1it can be said that each and every moment is its proper time. The obligation to fulfill the mitzva is perpetual and one may not neglect it. Why should it be prohibited for him to perform actions that facilitate the performance of the mitzva on Shabbat? Rather, Rav Naḥman said that Rav Yitzḥak said, and some say that he said that Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: The actions that facilitate the performance of these mitzvot do not override Shabbat, since one can render the relevant objects ownerless. One is only required to perform these mitzvot if the objects, i.e., the garment and the house, belong to him. If he renders them ownerless, he is no longer obligated to perform these mitzvot.
2It was taught that the Master said in a baraita : The mitzva of lulav and all its facilitators override Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. The Gemara poses a question: From where does Rabbi Eliezer derive this halakha ? If you say he derives it from the mitzvot of the omer and the two loaves, whose facilitators override Shabbat, this can be refuted by saying that the performance of facilitating actions is permitted on Shabbat in these cases because they are for the necessities of Temple service to God on High, as they are connected to the sacrificial service, which proceeds even on Shabbat. Rather, we can say that he derives it from the fact that the verse states: “And you shall take for yourselves on the first day, the fruit of goodly trees, branches of palm trees, boughs of thick-leaved trees, and willows of the river, and you shall rejoice before the Lord your God seven days” (Leviticus 23:40), from which he infers: “On the first day,” meaning that one is obligated to take it on the first day even if it occurs on Shabbat.
3The Gemara clarifies: And with regard to what halakha is this emphasis stated? In what way would the laws of Shabbat have prohibited fulfilling the mitzva of lulav ? If you say that it comes to permit moving the lulav despite the prohibition against moving set-aside items, is a verse required in order to permit moving the lulav ? The prohibition to move items that are set-aside is not a Torah prohibition. The Torah would not come to permit an action prohibited by the Sages. Rather, it must be that the verse is coming to permit violation of Shabbat prohibitions for the facilitators of the lulav .
4The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer understand the verse’s emphasis that the mitzva must be performed on that day? The Gemara answers: According to the Rabbis, that expression in the verse is necessary to teach that this mitzva must be performed by day and not by night.
5The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Eliezer derive that this mitzva must be performed by day and not by night? The Gemara answers: He derives this halakha from the phrase: “And you shall rejoice before the Lord your God seven days,” as this indicates that the mitzva applies during the days and not the nights.
6The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis respond to this? The Gemara answers: The previous derivation was necessary because it might have entered your mind to say that we should derive the seven days stated here from the seven days stated with regard to sukka , and say: Just as there, the mitzva of sukka applies not only during the days but even the nights, so too here, the mitzva of lulav applies not only during the days but even the nights. Therefore, the derivation teaches us that the mitzva only applies during the day based upon the original expression: “On the first day.”
7The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Eliezer’s approach, let the Torah write this principle only with regard to lulav , and let these, the mitzva of the omer and similar cases, be derived from it. The Gemara answers: Because the analogy can be refuted. What is unique about lulav ? That it requires four species, as the Torah demands that three other species be taken along with the lulav . Therefore, lulav cannot serve as a paradigm for other mitzvot that do not share this characteristic.
8Earlier, it was taught in a baraita : The mitzva of sukka and all its facilitators override Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. The Gemara asks: From where does Rabbi Eliezer derive this matter? If you say he derives it from the halakha with regard to the omer and the two loaves, this can be refuted by saying that the performance of facilitators is permitted on Shabbat in these cases as these are the necessities of Temple service to God on High. If you say he derives it from the halakha with regard to lulav , this too can be refuted, as lulav requires four species and therefore has special significance.
9Rather, he derived it through the following verbal analogy based upon the expression “seven days,” which is stated with regard to both the mitzva of sukka and the mitzva of lulav . Just as below, with regard to the mitzva of lulav , its facilitators override Shabbat, so too here, with regard to the mitzva of sukka , its facilitators override Shabbat.
10The Gemara asks: And let the Torah write only that actions that facilitate the performance of the mitzva override the halakhot of Shabbat, and let us bring these other mitzvot and derive their halakhot from sukka . The Gemara answers: Because this suggestion can be refuted: What is unique about the mitzva of sukka ? That it applies during the nights just as it applies during the days, whereas the others apply only during the day.
