1Rav Pappa said a different answer: When the Sages instituted an ordinance that one’s four square cubits effect acquisition of property for him, that was in the world, i.e., on public land. But the Sages did not institute this mode of acquisition for him in a field belonging to an owner. And even though the Merciful One accorded a poor person certain rights in a landowner’s field during the distribution of pe’a , this mode of acquisition is not included in those rights; when the Merciful One accorded him rights it was specifically to walk in the field and to collect pe’a , but the Merciful One did not accord him the right that the field be considered his courtyard with regard to acquiring pe’a . Therefore, the mishna in tractate Pe’a does not contradict the statement of Reish Lakish.
2As mentioned previously, Rava said that Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi raises an objection to this from a mishna in Nezikin . The Gemara elaborates: The mishna here states that if one saw a found item and fell upon it, and another came and seized it, the one who seized it acquired it. And if you say that a person’s four square cubits effect acquisition of property for him everywhere, let his four square cubits effect acquisition of the found item for him.
3The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a case where he did not say: I will acquire it. The Gemara asks: But if the Sages instituted an ordinance that one’s four square cubits effect acquisition of property for him, then even in a case when he did not say: I will acquire the item, what of it? The item should still be his. The Gemara answers: Since he fell upon it, he revealed his intention that it is satisfactory for him to acquire the item by falling on it, and it is not satisfactory for him to acquire the item through the ordinance concerning his four square cubits. Since he decided to forgo the mode of acquisition instituted by the Sages, he does not acquire the found item.
4Rav Sheshet said a different answer: When the Sages instituted that one’s four square cubits effect acquisition of property for him, that was in a place like an alleyway, where the multitudes do not crowd, so the four square cubits surrounding a person can temporarily be considered his property and enable him to acquire an item; but the Sages did not institute this mode of acquisition in the public domain, where the multitudes crowd.
5The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the wording of Reish Lakish’s statement indicate that there is no such limitation, as he says that the area of four square cubits surrounding a person effects acquisition of property for him everywhere? The indication is that this is true even in the public domain.
6The Gemara answers: The word everywhere is not to be taken literally; it was stated to include even the sides of the public domain, areas that are adjacent to the public domain but not actually part of it. Since the multitudes do not crowd there, one who is standing there acquires an item that is in his four square cubits.
7§ And Reish Lakish says another halakha in the name of Abba Kohen Bardela: A minor girl does not have the ability to acquire property by means of her courtyard, and she does not have the ability to acquire property by means of her four square cubits. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yannai that she has the ability to acquire property by means of her courtyard, and she has the ability to acquire property by means of her four square cubits.
8The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree? The Gemara explains: One Sage, Rabbi Yannai, holds that placing an item in a courtyard is included as a valid means of acquisition due to the fact that it acts as her hand. Just as a minor girl has the ability to acquire property with her hand, she also has the ability to acquire property by means of her courtyard. And one Sage, Abba Kohen Bardela, holds that placing an item in a courtyard is included as a valid means of acquisition due to the option of acquiring property via agency; and just as a minor girl has no power of agency, as a minor cannot appoint an agent, she does not have the ability to acquire property by means of her courtyard either.
9The Gemara asks: Is there anyone who says that a courtyard is included as a valid means of acquisition due to the option of acquiring property via agency? But isn’t it taught in a baraita : The verse states: “If the theft shall be found in his possession alive, whether it is an ox, or a donkey, or a sheep, he shall pay double” (Exodus 22:3)” From the term “in his possession [ beyado ],” I have derived only a case where the stolen item is found in his hand [ yado ]. From where do I derive that the same halakha applies if it is found on his roof, in his yard, or in his enclosure? The verse states the repetitive phrase “if the theft shall be found [ himmatze timmatze ],” to indicate that the same halakha applies in any case, i.e., in any location that the stolen item is found.
10The Gemara explains: And if it enters your mind that a courtyard is included as a valid means of acquisition due to agency, if so, we have found a case where there is agency for a transgression, i.e., theft. But we maintain that there is no agency for transgression. If one sends an agent to violate a transgression on his behalf, the agent is liable for the transgression and is not considered to be acting on behalf of the one who sent him.
11Ravina said: That baraita poses no problem, as where do we say that there is no agency for transgression? It is where the agent himself is subject to liability for transgression. Consequently, the agent is liable, not the one who sent him. But in the case of a courtyard, which is not subject to liability, its sender, i.e., its owner, is liable.
12The Gemara asks: If that is so, then in a case of one who says to a woman or a slave: Go out and steal for me, is the one who sent them indeed liable, since they are not subject to liability? Married women and slaves have no property of their own from which one could collect payment.
13The Gemara answers: You can say in response: A woman and a slave are not comparable to a courtyard, as they are subject to liability if they steal; and only now, in any event, they do not have the means to pay. This is as we learned in a mishna ( Bava Kamma 87a) concerning a married woman or Canaanite slave who injured another person: If the woman becomes divorced or the slave becomes emancipated, and they then have their own money, they are liable to pay for the damage they inflicted. Evidently, although it is not possible to collect payment from them, they are liable for their actions.
14Rav Samma stated a different resolution to the difficulty based on the baraita : Where do we say that there is no agency for transgression? It is specifically in a case where if the agent wants to execute his assignment he can do so, and if he wants to refrain from executing it he can also opt to not do it. But in the case of a courtyard, where one places items without its consent, its sender, i.e., its owner, is liable.
15The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the answers of Ravina and Rav Samma? The practical difference between them is in the case of a priest who said to an Israelite: Go out and betroth a divorced woman for me. It is prohibited for a priest to betroth a divorcée, while it is permitted for an Israelite to do so. Alternatively, the difference is in the case of a man who said to a woman: Round the corners of the head of a minor boy for me. Rounding the corners of a man’s head, and a man having the corners of his head rounded, are prohibited in the verse: “You shall not round the corners of your head” (Leviticus 19:27), but they are prohibited only for men and not for women.
16The Gemara explains: According to the formulation in which it was said that anywhere that if the agent wants to execute his assignment he can do so and if he wants to refrain from executing it he can opt to not do it the one who sent him is not liable for the transgression but rather the agent is liable, in these cases too, since if the agent wants to execute his assignment he can do so, and if he wants to refrain from executing it he can opt to not do it, the one who sent them is not liable. But according to the formulation in which it was said that wherever an agent is not subject to liability the one who sent him is liable, in these cases too, since the agents are not subject to liability, the one who sent them is liable.
17The Gemara asks about the explanation of the opinion of Abba Kohen Bardela: But is there anyone who says that placing an item in a courtyard is not included as a valid means of acquisition due to the fact that it acts as her hand? But isn’t it taught in a baraita : From the verse: “And he writes her a scroll of severance, and he gives it in her hand” (Deuteronomy 24:1), I have derived only that a woman is divorced if her husband places the bill of divorce in her hand. From where is it derived that even if he places it on her roof, in her courtyard, or in her enclosure, she is divorced? The verse states: “And he gives,” indicating that she is divorced in any case. Apparently one’s courtyard is considered an extension of his hand with regard to acquiring property, in this case, the bill of divorce.
18The Gemara answers: With regard to a bill of divorce everyone agrees that placing an item in a courtyard is included as a valid means of acquisition due to the fact that it acts as her hand. When they disagree, it is with regard to acquiring a found item that was discovered in her courtyard. One Sage, Rabbi Yannai, holds that