[Concerning one who] solely leads [the animal], is there anyone who says that he does not acquire [the animal]? The Gemara at this point is considering whether Shmuel’s question was whether leading an animal or riding it is an act of acquisition. The Gemara argues that if we are speaking of leading alone or riding alone, there can be no question that leading alone is an act of acquisition. That this is so apparently clear to the Gemara indicates that nobody can possibly argue with this. Tosfos finds that R’ Shimon (Kiddushin 25b) does in fact disagree. If so, we must understand the basis for our Gemara’s assumption that leading an animal is definitely a method of acquisition. Even though R’ Shimon in a Baraisa in the first Perek of Kiddushin (25b) maintains that [both small and large] animals can only be acquired by lifting them, which implies that leading them is not legally recognized as a method of acquisition, even so, [the Gemara’s] assertion that one must hold leading an animal is a method of acquisition, is based on our anonymous Mishna which teaches: Or if one was riding and one was leading etc. [an animal, thus demonstrating ownership, they divide the animal]. Our Mishna certainly indicates that leading an animal is a valid method of acquisition. Shmuel would definitely not issue a ruling that does not conform to Mishna (2a), an anonymous Mishna, even though R’ Shimon in Kiddushin (25b) does not agree with Mishna (2a). If the strength of the Gemara’s argument is the anonymous Mishna (2a), it follows that all other anonymous Mishnayos agree with it, but Tosfos introduces an anonymous Mishna in Kiddushin (25b) which also seems to say that leading an animal is not a proper method of acquisition? Let us study that Mishna together. A large animal can be acquired by “handing over” and a small animal by lifting it. These are the words of R’ Meir and R’ Eliezer. The Rabanan say: a small animal is acquired by leading it. An analysis of the text yields that the Rabanan hold that only a small animal is acquired by leading it. Insofar as a large animal is concerned they seem to agree that “handing over” is the method of acquisition. The opinion of the Rabanan, who are the majority, has the strength of an anonymous Mishna. Their opinion seems to contradict Mishna (2a) which says that even a large animal is acquired by leading it? If so, why does the Gemara argue that Shmuel must hold that a large animal is acquired by leading it, since anonymous Mishna (2a) is of that opinion, perhaps Shmuel rules in accordance with the Mishna in Kiddushin (25b) which says that a large animal is acquired by “handing over”? That which we learned in a Mishna in the first Perek of Kiddushin (25b): A large animal can be acquired by “handing it over” and a small animal by lifting it, these are the words of R’ Meir and R’ Eliezer? The Rabanan disagree about a small animal and say that leading it is the method for a small animal. They do not disagree about a large animal. It seems that the Rabanan are also of the opinion that “handing over” is a valid acquisition for acquiring a large animal. The opinion of the Rabanan, who are the majority, has the same force as an anonymous Mishna. If so, why is the Gemara so certain that Shmuel must rule that “leading” is a method of acquisition for a large animal, because Mishna (2a) says so? Perhaps Shmuel rules in accordance with the Rabanan of Kiddushin (25b), which is equal to an anonymous Mishna? Tosfos explains: when R’ Meir and R’ Eliezer speak of “handing over” they mean that it is also a method of acquisition, and certainly leading it is an acquisition. The Rabanan who agree with them insofar as a large animal is concerned are agreeing that “handing over” is also a method of acquisition. They are not saying that “leading” is not an acquisition. Thus, there is no contradiction between anonymous Mishna (2a) and the Rabanan of Kiddushin (25b). So too, when the Gemara there mentions that “handing over” is a method of acquisition, the meaning is that “handing over” is also a method of acquisition. But in such places where [the Gemara] mentions that leading is an acquisition, it means only leading and not “handing over”. In order to reconcile the Gemara’s argument that all must agree leading is an acquisition, with Mishna Kiddushin (25b), Tosfos resorts to an unorthodox interpretation of said Mishna. The Mishna which reads “handing over” is a method of acquisition, must mean that it is also a method of acquisition. Usually, one does not resort to such a novel interpretation without some proof that this is in fact the intent of that Mishna. Tosfos therefore says: Aside from this problem with the Gemara here, which indicates that all must agree that leading an animal is a valid acquisition, it is necessary to say so in order to understand the Gemara in Kiddushin (25b).
