1of falsehood, as it was written prior to the second loan, we are not concerned. So too here, the fact that the judges wrote the document before the event is not a matter of concern.
2The Gemara examines cases involving disputes concerning the property of the deceased. There was a certain man who deposited seven pearls [ marganita ] tied up in a sheet in the house of Rabbi Meyasha, son of the son of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. Rabbi Meyasha passed away without instructing the members of his household on his deathbed, and without explaining to whom the gems belonged. Rabbi Meyasha’s family and the depositor came before Rabbi Ami to discuss the ownership of the gems. He said to them: They belong to the claimant, first of all, since I know about Rabbi Meyasha, son of the son of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, that he is not wealthy enough to be able to afford such gems. And furthermore, the depositor has provided a distinguishing mark that proves that he is the owner.
3The Gemara comments: And we said that a distinguishing mark is effective only if the claimant does not usually enter and exit there. But if that person usually enters and exits there, one can say that a different person might have deposited the object, and he merely saw it there and was able to provide distinguishing marks.
4The Gemara relates a similar incident: There was a certain man who deposited a silver goblet in the house of the Sage Ḥasa. Ḥasa passed away without instructing anything about the goblet. They came before Rav Naḥman to discuss the ownership of the goblet. He said to them: I know about Ḥasa that he is not wealthy, and this goblet would not have belonged to him. And furthermore, the depositor has provided a distinguishing mark. And we said so only if the claimant does not usually enter and exit there. But if that person usually enters and exits there, one can say that a different person might have deposited the object and he merely saw it there.
5The Gemara relates another similar story: There was a certain man who deposited silk [ metakesa ] in the house of Rav Dimi, brother of Rav Safra. Rav Dimi passed away without instructing anything about the silk. They came before Rabbi Abba to discuss the ownership of the silk. He said to them: It belongs to the claimant, first of all, since I know about Rav Dimi that he is not wealthy. And furthermore, he has provided a distinguishing mark. And we said so only if he does not usually enter and exit there. But if that person usually enters and exit there, one can say that a different person might have deposited the object, and he merely saw it there.
6The Gemara relates the story of a certain man who said to those present at his deathbed: My property should go to Toviya. He passed away, and Toviya came to claim his possessions. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Toviya has come, and there is no need to be concerned that he might have meant a different Toviya.
7The Gemara adds: If the deceased had said: My property should go to Toviya, and Rav Toviya came forward, it is assumed that this is not the person the deceased had in mind, for he said: My property should go to Toviya. He did not say: My property should go to Rav Toviya. But if Rav Toviya is a person who is familiar with the deceased, then it can be assumed that the deceased called him by his personal name and not by his title because he was familiar with him. If two men named Toviya came forward, and one of them was the deceased’s neighbor and the other a Torah scholar but not his neighbor, the Torah scholar takes precedence. Similarly, if one was a relative and the other a Torah scholar, the Torah scholar takes precedence.
8A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If two men have the same name and one was a neighbor and the other one was a relative, what is the halakha ? The Gemara answers: Come and hear the solution from the following verse: “A close neighbor is better than a distant brother” (Proverbs 27:10). If they were both relatives, or both neighbors, or both scholars, there is no systematic way of determining who is entitled to the property, and the decision is left to the discretion of the judges.
9§ Rava said to the son of Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin: Come, and I will tell you something excellent that your father would say about that which Shmuel said: Shmuel said that in the case of one who sells a promissory note to another, and the seller went back and forgave the debtor his debt, it is forgiven, since the debtor essentially had a non-transferable obligation to the creditor alone, and even the creditor’s heir can forgive the debt. With regard to this halakha , Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said: Shmuel concedes with regard to a woman who brings in a promissory note to the marriage for her husband, and she went back and forgave the debtor his debt, that the debt is not forgiven. Why not? Because his hand is like her hand, i.e., the husband shares equal rights to her property, and she cannot unilaterally forgive the debt.
10The Gemara relates an incident: A relative of Rav Naḥman sold her marriage contract for financial advantage. In other words, she received a sum of money and in exchange agreed that if she were to be divorced and become entitled to her marriage contract, the money would belong to the purchaser of the rights to her marriage contract. She was subsequently divorced from her husband and died, leaving the right to her marriage contract to her daughter. The purchasers came and claimed the value of the marriage contract from her daughter. Rav Naḥman said to the people around him: Is there no one who can give the daughter advice,