1The wine must all be poured out in order to prevent a possible mishap. And Beit Hillel say: Let the wine be used for sprinkling. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: I will decide the halakha by proposing an intermediate opinion: If the wine became impure in a house, it may be used for sprinkling, as it can be used immediately, but if it became impure in the field, it must all be poured out, as it is possible that by the time it is brought to the house and used for sprinkling, someone may drink it.
2There are those who say that he decided the halakha as follows: With regard to aged wine, it may be used for sprinkling, as it is fit to be sprinkled immediately, but with regard to new wine, which does not yet have a pleasant aroma, it must all be poured out in order to prevent a possible mishap. They said to Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei: A decision by a third party does not conclusively decide the halakha .
3§ The mishna teaches that if the owner of the wine said to the owner of the honey: I will salvage your honey and you will pay me the value of my wine, the owner of the honey is obligated to give him compensation for the wine. The Gemara asks: Why is the stipulation binding? Let the owner of the honey say to him: I was merely fooling with you when I accepted your condition, and I did not agree to it at all.
4Isn’t it taught in a baraita : In a case where one was fleeing from prison and there was a ferry before him, and he said to the ferryman: Take this entire dinar and take me across the river, the ferryman has the right to collect only his usual wage, but not the entire dinar. Apparently, the prisoner could have said to him: I was merely fooling with you and never intended to pay you a full dinar. Here also, let the owner of the honey say to the owner of the wine: I was merely fooling with you.
5The Gemara answers: This case in the mishna is not comparable to the case cited above; rather, it is comparable to the latter clause of that same baraita , which states: And if he said to the ferryman: Take this dinar as your wage and take me across the river, the prisoner must give him his wage in the full amount, i.e., the entire dinar.
6What is different in the first clause, which states that the ferryman receives only his regular wage, and what is different in the latter clause, which states that he receives the full dinar? Rami bar Ḥama said: The latter clause deals with a trapper who scoops fish from the sea, i.e., a fisherman, and he can say to the prisoner: You have caused me a loss of fish [ kavrei ] worth a dinar, which I would have caught had I not taken you across the river. Similarly, in the case in the mishna, the owner of the wine sustains a financial loss in order to save the honey, and therefore he is entitled to the compensation that the owner of the honey agreed to pay.
7§ The mishna teaches: If a river washed away his donkey and the donkey of the other man, and his donkey is worth one hundred dinars, etc. The Gemara notes: And it is necessary to teach both the case of the barrels of wine and honey and the case of the donkeys, as if it had taught us only the first case, that of the wine and honey, it might be said that it is only there, in that case, that when the owner of the wine states his stipulation, the owner of the honey gives him the value of the entire loss. Why is this? It is because the wine is lost through the direct action of its owner. But here, in the case of the donkeys, since the donkey is lost by itself in the river, let us say: The one who salvages the donkey of his fellow has the right to only his wage, i.e., compensation for his labor.
8And if the mishna had taught us only the case of the latter clause, it might be said: It is here, in the case of the donkeys, that if the intention of the one who saved the donkey was unspecified, i.e., he did not stipulate that the owner of the other donkey would compensate him for the loss of his own donkey, he has the right to only his wage, because the donkey is lost by itself. But there, where the barrel of wine is lost through the direct action of its owner, one might say: Even in a case where the intention of the owner of the wine was unspecified, the owner of the honey must give him the value of the entire barrel of wine. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, both cases are necessary.
9The Gemara cites a relevant discussion. Rav Kahana raised a dilemma before Rav: If one descended into the river to rescue another’s donkey instead of his own after stipulating that he would be compensated for the loss of his own donkey, and his own donkey emerged from the river by itself, what is the halakha ? Is the rescuer still entitled to payment from the owner of the donkey that he saved, despite the fact that he did not suffer a monetary loss? Rav said to him: The rescuer is still compensated because it was from Heaven that mercy was bestowed upon him, and his good fortune does not affect the stipulation.
10This is like that case where Rav Safra was traveling in a caravan, and a certain lion followed them, accompanying them along the way. Every night, the travelers would send one of their donkeys to the lion, and the lion would eat it. When Rav Safra’s time arrived to provide the lion with prey, he sent it his donkey but the lion did not eat it. Rav Safra went ahead and acquired it back, as his donkey had become ownerless when he presented it to the lion. Although Rav Safra did not lose his donkey, he had fulfilled his obligation to provide the lion with a donkey, and his good fortune did not affect his obligation vis-à-vis the other travelers.
11With regard to this episode, Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: Why was it necessary for him to acquire the donkey again? Although Rav Safra made it ownerless by sending it to the lion, it was made ownerless only with the intention that the lion would consume it, but it was not made ownerless with the intention that everyone else could acquire it. Accordingly, no one else could have acquired the donkey. Ravina said to him: Rav Safra did so as an added precaution.
12Rav raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: If one descended into the river in order to rescue another’s donkey instead of his own, but he did not manage to rescue it, what is the halakha ? Does the stipulation still apply so that the owner of the donkey he attempted to rescue must compensate him for the loss of his own donkey? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: And is this a question? It is clear that he has the right to collect only his wage, but he is not entitled to the value of his own donkey.
13Rav raised an objection to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s ruling from a baraita : In a case of one who hires a laborer