1If she was taken as security, in a case where her husband stipulated that if he fails to pay a debt the gentiles may take his wife and do with her as they please, yes, she requires witnesses to testify that she was not violated. However, if she was imprisoned by the authorities, no, she is deemed untainted even without witnesses. Apparently, the distinction is not based on the dominance of the Jewish people. Rather, it is based on the manner in which she was apprehended. The Gemara answers: The same is true that she is forbidden to her husband even if she was imprisoned, and the reason that the tanna’im testified about a case where she was taken as security is because the incident that transpired, transpired in that manner.
2Some say a different version of this tradition. Rava said that we too learn a proof from a mishna for the statement that Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak said that Rav said: Rabbi Yosei the priest and Rabbi Zekharya ben HaKatzav testified about a Jewish woman about whom witnesses testified that she was taken as security for a debt in Ashkelon. And the members of her family, who suspected that she engaged in intercourse there, distanced themselves from her, and her witnesses testified about her that she neither entered into seclusion nor was violated. And the Sages said to the members of the family: If you believe the witnesses that she was taken as collateral, believe the witnesses who say that she neither entered into seclusion nor was violated. And if you do not believe the witnesses that she neither entered into seclusion nor was violated, do not believe the witnesses that she was taken as collateral at all.
3Rava asks: But in the case in Ashkelon that was due to a monetary offense, the reason that she was permitted is that witnesses testified about her that she was untainted. However, if witnesses did not testify about her, no, she would not be permitted to her husband, although she was taken due to a monetary offense. What, is it not that it is no different if she was taken as collateral and it is no different if she was imprisoned? Apparently, if the authority of the gentiles is dominant, even if she was imprisoned for the sake of money there is concern that she was violated. The Gemara rejects the proof: No, the case where the woman is taken as collateral is different, and only in that case, where her husband stipulated that the gentiles could take her, would the gentiles allow themselves to violate her. However, in a case where she is imprisoned there is no concern of that sort.
4Some raise it as a contradiction between the sources. We learned in the mishna: A woman who was taken hostage due to a monetary offense is permitted to her husband. And they raise a contradiction from the mishna in Eduyyot : Rabbi Yosei the priest and Rabbi Zekharya ben HaKatzav testified about a Jewish woman about whom witnesses testified that she was taken as collateral for a debt in Ashkelon. But this is not the case in Ashkelon, which was due to a monetary offense, and it is taught that the reason that the woman was permitted is that witnesses testified about her that she was untainted. However, if witnesses did not testify about her, no, she would not be permitted, although she was taken for the sake of money.
5And he answers that Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak said: This is not difficult. Here, the mishna is referring to a period when the authority of the Jewish people is dominant over the nations of the world. Then, a woman taken hostage for the sake of money is permitted. There it is referring to a period when the authority of the nations of the world is dominant over themselves and over the Jewish people. Therefore, even a woman taken because of a monetary offense is forbidden unless witnesses testify that she is untainted.
6§ We learned in the mishna: A woman who was imprisoned because of a capital offense is forbidden to her husband. Rav said: The mishna is referring to a case where the wives of thieves are involved, as when thieves were apprehended and hanged, their wives were abandoned and made available to all, and they were not protected from potential rapists. And Levi said: The mishna is referring to a case where the wife of ben Donai, a murderer, is involved, as in that case the government abandons his wife and makes her available to all, which is not the case when one is condemned for theft. Ḥizkiyya said: And this abandonment is only in a case where the husbands were sentenced to death. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Although their husbands were not sentenced to death, if the imprisonment is because of a capital offense, the women are abandoned and available to all.
7MISHNA: With regard to a city that was conquered by an army laying siege, all the women married to priests located in the city are unfit and forbidden to their husbands, due to the concern that they were raped. And if they have witnesses, even if the witness is a slave, even if the witness is a maidservant, both of whom are generally disqualified as witnesses, they are deemed credible. And a person is not deemed credible to establish his status by his own testimony. Therefore, a woman is not deemed credible to claim that she was not violated.
8GEMARA: The Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna ( Avoda Zara 70b): If there is a gentile military unit that entered a city, if it entered during peacetime, after the soldiers leave, the open barrels of wine are forbidden and the wine in them may not be drunk, due to suspicion that the gentile soldiers may have poured this wine as a libation for idolatry. The sealed barrels are permitted. However, if the unit entered in wartime, both these and those are permitted because in wartime there is no respite to pour wine for idolatry. One can be certain that the soldiers did not do so because the soldiers were preoccupied with preparations for a potential attack by the enemy. Why, then, is the mishna concerned that perhaps the soldiers laying siege to the city rape the women?