[It can be said only about the] rider, that he does not acquire [the animal he is riding]. The Gemara is arguing that leading is definitely a valid method of acquisition, since our specifically mentions leading. It is only riding that might not be a method of acquisition. But our Mishna also speaks of riding, just as it speaks of leading? If leading is an acquisition, shouldn’t riding also be an acquisition? The Mishna (2a) which also speaks of one who is riding in the same context as one who is leading, seems to indicate that riding is also an acquisition. [The Gemara] later, deflects an attempt to prove from the Mishna that riding is a valid acquisition by saying that the Mishna is speaking of one who is leading the animal by causing it to move with his feet. He is not merely sitting on the animal. The Gemara’s discussion of riding is limited to one who is sitting on the animal and not causing it to move at all.
[Does the] rider [have a] superior [right to the animal] since he holds it? Tosfos searches for a definition of “he holds it”. Which specific action is called “holding it”? In the second section Tosfos will also discuss whether holding it alone is the determinant factor for acquiring the animal. We should not explain that [a rider] “holds” [an animal] with his legs wrapped around the midsection or by sitting on it, for these are not called “holding it”. Rather, the fact that he is holding the bridle is called “he holds it”. The proof of this contention is that [the Gemara] will presently use this expression - he is holding the bridle. Tosfos has explained the physical action of “holding it”, but we still need to know the logic behind this method of acquisition. We must say that together with the feature that he is holding [the bridle], [the animal] is also moving slightly because of him and this combination of features is why holding the bridle is a method of acquisition. But if it is an acquisition because he moves the animal slightly, why does the Gemara suggest that leading might possibly be superior because the leader moves it? The rider also moves the animal. Tosfos explains the second side of the Gemara’s query: Or perhaps a leader is superior because the animal moves much more because of [a leader] as opposed to a rider. Tosfos tells us the reason why he is compelled to say that the movement of the animal is also an important factor in the acquisition of a rider and it is not only because he is holding the bridle. The Gemara will soon compare the rules of acquiring an animal to the rules governing liability for drawing a wagon with an illegal combination - an ox and a donkey. Tosfos draws his conclusion from the basis of this comparison. For if [the Gemara’s] question about whether riding is a valid method of acquisition is only because [the rider] is holding [the animal] by the bridle, and that alone is the reason that he acquires it, then how can [the Gemara] presently resolve this question by comparing holding to one who sits in a wagon which is drawn by an illegal combination and is exempt from receiving lashes because he has not caused the wagon to move, and conclude that so too, a rider who is holding the animal cannot acquire it? The comparison of the two cases is totally unfair. For in regard to the prohibition of drawing a wagon with an illegal combination of animals is concerned, violation does not all depend on whether he is holding the animals, but rather on whether they move the wagon because of him. Whereas, insofar as acquiring is concerned, the validity of the act is dependent only on whether he is holding [the animal] and not on whether it moves because of him? Since the Gemara does compare the two cases, the basis of comparison must be whether one who rides an animal or sits in a wagon is causing it to move. Thus, Tosfos has effectively demonstrated that acquiring an animal is also dependent not on the holding factor alone but on whether he is also causing it to move.
