1MISHNA: One who injures another is liable to pay compensation for that injury due to five types of indemnity: He must pay for damage, for pain, for medical costs, for loss of livelihood, and for humiliation.
2How is payment for damage assessed? If one blinded another’s eye, severed his hand, broke his leg, or caused any other injury, the court views the injured party as though he were a slave being sold in the slave market, and the court appraises how much he was worth before the injury and how much he is worth after the injury. The difference between these two sums is the amount that one must pay for causing damage.
3How is payment for pain assessed? If one burned another with a skewer [ beshapud ] or with a hot nail, or even if one burned another on his fingernail, which is a place where he does not cause a bruise that would affect the victim’s value on the slave market, the court evaluates how much money a person with a similar threshold for pain as the victim is willing to take in order to be made to suffer in this way. The one who burned the victim must then pay this amount.
4How is payment for medical costs assessed? If one struck another, then he is liable to heal him by paying for his medical costs. In a case where growths, e.g., blisters or rashes, appeared on the injured party, if the growths are due to the blow, the one who struck him is liable; if the growths are not due to the blow, the one who struck him is exempt. In a case where the wound healed, and then reopened, and again healed, and then reopened, the one who struck him remains liable to heal the injured party by paying for his medical costs, as it is apparent that the current wound resulted from the original injury. If the injury healed fully, the one who struck him is not liable to heal him by paying for any subsequent medical costs.
5How is payment for loss of livelihood assessed? The court views the injured party as though he were a watchman of cucumbers, and the one who caused him injury must compensate him based on that pay scale for the income that he lost during his convalescence. This indemnity does not take into account the value of the standard wages of the injured party because the one who caused him injury already gave him compensation for his hand or compensation for his leg, and that compensation took into account his professional skills.
6How is payment for humiliation assessed? It all depends on the stature of the one who humiliates the other and the one who is humiliated.
7GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Why does the mishna take for granted the fact that one who caused injury is liable to pay compensation to the injured party? The Merciful One states in the Torah: “An eye for an eye” (Exodus 21:24). You might say that this means that the one who caused injury shall lose an actual eye rather than pay money.
8The Gemara responds: That interpretation should not enter your mind. The principle implicit in the mishna is derived from a verbal analogy in the Torah, as it is taught in a baraita : Based on the verse: “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a hand for a hand, a foot for a foot” (Exodus 21:24), one might have thought that if one blinded the eye of another, the court blinds his eye as punishment; or if one severed the hand of another, the court severs his hand; or if one broke the leg of another, the court breaks his leg. Therefore, the verse states: “One who strikes a person,” and the verse also states: “And one who strikes an animal,” to teach that just as one who strikes an animal is liable to pay monetary compensation, so too, one who strikes a person is liable to pay monetary compensation.
9And if it is your wish to say that there is an objection to this derivation, there is an alternative derivation: The verse states: “And you shall not take ransom for the life of a murderer, who is guilty of death, for he shall die” (Numbers 35:31). This indicates that it is only for the life of a murderer that you shall not take ransom; but you shall take ransom for one who severed another’s extremities, which is analogous to the death of a limb, as severed limbs do not regenerate.
10The Gemara asks: To which verse is the baraita referring when it quotes: “One who strikes a person” and: “One who strikes an animal”? If we say that the baraita is referring to the verse: “One who strikes an animal shall pay its compensation, and one who strikes a person shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:21), this cannot be, as that verse is written with regard to killing, not injury, and there is no monetary compensation for killing.
11Rather, the baraita references the verse from here: “One who strikes an animal mortally shall pay its compensation, a life for a life” (Leviticus 24:18); and juxtaposed to that is the verse: “And if a man maims his neighbor, as he has done, so shall it be done to him” (Leviticus 24:19). The Gemara challenges: But this latter verse does not use the expression: “One who strikes,” which is the basis for the comparison in the baraita . The Gemara responds: We are stating an analogy from striking to striking that is based not upon the exact phrasing of the verse but upon the details of the halakha , as follows: Just as the act of striking that is stated with regard to an animal renders one liable to pay monetary compensation, so too, the act of striking that is stated with regard to a person renders one liable to pay monetary compensation.
12The Gemara challenges: But isn’t it written in the verses discussing one who injures another: “And a man who strikes any person mortally shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:17), which presumably means that in the case of one who severs another’s extremity the same injury, i.e., death of a limb, is done to the one who caused the injury, and he does not pay monetary compensation? The Gemara answers: The verse does not mean that his limb shall be put to death, i.e., removed, but rather, that he should pay compensation with money. The Gemara asks: From where do you say that the verse is referring to paying compensation with money? Why not say that he is punished with actual death i.e., loss of a limb?
