1but when the time of his obligation to pay arrives, he applies himself and remembers all the details, so as not to violate the prohibition of delaying payment of the laborer’s wages.
2The Gemara asks: Why would one rely upon the presumption that the employer would not transgress? But is the hired laborer suspected of violating the prohibition of stealing? The Gemara replies: There, concerning the credibility of an employer, there are two presumptions, whereas here, concerning the credibility of a laborer, there is only one presumption. The Gemara explains: Concerning the credibility of an employer there are the following two presumptions: One is that the employer does not violate the prohibition of delaying payment of wages, and the other one is that a hired laborer does not delay the request for his wages. But here, concerning the credibility of the laborer, there is only one presumption, i.e., that the laborer does not violate the prohibition of stealing.
3The mishna teaches: If there are witnesses who testify that he claimed the money from him, he takes an oath and receives the money. The Gemara asks: But what need is there for witnesses that he lodged a claim, when he is claiming it from him in front of us? Rabbi Asi said: The tanna is referring to witnesses that testified that he claimed it from him at its proper time. The Gemara challenges: Even if the laborer claimed the money at the proper time, perhaps the employer paid him afterward. Abaye said: The witnesses testify that he claimed it from him the entire time, i.e., from the time he completed his labor until the end of that day.
4The Gemara continues: And is it always assumed that the employer did not pay the laborer? Why does the fact that he claimed his money at the proper time mean that his claim against his employer is always accepted? Rav Ḥama bar Ukva said: The tanna means that he is given another day corresponding to that day of his claim during which the laborer can claim that he has not been paid.
5MISHNA: With regard to one who lends money to another and the debtor fails to repay it at the end of the term of the loan, the creditor may take collateral from him to ensure payment only by means of an agent of the court, not of his own accord. And he may not enter the debtor’s house to take his collateral, as it is stated: “When you lend your neighbor any manner of loan, you shall not go into his house to take his collateral. You shall stand outside, and the man to whom you lend shall bring forth the collateral to you outside” (Deuteronomy 24:10–11). If the debtor had two utensils of the same kind, the creditor takes one and leaves the other one in the debtor’s possession.
6And in addition, the creditor must return a pillow at night, as the debtor requires it for sleeping, and a plow, which is needed for his daytime work, by day. If the debtor died, he is not required to return it to the debtor’s heirs. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even to the debtor himself he needs to return the collateral each day only until thirty days have passed, and from thirty days onward, the creditor can sell them in court, with the proceeds going toward payment of the debt.
7GEMARA: Shmuel says: An agent of the court who was granted permission to appropriate items from a debtor up to the sum of the loan may seize these items from him in the marketplace, but is not permitted to enter the debtor’s house and take collateral. The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that one who lends money to another may take collateral from him only by means of an agent of the court, which proves by inference that when it is taken by means of an agent of the court the agent of the court may enter the debtor’s house and take collateral?
8The Gemara responds: Shmuel could have said to you: Say that the mishna meant as follows: He may seize it forcibly from him only by means of an agent of the court. The Gemara adds: So, too, it is reasonable that this is correct, as the latter clause of the mishna teaches: And he may not enter the debtor’s house to take his collateral. Who is the tanna referring to here? If we say it is referring to the creditor, this clause is not needed, as this halakha can be concluded from the first clause of the mishna, which states that a creditor has no right to take collateral himself. Rather, is it not referring to the court agent? Accordingly, this teaches that even an agent of the court may not enter the debtor’s house to take the collateral.
9The Gemara refutes the above claim: If the argument to understand the mishna in that manner is due to that reason, there is no conclusive argument, as it is possible that this is what the mishna is saying: One who lends money to another may take collateral from him by entering the debtor’s house only by means of an agent of the court, which proves by inference that it is permitted to take collateral by entering the debtor’s house by means of an agent of the court. One can then infer: But as for the creditor himself, he may not even seize collateral outside the debtor’s house. This is a rabbinic decree so that he should not enter the debtor’s house to take his collateral.
10Rav Yosef raises an objection to Shmuel’s statement from a baraita : The Torah states: “He may not take the lower or upper millstone as collateral” (Deuteronomy 24:6). But it may be inferred that other items may be taken as collateral. Similarly, it states: “You may not take a widow’s garment as collateral” (Deuteronomy 24:17), but clothing that belongs to others you may take as collateral. The Gemara analyzes these statements: Who is permitted to do so? If we say that the creditor may take these items, that cannot be, as it is written: “You shall not go into his house to take his collateral” (Deuteronomy 24:10). Rather, is it not referring to the agent of the court, which indicates that the agent of the court may enter the debtor’s house and take collateral, although the Torah places limits on which item he can take?
11Rav Pappa, son of Rav Naḥman, interpreted the baraita before Rav Yosef; and some say it was Rav Pappa, son of Rav Yosef, who interpreted the baraita before Rav Yosef: Actually, it is referring to a creditor, and the Torah’s additional prohibition against appropriating certain items is given so that he will violate two prohibitions for this action. For example, if he took the lower or upper millstone he violates both the command: “You shall not go into his house,” as well as the more specific prohibition.
12The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a different baraita that contradicts Shmuel: From the implication of that which is stated: “You shall stand outside,” do I not know that: “And the man to whom you lend shall bring forth outside” (Deuteronomy 24:11)? Rather, why must the verse state the inclusive phrase “And the man to whom you lend shall bring forth outside”? This serves to include the agent of the court. The Gemara comments: What, is it not that the agent of the court has the same status as the debtor himself, indicating that just as the debtor may enter his own house at any time, the court agent may act likewise?