Or perhaps a leader is superior [since it moves because of him] — The Gemara assumed that Shmuel was speaking of when one of the litigants was riding the animal and the other was leading it. Shmuel says that one of them acquires the animal and the other does not. Rav Yehudah could not remember which of the two is the superior acquisition. The Gemara is now explaining the various attributes of either acquisition. It now says: Perhaps leading is a superior acquisition since he causes the animal to move? It emerges from the very question, that we could conceivably decide that a leader is not a superior acquisition and it is ineffective when the opponent is riding the animal. Tosfos finds this bewildering! How is it possible to consider the possibility that leading is not effective when the opponent is riding the animal? Doesn’t our Mishna clearly say otherwise? Tosfos is perplexed because he assumes that when Mishna (2a) speaks of one litigant riding the animal and the other leading, the Mishna means that these were the methods of acquisition. If so, the Mishna is a clear indication that leading an animal is an effective acquisition even when one’s opponent is riding it. This is bewildering! For we should conclude from our Mishna (2a) that a leader acquires in the presence of an opponent who rides? It is certainly evident from the Mishna that a leader acquires when one is leading and the other is riding. It is not clear that a rider acquires when his opponent is leading. Even though the Mishna does say that the rider receives half, the Mishna may be speaking of when the rider is also driving the animal with his feet as riders often do. Shmuel’s query about a rider is only when he is not actively making an effort to move the animal, as we will soon see in the Gemara. Tosfos wishes to point out that even according to the Gemara that soon says the Mishna is speaking of a rider who is moving the animal with his legs, there is still proof that a leader alone acquires. For even if the rider [the Mishna] speaks of is driving with his feet as the Gemara soon says, even so, a leader is certainly superior to only riding. For if even when the rider is driving with his feet, [the leader] acquires, certainly he acquires when the rider is only riding. In order to answer this question, Tosfos must retract his original assumption that when the Mishna speaks of a rider versus a leader, it is discussing the method of acquiring the animal. We must distinguish between actually acquiring an animal and demonstrating possession of said animal. Any method of acquisition, even if not effective in a particular situation is still considered to be a demonstration of possession as we will now see. b> We can answer: From the Mishna we cannot prove that a leader acquires in the presence of a rider. For even if [a leader] cannot acquire in the presence of a rider, he is considered to be demonstrating possession. For since leading alone, when not in the presence of a rider acquires, he is considered to be showing possession even in the presence of a rider. But later the Gemara attempts to prove from this very case in the Mishna that riding is an effective method of acquiring? It seems that the Mishna equates a demonstration of possession with an effective acquisition. Even so, later [the Gemara] correctly proves from our Mishna that riding alone acquires, since it is considered a demonstration of possession. For if even [riding] alone does not acquire, logic dictates that it is not a demonstration of possession in the presence of leading. Tosfos needs to show that his approach to differentiating between that which is an effective acquisition and that which is a demonstration of possession is evident from an earlier Gemara. He turns to 8a, where the Gemara discusses Rami bar Chama’s ruling that one can lift a found object for his fellow. The Gemara says: From where in Mishna (2a) did Rami bar Chama deduce that one may acquire a found object for his fellow? If we should say: From the first case: Two are grasping a cloak with each one claiming it is mine. We rule that they share the cloak. We are assuming that the ruling is based on the fact that since they are both exhibiting the way they acquired the cloak, they divide it. This shows that when they both lift it together they acquire it for each other. The Gemara rejects this proof: There, in the first case of the Mishna, this one says it is all mine and I lifted it entirely, and this one says it is all mine and I lifted it entirely. Neither claims that they lifted the cloak together, rather each of them says I lifted the cloak myself and it is all mine. Our ruling that they divide the cloak is not because we believe that they lifted the cloak simultaneously. Rather, it is because we do not know the truth and we must therefore divide it. This does not in any way prove that when they lift together they acquire it. We see from this answer that even though the way they are presently holding the cloak could not have been a way of acquiring it, even so, it is a proper demonstration of possession. So too, earlier (8a), the Gemara says: If you say that Rami bar Chama’s proof is from this case: two are grasping a cloak and we rule that they divide it. It seems that when they lifted the cloak simultaneously they both acquired it. This demonstrates that one can lift a found object for his fellow. The Gemara rejects this argument: This one says: I lifted the entire cloak and they divide because we cannot determine who the true owner is, but two who lift a cloak together would not acquire it at all. There, as well we see, that even though as they are both holding the cloak they could not acquire it, since one cannot lift a found object for his fellow, they are considered demonstrating possession, since if each of them lifted it alone, had his fellow not been lifting it on the other side, he could acquire it, he is therefore considered demonstrating possession even as he holds it together with his fellow. There is a final case in the Mishna (2a) that we might believe proves that both a leader and a rider can acquire in the presence of each other. Tosfos shows us that this is a fallacy. From the last case of the Mishna we can also not prove that a rider and a leader can acquire in each other’s presence. Why might we think that the final case of the Mishna proves this point? For [the Mishna] teaches: If both [litigants] admit, they divide the cloak and there is no need for an oath. What are they admitting? A superficial reading of the Mishna might indicate that they both acquired the animal as they are presently exhibiting ownership, one by riding the animal and the other by leading it. This seems to prove that had they acquired it in this manner, they would both be declared owners. Tosfos says that this is not so. For they are not both admitting that this is how they acquired the animal together, this one by riding and this one by leading, rather, they are admitting that both acquired the animal by leading it together or through some other method of acquisition. That one is riding the animal and the other leading it is merely their way of demonstrating possession.