13The Gemara answers: That interpretation should not enter your mind for two reasons. One reason is that this verse is juxtaposed to the following verse: “One who strikes an animal mortally shall pay its compensation” (Leviticus 24:18). And furthermore, it is written after it: “A fracture for a fracture, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth; as he has given a blemish to a person, so shall it be given unto him” (Leviticus 24:20); and learn from the use of the word “given” that the verse is referring to money.
14The Gemara asks: And what potential difficulty with the first derivation did the baraita refer to when it prefaced its second derivation with the phrase: If it is your wish to say? The Gemara explains: The baraita means that a further difficulty was troubling to the tanna : What did you see that led you to derive the principle of monetary payment from the phrase “one who strikes an animal”? Why not derive the halakha from the verse: “One who strikes a person shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:21), and learn that causing an injury renders one liable to receive physical retribution, which is analogous to death, and not monetary payment?
15The Sages say in response: The halakhot of damages are derived from a verse concerning damages, and the halakhot of damages are not derived from a verse concerning death. The Gemara questions this statement: On the contrary, why not say that the halakhot concerning a person are derived from a verse concerning a person, and the halakhot concerning a person are not derived from a verse concerning animals?
16To deflect this question, this is consistent with that which the second derivation of the baraita teaches: If it is your wish to say that there is an objection to this derivation, there is an alternative derivation, as the verse states: “And you shall not take ransom for the life of a murderer, who is guilty of death, for he shall die” (Numbers 35:31). This indicates that it is only for the life of a murderer that you shall not take ransom; but you shall take ransom for one who severed another’s extremities, which is analogous to the death of a limb, as severed limbs do not regenerate.
17The Gemara challenges this claim: But is this verse: “You shall not take ransom for the life of a murderer,” coming to exclude the case of one who severs another’s extremities from the prohibition against taking ransom? Isn’t this verse necessary to teach that which the Merciful One states: You shall not mete out two punishments to him; i.e., do not take money from him as ransom and also kill him? The Gemara answers: That halakha is derived from the verse: “Then it shall be, if the guilty deserves to be lashed, that the judge shall lie him down and flog him before him, according to the measure of his evildoing” (Deuteronomy 25:2). From the fact that “evildoing” is singular, the Gemara homiletically infers: For one evildoing, you can render him liable, but you cannot render him liable for two evildoings, i.e., one cannot receive two punishments for the same act.
18The Gemara challenges this explanation: But the verse: “You shall not take ransom for the life of a murderer, for one who is guilty of death” is still necessary to teach the primary halakha taught in that verse, in which the Merciful One states: You shall not take money and thereby exempt the guilty from being put to death. The verse does not serve to exclude liability to pay damages from the prohibition against paying restitution. The Gemara answers: If so, i.e., if the Torah desires to teach only that the court cannot take ransom to spare the murderer from being put to death, let the Merciful One write in the Torah: “You shall not take ransom” and follow it immediately with the phrase “for one who is guilty of death.” Why do I need the Torah to also state: “For the life of a murderer”? Learn from the addition of that phrase that it is only for a murderer that you shall not take ransom; but you shall take ransom for one who severed another’s extremities, which do not regenerate once severed.
19The Gemara asks: And once it is written: “You shall not take ransom,” why do I need the first derivation of the baraita , which juxtaposes: “One who strikes a person” to: “One who strikes an animal”? The Sages say in response: If the halakha were to be derived only from that verse which states: “You shall not take ransom” (Numbers 35:31), I would say: If the one who caused the damage desires, he may choose to give his eye, and if he desires, he may choose to give the monetary value of his eye. Therefore, the Torah teaches us to derive this halakha from that of an animal: Just as one who strikes an animal is liable to pay monetary compensation and does not receive corporal punishment, so too, one who strikes a person is liable to pay monetary compensation and does not receive corporal punishment.
20§ The Gemara presents a series of derivations for the principle that one who injures another is liable to pay monetary compensation. It is taught in a baraita : Rabbi Dostai ben Yehuda says: The phrase: “An eye for an eye” (Leviticus 24:20), means monetary restitution. Do you say that he must pay the victim monetary restitution, or is it only teaching that the one who caused the injury must lose an actual eye? You say: There may be a case where the eye of the one who caused the injury is large and the eye of the injured party is small. How can I read and literally apply the phrase “an eye for an eye” in this case?
21The Gemara continues the derivation: And if you would say that in all cases like this, where their eyes are different sizes, the injured party takes monetary restitution from the one who caused him injury, but in a case where their eyes are the same size, the one who caused injury is punished by actually having his eye removed, this cannot be, as the Torah said: “You shall have one manner of law” (Leviticus 24:22), teaching that the law shall be equal for all of you.
22The Sages object to this derivation and say: What is the difficulty in saying that his eye should be blinded? Perhaps, as the one who caused the injury took the sight from the injured party’s eye, the Merciful One states that the court should take the sight from his eye as well, no matter the size of the eye. Since, if you do not say so, then by the same logic,