1The Gemara rejects the proof: No, the case there is referring to where he betrothed her without specification and then married her without specification.
2The Gemara asks: But according to this explanation, if he betrothed her conditionally and then married her without specification, is it indeed the case that she does not require a bill of divorce? If so, instead of teaching in the mishna that if one betroths a woman on condition that there are no vows incumbent upon her to fulfill, and it was subsequently discovered that there are vows that are incumbent upon her, she is not betrothed, let the mishna teach instead a more novel halakha : If he betrothed her with a condition and married her without specification and then it was discovered that vows were incumbent upon her, she is not betrothed. And from this one can derive that all the more so the same halakha would apply in this case, where he betrothed her conditionally but did not repeat the condition when marrying her.
3The Gemara answers: That is also what he is saying, and one should understand the mishna this way: One who betroths a woman on condition that there are no vows incumbent upon her to fulfill, and then marries her without specification, and it is then discovered that vows were incumbent upon her, she is not betrothed. If he betrothed her without specification and married her without specification, she requires a bill of divorce but may be divorced without receiving payment of her marriage contract.
4The Gemara asks about this halakha according to Shmuel: The mishna says that she does not require or receive payment of her marriage contract, but one can infer that she does require a bill of divorce. And what is different about a marriage contract that she does not require payment? Because he says: I do not want a vowing wife, and therefore the marriage is considered a mistaken transaction. If so, she should also not require a bill of divorce. Since he is clearly particular about this, shouldn’t the betrothal also be considered a mistaken transaction?
5Rabba said: She requires a bill of divorce from the words of the Sages, i.e., by rabbinic law. Although by Torah law the betrothal is in fact invalid, the Sages declared that since he did not explicitly stipulate the condition, she requires a bill of divorce. And similarly, Rav Ḥisda said: She requires a bill of divorce from the words of the Sages. Rava said a different explanation: The tanna is uncertain about the status of the betrothal in this case. Concerning monetary matters, one should be lenient. Therefore, she cannot extract money from the husband for the marriage contract based on the principle that in monetary cases the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. But concerning prohibitions such as adultery, one must be stringent, and she therefore requires a bill of divorce.
6Rabba said: The dispute between Rav and Shmuel is in the case of an error concerning two women. The same man married one woman on condition that she had no vows incumbent upon her and then married another woman without specification. Rav and Shmuel disagree whether the condition he explicitly stated for the first woman should be seen as proof that he is particular about this with regard to the second one as well, to the point that the betrothal is invalid if the condition was not fulfilled. But in the case of an error concerning one woman, where he betroths her with a condition, marries her without specification, and subsequently discovered that the condition was not fulfilled, all agree, including Rav, that she does not require a bill of divorce from him.
7Abaye said to him: But the mishna discusses an error concerning one woman, as a second woman is not mentioned, and we raise an objection from it against Shmuel, implying that Rav and Shmuel have a dispute in this case as well. How, then, can you say that dispute is in the case of an error concerning two women?
8Rather, the previous explanation must be retracted and instead the Gemara says: If the above statement of Rabba was said, it was said as follows: Rabba said that the dispute between Rav and Shmuel is with regard to a case of an error concerning one woman similar to an error concerning two women. He betrothed one woman conditionally and then divorced her, and subsequently married her again without specification. In this case, Rav and Shmuel dispute whether the assumption is that he intended to nullify the initial condition with the second betrothal or whether he married her the second time based upon the conditions of the first betrothal. But in the case of a simple error only concerning one woman, where he betroths her with a condition, marries her without specification, and then discovers that the condition was not fulfilled, all agree that she does not require a bill of divorce from him.
9Abaye raised an objection to Rabba’s statement from a baraita : In cases where the man betrothed her in error, or he betrothed her with an item worth less than the value of a peruta , and similarly in a case where there was a minor boy who betrothed a woman, even if the man later sent presents [ sivlonot ] to the bride after he became an adult, she is not betrothed, because he sent them on the basis of the original betrothal. And if the men in any of these cases engaged in sexual intercourse with the woman after betrothal at the appropriate time, they have acquired the women as their wives, since they presumably intended the intercourse to serve as betrothal. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: Even if they engage in sexual intercourse, they have not acquired the women as wives, since they presumably engaged in these relations based upon the earlier betrothal, which was invalid.
