forbidden by rabbinic law as a secondary relative, and an ailonit are not entitled to payment of a marriage contract and are not entitled to their worn clothes. Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya said to Rav Kahana: You told us in the name of Shmuel: They taught that she is not entitled to her worn clothes only with regard to the worn-out items of usufruct property [ nikhsei melog ], but she does have rights to the worn-out items of her guaranteed property [ tzon barzel ].
10Rav Pappa discussed it and wondered: To which part of the mishna is this referring? If we say that it is referring to one who refuses to continue living with her husband, then if the worn-out articles are still in existence, she takes both the usufruct and the guaranteed properties. Since the marriage is annulled, she takes whatever belongs to her. And if they are no longer in existence and were completely worn out over the course of time, then she does not take compensation for either of them, as the husband was within his rights to make use of them.
11Rather, it must be that Shmuel’s statement is in reference to an ailonit . This too is difficult as, in that case, if the articles are still in existence she takes both the usufruct and the guaranteed properties. If they are no longer in existence, then Shmuel should have stated the opposite and said: With regard to the usufruct property, which remains in her possession during the marriage, she does receive compensation for it in the event that the marriage is annulled. However, she does not receive compensation for the guaranteed property, which does not remain in her possession during the marriage but in the possession of her husband.
12Rather, it must be that Shmuel’s statement is in reference to a secondary forbidden relative, and the rationale for this halakha is that the Sages penalized both the husband and the wife for violating a rabbinic prohibition. The Sages assigned a penalty to her with regard to his obligations to her, and she is not reimbursed for the worn-out usufruct property. And they assigned a penalty to him with regard to her obligations to him so that he is responsible for reimbursing her for the worn-out guaranteed property.
13Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: Conclude from the statement of Rav Kahana that if a wife brought home to her husband a cloak after they were already married, it is viewed as capital, and he may not go and cover himself with it until it wears out. With regard to land that the wife obtains during the marriage, the husband has the right to benefit from it by consuming its produce. From the fact that Rav Kahana stated that it is only in this particular case that the woman is not reimbursed for clothing that became worn out through her husband’s use, one can infer that generally, the husband does not have the right to use a garment she obtains, to the degree that it becomes worn out.
14The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rav Naḥman say that use of the cloak is considered the produce of her property, to which the husband is entitled? The Gemara answers: The statement of Rav Naḥman is in disagreement with that opinion.
15§ The mishna teaches that these specific women are not entitled to payment of a marriage contract. Shmuel said: They taught this only with regard to the principal of the marriage contract, which the Sages instituted for all women, amounting to one hundred dinars for a widow and two hundred dinars for a virgin. However, the additional sum listed in the marriage contract, which their husband specified for them of his own accord, is considered a gift and they are entitled to it.
16The Gemara notes: That is also taught in a baraita : Women with regard to whom the Sages said: They are not entitled to payment of a marriage contract, for example, one who refused to remain married to her husband, and her companions, they are not entitled to the principal of one hundred dinars or two hundred dinars. But as for the additional sum stipulated in the marriage contract that the husband added of his own accord, they are entitled to it.
17However, women with regard to whom the Sages said: They are divorced without receiving payment for their marriage contract, for example, a woman who violates the precepts of halakha or Jewish custom, and her companions, are not entitled to the additional sum stipulated by their husbands in the marriage contract. And since they violated and transgressed the mitzvot, it is all the more so that they are not entitled to receive the principal one hundred dinars or two hundred dinars, as the Sages penalized them and negated all of their husband’s obligations that are recorded in the marriage contract. And one who is divorced because she received a bad reputation for licentiousness takes what is left of her usufruct property and is divorced.
18The Gemara notes: This baraita supports the opinion of Rav Huna, as Rav Huna said: A woman who was licentious has not lost