1until it sees the front of the house through which people enter and exit, and it is brought into the house through that entrance, as it is stated in the formula of the declaration of the tithes: “I have removed the consecrated from the house” (Deuteronomy 26:13), which indicates that the obligation to tithe produce whose purpose has not yet been designated applies only when it is brought into the house.
2And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even bringing produce into the courtyard determines that the production process of the produce has been completed and that the produce is therefore subject to tithes, as it is stated in the confession of the tithes: “And I have given to the Levite, the stranger, the orphan, and the widow, and they shall eat in your gates and be satisfied” (Deuteronomy 26:12).
3The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan also, isn’t it written: “From the house”? The Gemara answers: He could have said to you that the term “house” is not to be taken literally. Rather, it indicates that bringing untithed produce into a courtyard is similar to bringing it into a house, in the following way: Just as a house is a secured area, so too, the courtyard must be secured. An area that is accessible to the public is not considered a courtyard for the purposes of this halakha .
4The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yannai also, isn’t it written: “In your gates”? The Gemara answers: That term is necessary to teach that this halakha , that the production process is considered complete, applies only when one brings the produce into his house through the gate, i.e., the entranceway, to the exclusion of produce that was brought in through rooftops and enclosures, in which case the produce is not subject to tithes.
5Rav Ḥanina Ḥoza’a raises an objection from a statement of the baraita mentioned earlier (87b): The term “at your own pleasure [ kenafshekha ]” can also mean: As you are. Consequently, the term kenafshekha teaches that just as the halakha is concerning the owner of the vineyard himself, so is the halakha concerning the laborer himself: Just as the owner, alluded to by the term nafshekha , may eat from the produce before its labor is complete and is exempt from separating tithes, so too, the laborer himself may eat and is exempt from tithes.
6The objection of Rav Ḥanina Ḥoza’a is as follows: This indicates that only an owner and a laborer may eat from produce without tithing it; but one who buys produce is obligated by Torah law to separate tithes before partaking of it. What, is it not correct to conclude that this is the halakha even when he purchased the produce while it was still in the field, i.e., he is obligated to tithe the produce even though it has not entered his house or courtyard?
7Rav Pappa said: Here, in the baraita , we are dealing with a fig tree that is standing in a garden outside a courtyard and its leaves are leaning into a courtyard, or, according to the one who says that the obligation to separate tithes applies when the produce is brought into the house, the branches are leaning into the house. Therefore, the produce entered the courtyard or house.
8The Gemara asks: If so, the homeowner himself, not only the buyer, should also be obligated to separate tithes, as the produce is in either the courtyard or the house. The Gemara answers: The homeowner’s eyes are on his fig tree, i.e., his primary concern is the tree, not its produce, and the main part of the tree is outside the courtyard. But the buyer’s eyes are on his purchase, i.e., his focus is on the produce itself, which is in the space of the courtyard or house.
9The Gemara asks: And is a buyer obligated by Torah law to tithe the produce he purchases? But isn’t it taught in a baraita : For what reason were the shops of Beit Hino, a town near Jerusalem, destroyed three years before the destruction of Jerusalem itself? It was because they based their practices strictly on matters of Torah, i.e., they did not adhere to the rabbinic safeguards. The baraita explains that they would say