Riding alone is not an acquisition — At this point in the dialogue the Gemara concludes that riding alone is not a valid method of acquisition. This seems to contradict the simple reading of the Gemara earlier. Let us review the Gemara: The Gemara relates that Shmuel said: Concerning riding and leading, one is a valid method of acquisition and the other is not. Rav Yehudah commented: I do not know which one is the valid method of acquisition. A) The Gemara wondered about Rav Yehudah’s query whether leading or riding is a valid method of acquisition. Was Shmuel possibly speaking of leading alone or riding alone? The Gemara argued that this could not have been the question, because leading alone is definitely a method of acquisition. It is certain that if only one of the two is a method of acquisition and not the other, it must be that leading is an acquisition and riding is not. B) The Gemara then says: rather, the question was whether riding is a method of acquisition in the presence of a leader? This conclusion indicates that certainly riding alone is an acquisition. Shmuel’s statement was only about riding versus leading. C) The Gemara then present a Mishna (Kilayim 8, 3) as proof that even riding alone is not an acquisition. This understanding of the Gemara, although logical creates a major problem in the flow of the Gemara. For initially the Gemara in step b) was certain that riding alone is an acquisition and then in step c) it concludes that even riding alone is not a method of acquisition. The Gemara does not usually categorically say that the halacha is one way and then reverse itself and say the halacha is the opposite. We must find a way of reading the Gemara so that the question of whether riding alone is an acquisition remained open and would then be subject to a conclusion that it is not an acquisition. Tosfos re-defines Rav Yehudah’s query about Shmuel’s statement: It appears that Rav Yehudah was in doubt if the statement he heard from Shmuel was about riding alone and leading alone, and then, it would be plain to him that Shmuel said riding was not an acquisition, because leading alone is known to be an acquisition. Or, if he heard from [Shmuel] about riding in the presence of a leader, and in that case, he is in doubt which of the two is an acquisition. According to this interpretation, the Gemara in step b) never concluded that riding is an acquisition. The Gemara simply said that if Shmuel’s statement was about riding alone and leading alone, it would be certain that leading alone was an acquisition and riding was not. The Gemara never definitively stated that this was Shmuel’s position. The question remained open. The Gemara can therefore conclude in step c) that even riding alone is not a method of acquisition. For if [Rav Yehudah] ultimately had no doubt about riding alone, as we explained in the simple reading of the Gemara, rather, he definitely heard from Shmuel that his statement was only about riding in the presence of a leader, if so, the Gemara has initially concluded in step b) that Shmuel maintains that riding alone is an acquisition, and now in step c) the Gemara resolves that even riding alone is not an acquisition. The Gemara does not change its conclusions. We must say that in step b) the question of riding alone did remain open. It is then fair to say that in step c) the Gemara concludes it is not an acquisition.