10Noting that the first case in the baraita is where a man betrothed a woman in error, Abaye asks: But here in this baraita , where the first case is an error concerning one woman, and the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda disagree; what, is it not that the intention of the phrase: Betrothed her in error, is referring to an error in the condition with regard to vows, where he mistakenly believed she didn’t have any vows incumbent upon her? This would constitute a refutation of Rabba’s statement that all agree that in a case of an error concerning one woman she is not betrothed.
11The Gemara responds: No, here it is referring to a halakhic error, that he betrothed a woman with an item worth less than the value of a peruta . The Gemara asks: Concerning the case where the betrothal is with an item worth less than the value of a peruta , the baraita teaches it explicitly as a separate case with the following words: If he betrothed her in error, or if he betrothed her with an item worth less than the value of a peruta . The Gemara answers: It is explaining what it stated earlier: What is the case of one who betrothed her in error? For example, when he betrothed her with an item worth less than the value of a peruta , as he did not engage in sexual intercourse with her based on such a betrothal.
12The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree? The Gemara answers: One Sage, the first tanna , holds that a person knows that betrothal does not take effect with an item worth less than the value of a peruta . Consequently, he decides to engage in sexual intercourse for the purpose of betrothal and therefore acquires the woman as his wife through these relations. And one Sage, Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, holds that a person does not know that betrothal does not take effect with an item worth less than the value of a peruta , and when he later engages in sexual intercourse, he does so on the basis of the original betrothal, so no new betrothal takes place.
13Abaye again raised an objection to Rabba’s statement from a baraita : If a man said to a woman: I am engaging in sexual intercourse with you for the purpose of betrothal on condition that my father will desire our betrothal, and then he married her without specification, although the father did not desire it, she is nevertheless betrothed through this act of intercourse. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: If the father desires it, she is betrothed, and if the father does not desire it, she is not betrothed, since he engaged in intercourse with her based on the initial condition. But here it is similar to a mistake concerning one woman, and they disagree whether the betrothal is valid.
14The Gemara responds: There, they disagree about this: One Sage, the first tanna , holds that: On condition that my father will desire it, means: On condition that my father is silent. Consequently, if his father does not protest, the betrothal is valid, and he was indeed silent about it. And one Sage, Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, holds that it means: On condition that my father says yes, and he did not say yes. Therefore, the dispute is about the significance of the father’s silence in this case.
15Abaye again raised an objection to Rabba’s statement from a baraita : The Rabbis concede to Rabbi Eliezer concerning a minor girl who was married off by her father and then divorced while she was still a minor, and is therefore treated by the halakha as an orphan in the lifetime of the father, since the halakha is that the father is no longer able to marry her off to someone else, and while she was still a minor, her former husband remarried her, and he then died without children, that she performs ḥalitza and may not instead enter into levirate marriage.
16The baraita continues: This is because her divorce was a full-fledged divorce, since the father has authority to receive her bill of divorce from her husband, and her return to her husband afterward is not a full-fledged return, since she remarries her husband while still a minor, and her father no longer has authority to marry her off, and marriage to a minor girl by her own consent is not considered a full-fledged marriage. She is consequently prohibited from entering into a levirate marriage based on the prohibition against a divorcée marrying her former husband’s brother.
17The baraita continues: In what case is this statement said? When he divorced her while she was still a minor girl and then remarried her while she was still a minor girl. But if he divorced her while she was still a minor girl, and then remarried her when she was an adult woman, or if he remarried her while she was still a minor girl and she became an adult woman while married to him, the second marriage is binding, and she has the status of a full-fledged married woman. And therefore, if he died, either she performs ḥalitza or she enters into levirate marriage like any other widow.