1And if the produce decreased in price due to the market value, the debt is not reduced for him.
2The Gemara challenges: But the value of the coin has been enhanced for the purpose of melting it down into a bar of metal. Since this coin now contains a larger quantity of metal, if it were to be melted it would be worth more than an earlier coin of the same type, so it should be considered interest. Rather, in this case one must act in accordance with how Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, acted when they performed an action with the dinars of Agardamis the Arab merchant [ tayya’a ]: They considered up to ten old coins to be the equivalent of eight new coins. Since ten old coins were equivalent in value to eight new coins, they paid eight new coins in exchange for ten old ones.
3§ Rabba says: One who throws another’s coin into the Great Sea is exempt from liability. What is the reason for this? He can say: The coin is resting before you; if you wish, take it. The Gemara comments: And this statement applies only if the coin is in translucent water, where the owner of the coin can see the coin, but in turbid water, where he cannot see the coin, it does not apply, and the one that threw it will be liable to compensate the owner. And this statement applies only when he rolled the coin into the sea without picking it up, but if he took the coin with his hands and threw it into the sea, he has robbed the owner of it, and the robber is required to perform the mitzva of returning the coin to its owner.
4Rava raises an objection to the statement of Rabba from a baraita ( Tosefta , Ma’aser Sheni 1:6): One cannot desacralize second tithe by transferring its sanctity onto money that is not in his possession. How so? If he had money in a fortress [ kastera ], or in the King’s Mountain [ Har HaMelekh ], or if his purse fell into the Great Sea, one may not desacralize second tithe by transferring its sanctity onto that money. This indicates that money that fell into the Great Sea is considered lost. Rabba said: This is not difficult; it is different with regard to second tithe, since it is necessary that the money be found in the hand of the one who wishes to desacralize the tithe, as the Merciful One states in the Torah: “Then you shall turn it into money, and bind up the money in your hand, and shall go to the place that the Lord your God shall choose” (Deuteronomy 14:25), and if it is in the Great Sea, it is not in his hand, but nevertheless it is not considered lost.
5And Rabba also says: One who effaces the image of another’s coin is exempt from paying damages, even though he caused the coin to lose value. What is the reason for this? As he did not do anything, the coin remains the same size as before. The Gemara comments: And this statement applies only in a case where he struck it with a hammer [ kurnesa ] and flattened it; but if he filed it with a file [ shofina ] he must pay the amount of the reduction in value, since he caused it to diminish in size.
6Rava raises an objection to the statement of Rabba from a baraita ( Tosefta 9:26): If a master struck his slave on his eye and blinded it, or on his ear and deafened it, the slave is emancipated by means of these injuries. If he struck the slave near his eye and as a result he does not see, or near his ear and he does not hear, the slave is not emancipated by means of these injuries. The first clause indicates that one is liable for damage caused even if it is not visible damage.
7The Gemara responds: Rabba conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as Rabba says: One who deafens his father is put to death, even though no bruise is visible, because it is impossible for deafening to occur without a bruise, as it is certain that a drop of blood fell into his ear from the blow, even if it is not visible from the outside. Striking someone in the ear in a manner that causes deafness results in a significant physical change, while striking a coin with a hammer does not detract from the actual size of the coin.
8And Rabba also says: One who slits the ear of another’s cow is exempt from paying damages, even though this cow is no longer fit to be sacrificed as an offering due to the injury. What is the reason for this? As the cow was available for many uses until now, so it is still available for those uses now, since the one who slit its ear did not do anything to damage the cow in a substantial way. And concerning the fact that it is rendered disqualified from being sacrificed as an offering, not all oxen stand near the altar, i.e., most animals are not sacrificed as offerings anyway, so it is not considered a loss.
9Rava raises an objection from a baraita : One who performs a task with the water of purification, i.e., the water that is mixed with the ashes of the red heifer and sprinkled upon one who has become impure as part of the purification ritual, or with the red heifer of purification, whose ashes are mixed with springwater and sprinkled on those who have contracted impurity imparted by a corpse on the third and seventh days of their impurity, is exempt according to human laws, since he has not caused any discernible damage, but is liable according to the laws of Heaven. It may be inferred from here that one is exempt from liability according to human laws only if he performed a task with those items, since the damage that he caused is not evident, but in the case of one who slits the ear, where the damage is evident, he is indeed liable according to human laws.
10The Sages say in response: The same is true that even one who slits the ear is exempt according to human laws, and the baraita that specified cases where the damage is not evident teaches us this: That even one who performs a task with the water of purification or the red heifer, where the damage is not evident, is liable according to the laws of Heaven.
11And Rabba also says: One who burns another’s promissory note is exempt, as the one who burned it can say to him: I have burned only your paper, and he is not held liable for the fact that the creditor will no longer be able to prove that he had provided the loan. Rami bar Ḥama objects to this: What are the circumstances?