11Earlier it was taught in a baraita : The mitzva of matza and all its facilitators override Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. The Gemara asks: From where does Rabbi Eliezer derive this matter? If you say he derives it from the halakha with regard to the omer and the two loaves, this can be refuted, as these are the necessities of Temple service to God on High. If you say he derives it from the halakha with regard to lulav , this too can be refuted, as it requires four species. If you say he derives it from the precedent of sukka , this too can be refuted, as it applies during the nights just as it applies during the days.
12Rather, Rabbi Eliezer derived it by means of a verbal analogy based upon the word fifteenth stated with regard to the mitzva of matza , and the word fifteenth stated with regard to the festival of Sukkot : Just as below, with regard to the mitzva to dwell in a sukka on the festival of Sukkot , which is on the fifteenth of the month, its facilitators override Shabbat, so too here, with regard to the mitzva to eat matza on the fifteenth of the month, its facilitators override Shabbat.
13The Gemara asks: And let the Torah write this principle with regard to matza , and let us bring these other mitzvot and derive their halakhot from matza . The Gemara answers: Because this suggestion can be refuted: What is unique about the mitzva of matza ? That it applies to women as it does to men. It is therefore different from the other mitzvot under discussion, which only apply to men.
14It was also taught in the baraita : The mitzva of shofar and all its facilitators override Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. The Gemara asks: From where does Rabbi Eliezer derive this matter? If you say he derives it from the halakha with regard to the omer and the two loaves, this can be refuted, as these are the necessities of Temple service to God on High. If you say he derives it from the halakha with regard to lulav , this too can be refuted, as it requires four species. If you say he derives it from the precedent of sukka , this too can be refuted, as it applies during the nights just as it applies during the days. If you say he derives it from matza , this too can be refuted, as it applies to women just as it applies to men. Rather, Rabbi Eliezer derives it from the fact that the verse stated: “And in the seventh month, on the first of the month, a holy calling it shall be to you; any prohibited labor of work you shall not perform; a day of sounding the shofar it shall be for you” (Numbers 29:1). The verse’s emphasis that the shofar must be sounded on that day teaches us that it applies even on Shabbat.
15And for what purpose was this emphasized? If you say it is in order to permit sounding the shofar , this has already been taught by one of the Sages of the school of Shmuel with regard to the verse that prohibits performing prohibited labor on Festivals: “Any prohibited labor of work you shall not perform” (Numbers 29:1), which comes to exclude from the category of prohibited labors the sounding of the shofar and the removal of bread from the oven, which are skills and not labors. Rather, it is necessary to teach with regard to actions that facilitate the performance of the mitzva.
16The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis understand the verse’s emphasis that the mitzva must be performed on that day? The Gemara answers: That expression in the verse is necessary according to the Rabbis in order to teach that this mitzva must be performed by day and not by night. The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Eliezer derive that this mitzva must be performed by day and not by night? The Gemara answers: He derives this halakha from the verse with regard to the laws of the Jubilee Year: “And you shall pass a shofar of sounding in the seventh month, on the tenth of the month, on the Day of Atonement you shall pass a shofar throughout your land” (Leviticus 25:9), and the laws of all instances of sounding the shofar during the seventh month are derived from each other. Therefore, just as on Yom Kippur the shofar is sounded during the day, as emphasized by the fact that the verse uses the phrase Day of Atonement, the same applies on Rosh HaShana.
17The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Eliezer’s approach, let the Torah write this principle only with regard to shofar , and let us bring these other mitzvot and derive their halakhot from shofar . The Gemara answers: From the sounding of the shofar of Rosh HaShana, the principle that actions that facilitate the performance of a mitzva override Shabbat cannot be derived, because it has special significance in that it introduces the remembrances of the Jewish people before their Father in heaven. From the sounding of the shofar of Yom Kippur, the principle that actions that facilitate the performance of a mitzva override Shabbat cannot be derived, as this shofar sounding also has special significance, as the Master said: Once the court sounds the shofar on Yom Kippur in the Jubilee Year, the declaration of freedom applies at once. Slaves may take leave of their masters and go to their homes, and fields that had been sold return to their ancestral owners. Therefore, other mitzvot cannot be derived from the sounding of the shofar of Yom Kippur.
18Earlier it was taught that the Master said in the baraita : The mitzva of circumcision and all its facilitators override Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. The Gemara asks: From where does Rabbi Eliezer derive this halakha ? If he derives it from all of the other mitzvot cited above, we can refute it, as we have already said that each one of them includes a unique aspect of severity or significance. And furthermore, there is another difficulty: What is unique about these mitzvot