1permission, and the homeowner’s ox gored it or the homeowner’s dog bit it, the homeowner is exempt. If it gored the homeowner’s ox, the owner of the goring ox is liable. Furthermore, if the ox that he brought into the courtyard without permission fell into the owner’s pit and contaminated its water, the owner of the ox is liable to pay compensation for despoiling the water. If the homeowner’s father or son were inside the pit at the time the ox fell and the person died as a result, the owner of the ox pays the ransom. But if he brought the ox into the courtyard with permission, the owner of the courtyard is liable for the damage caused.
2Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The homeowner is not liable in any of the cases in the mishna, even if he gave his permission for the items to be brought into his premises, unless he explicitly accepts responsibility upon himself to safeguard them.
3GEMARA: From the first case of the mishna, it can be inferred that the reason the potter is liable is that he brought his pots into another’s courtyard without permission. But if he brought them in with permission, the potter would not be liable for damage caused to the courtyard owner’s animal; and we do not say that the potter accepted responsibility for the safeguarding of the courtyard owner’s animal from his own pots.
4Whose opinion is this? It is that of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who says at the conclusion of the mishna that any case where permission is granted to allow an item into one’s premises without specification, i.e., without an explicit agreement as to who is responsible for safeguarding the item, it is assumed that with regard to each party, he has not accepted upon himself the responsibility of safeguarding the item. Therefore, the potter who received permission to bring his pots into the owner’s courtyard similarly did not accept responsibility to safeguard against damage to the property of the owner of the courtyard.
5But say the latter clause: If the potter brought them into the courtyard with permission, the owner of the courtyard is liable. In this case, we arrive at the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and say that, even in a case where permission is granted to allow an item into one’s premises without specification, where the owner merely said he could bring them into the courtyard, the homeowner accepts upon himself responsibility for safeguarding the items to ensure that they are not damaged, as well.
6And furthermore, the end of the mishna states: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that the owner of the courtyard is not liable in any of the cases in the mishna, even if he gave his permission for the items to be brought into his premises, unless the homeowner explicitly accepts responsibility upon himself to safeguard them. Therefore, it emerges that the first clause and the last clause of the mishna are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, but the middle clause of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Is this a reasonable way to read the mishna?
7The Gemara answers that Rabbi Zeira said: This mishna is disjointed and doesn’t follow a single opinion. Rather, the one who taught this clause of the mishna did not teach that clause of the mishna. Rava said: The beginning of the mishna is entirely in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. In the case where the potter received permission to place his pots there, the owner of the courtyard accepted responsibility upon himself for the safeguarding of the pots, and even to the extent that if the pots broke due to the wind, he would be liable. The owner of the pots, by contrast, did not accept any responsibility to ensure that his items would not cause damage.
8§ The mishna teaches: If he brought his produce into the homeowner’s courtyard without permission, and the owner’s animal was injured by the produce, he is liable. Rav says: They taught this halakha only in a case where the animal slipped on it and fell, but if it ate from the produce and was injured, he is exempt. What is the reason? The animal should not have eaten it, and it was not the owner of the fruit who acted improperly but the animal itself.
9Rav Sheshet said: I say that Rav stated this halakha while dozing and lying down, and it is not entirely precise, as it is taught in a baraita : One who places poison before another’s animal is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. From the above statement, it may be inferred that it is specifically where he put poison before the animal that he is exempt, since it is not suitable for eating. But if he put produce before it, which is suitable for eating, and the animal dies from eating it, he is also liable according to human laws. The Gemara analyzes this ruling: But why is he liable? Here also Rav’s logic can be invoked, that the animal should not have eaten it. Therefore, this baraita poses a difficulty for Rav.
10In order to explain Rav’s statement, the Sages said: The same is true, that even if the animal was injured by eating the produce, he would also be exempt according to human laws, and this baraita teaches us this, that even in the case of poison, which is not suitable for eating, the one who placed the poison before the animal is liable according to the laws of Heaven.
11And if you wish, say instead that the case where the baraita exempts from liability according to human laws the one who placed poison before the animal is referring to an item suitable for eating as well, such as afrazta , a type of herb that appears edible for animals but is actually poisonous. Therefore, this herb is halakhically equivalent to any other produce for which he is exempt from liability according to human laws, since, as Rav explained, the animal should not have eaten it.
12The Gemara raises an objection to Rav’s statement from a baraita : In the case of a woman who entered the house of a homeowner without permission in order to grind wheat, and the homeowner’s animal ate the wheat, he is exempt. Moreover, if the homeowner’s animal was injured by the wheat, the woman is liable. Now according to Rav’s explanation, why is she liable? Let us say here as well that the animal should not have eaten it.
13In order to explain Rav’s statement, the Sages said: What is the difficulty here? Is this baraita preferable to the mishna that we interpreted as a scenario where the animal slipped on the produce? Similarly, the baraita is also referring to a case where the animal was injured by slipping on the wheat, not by eating it.
14The Gemara asks: And he who asked it, why did he ask it? This answer seems obvious. The Gemara answers: The questioner could have said to you: Granted, the mishna that teaches: If it is injured by them [ bahen ], is referring to a case where the animal slipped on them [ bahen ]. But here in the baraita it teaches the phrase: If it is injured, and it does not teach the additional term: Bahen . Since this case is immediately preceded by the case of: And the owner’s animal ate them, it is reasonable to surmise that when the baraita teaches the case of the animal being injured, the injury is due to eating.
15The Gemara notes: And the other one, i.e., the one who provided the answer, could have said to you in response: There is no difference whether it states: It was injured, or: It was injured by them, as in both cases the injury can be explained as resulting from slipping and not from eating.
16Come and hear a proof from a baraita : If one brought his ox into a homeowner’s courtyard without permission, and the ox ate wheat belonging to the homeowner and consequently was stricken with diarrhea and died, then the homeowner is exempt. But if the ox’s owner brought it into the courtyard with permission, the owner of the courtyard is liable. The Gemara comments: Why, in the latter case, is the owner liable for the damage to the ox? Shouldn’t the assertion: The ox shouldn’t have eaten it, be invoked, and any injury that follows is the responsibility of the ox’s owner?
17Rava said in response: Are you raising a contradiction from a case with permission and applying it against a case without permission? There is no difficulty here, since in the case where the ox’s owner brought the ox into the courtyard with permission, the homeowner thereby accepted responsibility upon himself for safeguarding against any damage to the other’s ox. And even if the ox strangled itself, he would still be liable.
18§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In a case where the owner of the courtyard accepted upon himself responsibility for safeguarding the items entering his premises, what is the halakha ? Did he accept upon himself only the responsibility of safeguarding himself and his animals from causing damage? Or, perhaps he even accepted responsibility upon himself for safeguarding against all forms of damage that originate from the outside.
19Come and hear a solution based on that which Rav Yehuda bar Simon taught in the tractate of Nezikin from the school of Karna: If one brought his produce into a homeowner’s courtyard without permission, and an ox came from elsewhere and ate it, he is exempt. But if one brought the produce into the courtyard with permission, he is liable. The Gemara clarifies: Who is the phrase: He is exempt, referring to, and who is the phrase: He is liable, referring to? Does it not mean that the owner of the courtyard is exempt and the owner of the courtyard is liable? This would indicate that by granting permission for the produce to be brought in, he accepts responsibility to safeguard against other damage as well, such as that caused by another ox entering from the outside.
20In response, they said that this interpretation should be rejected: No, it means that the owner of the ox that causes damage is exempt, and the owner of the ox is liable.
21The Gemara asks: But if it is referring to the owner of the ox,