9Rav Mari said: To engage in intercourse there is respite; to pour wine for idolatry there is no respite. Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Elazar said in the name of Ḥizkiyya: There is a different distinction between the cases. There, the mishna is referring to the siege of a city under the rule of the same monarchy. In that case, the soldiers, acting as the enforcement body of the monarchy, seek to minimize unnecessary damage to the city and will refrain from ruining the wine and raping the women. Here, the mishna is referring to the siege of a city under the rule of a different monarchy. Therefore, there are no restraints with regard to ruining the wine or raping the women.
10The Gemara asks: Even in the siege of a city under the rule of the same monarchy, it is impossible that one of the soldiers did not wander off and rape a woman. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: This is referring to a case where the sentries see each other and do not allow the soldiers to plunder the city. The Gemara asks: It is impossible that the sentries would not doze a bit, enabling some soldiers to enter and plunder the city. Rabbi Levi said: It is referring to a case where they surround the city with chains, and dogs, and branches [ gavza ], and geese, as obstacles preventing unauthorized entry.
11Rabbi Abba bar Zavda said: Rabbi Yehuda Nesia, grandson of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, redactor of the mishna, and the Rabbis dispute this matter. One said: There, the mishna is referring to the siege of a city under the rule of the same monarchy. Here, the mishna is referring to the siege of a city under the rule of a different monarchy, and it was not difficult for him at all, as in that case there is no concern that perhaps an individual soldier would enter the city. And for the other one, all these questions were difficult, and he answers: It is referring to a case where they surround the city with chains, and dogs, and branches, and geese.
12§ With regard to the ruling in the mishna, Rav Idi bar Avin said that Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Ashyan said: If there is a single hideaway there in the city, where the women could hide from the soldiers, it saves all the women married to priests. Due to the uncertainty, the presumption is that each of the women found the hideaway, and therefore they are not forbidden to their husbands.
13Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: If the hideaway holds only one woman, what is the ruling? Do we say that with regard to each woman who appears before us, this is the one who hid there, and each is permitted to her husband? Or, perhaps we do not say that.
14The Gemara asks: And in what way is this different from the case of two paths? As we learned in a mishna: There were two paths, one that was ritually impure due to a corpse buried there and one that was ritually pure. And one walked on one of them, but he does not remember which, and afterward engaged in handling items of ritual purity, e.g., teruma or consecrated items. And another person came and walked on the second path, and he too does not remember which path it was, and he also engaged in handling items of ritual purity.
15Rabbi Yehuda says: If this one asked a Sage in and of himself, and that one asked a Sage in and of himself, they are both pure. When considered separately, each person retains his presumptive status of ritual purity. However, if they both came to ask at the same time, they are both ritually impure. Since one of the two certainly passed on the impure path, although it is uncertain which, both are deemed impure due to that uncertainty. Rabbi Yosei says: One way or another they are both ritually impure.
16And Rava said, and some say it was Rabbi Yoḥanan who elaborates: If they came at the same time, everyone agrees that they are ritually impure, as even Rabbi Yehuda concedes that this is the halakha . If they came independently, this one after that one, everyone agrees that they are ritually pure. They disagree only with regard to a case where one comes to ask about himself and about the other. One Sage, Rabbi Yosei, likens it to a case where they come to ask at the same time, and Rabbi Yehuda likens it to a case where this one comes after that one. The Gemara concludes the analogy: And here too, where there was room in the hideout for only one woman, although they came and asked individually, since they seek to render all the women married to priests permitted to their husbands based on that hideout, it is tantamount to asking about them all at the same time, and they should be deemed forbidden to their husbands.
17The Gemara asks: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of the two paths, there is certainly ritual impurity in one of the paths, and therefore there is certainly one man who is impure. Here, who says any of the women was violated? Since there is uncertainty whether any woman was violated at all, one is more likely to rule that each woman was the one who hid than it is to rule that each of the men walked on the ritually pure path.
18Rav Ashi raises a dilemma: If there was a hideaway in the city and a woman married to a priest says: Neither did I hide nor was I violated, what is the ruling? Do we say the principle: