1he is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven.
2The Gemara comments: And the Rabbis concede to the opinion of Rabbi Meir in the cases of one’s stone, one’s knife, or one’s load, that if he placed them on top of his roof and they fell as a result of being blown off by a typical wind, i.e., one of ordinary force, and they caused damage, that he is liable. And Rabbi Meir concedes to the opinion of the Rabbis in the case of one who puts pitchers [ kankanin ] on the roof in order to dry them, and they fell as a result of being blown off by an atypical wind, i.e., one of unusual force, and they caused damage, that he is exempt. Evidently, even Rabbi Meir concedes that if one’s property causes damage due to circumstances completely beyond his control, he is exempt.
3Accordingly, Abaye rejects Rabba’s explanation of Rabbi Yehuda’s statement, that he deems the owner of the jug liable even if he merely attempted to take it off his shoulder and it broke, and offers another explanation. Rather, Abaye said that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree with regard to two different situations. They disagree with regard to a situation where the damage was caused at the time of the person’s fall, and they disagree with regard to a situation where the damage was caused after the person’s fall.
4They disagree in a situation where the damage was caused at the time of the person’s fall, with regard to whether or not one who stumbles, thereby causing his jug to break, is considered negligent. One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that one who stumbles is considered negligent, as his carelessness caused him to stumble. Therefore, he is liable to pay for damage caused by the shards of the jug, which broke as result of his stumbling. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that one who stumbles is not considered negligent.
5They disagree in a situation where the damage was caused after the person’s fall, with regard to one who renounces ownership of his hazardous property. Presumably, the owner of the jug has no interest in keeping the shards, and it is considered as though he renounced his ownership of them. One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that one who renounces ownership of his hazardous property is liable to pay restitution for damage caused by it, despite the fact that it no longer belongs to him. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that he is exempt from paying restitution, as it does not belong to him anymore.
6And from where is this interpretation derived? It is derived from the fact that the mishna teaches two possible cases of damage, stating: Another person slipped in the water or was injured by the shards. This case, slipping in the water, is seemingly identical to that case, injured by the shards. Rather, is it not necessary to explain that this is what the mishna is saying: Another person slipped in the water at the time of the person’s fall, or was injured by the shards after the person’s fall?
7The Gemara infers: And since the dispute in the mishna is with regard to two situations, the dispute in the baraita between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis must also relate to two situations, as there too, two cases are mentioned, a case where one’s jug broke and a case where one’s camel fell. Apparently, the dispute is with regard to damage caused both at the time of the fall and after the fall. Rabbi Meir holds that one who stumbles and breaks his jug, causing damage to others, is considered negligent and that one who renounces ownership of his hazardous property is liable, and the Rabbis disagree with regard to both issues.
8The Gemara asks: Granted, with regard to the case where one’s jug broke, you find these circumstances either at the time of the fall or after the fall. But with regard to the case where his camel fell, granted, you find this circumstance after the fall, when he renounces his ownership of the carcass, not considering it worth keeping, but how can you find these circumstances at the time of the fall? How can the camel’s falling be considered to be due to the owner’s negligence, possibly rendering him liable to pay for injuries caused by it?
9Rav Aḥa said: For example, in a case where the camel crossed through water, through the inundation [ serata ] of a river that overflowed its banks, and it stumbled there, the owner was negligent, as he should not have gone this way.
10The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If there was another route, and he nevertheless chose this one, he is clearly negligent according to all opinions. And if there was no other route, he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control, and he is exempt from liability according to all opinions.
11Rather, you find this circumstance in a case where the owner stumbled and the camel then stumbled on him. In this case, the Sages engage in a dispute whether or not one who stumbles is considered negligent.
12The Gemara asks: According to Abaye’s explanation that the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda is with regard to a situation where the owner of the jug renounces ownership of his hazardous property after it falls, what is the meaning of Rabbi Yehuda’s statement that if the owner of the jug acted with intent he is liable? What intention is there after the jug fell and broke?
13Rav Yosef said: It is a situation where he intends to acquire the shards of the broken jug, and he does not renounce his ownership of them. It is specifically in that case that Rabbi Yehuda holds him liable to pay for damage caused by the shards. And similarly, Rav Ashi said: It is a situation where he intends to acquire the shards.
14§ Rabbi Elazar says: The dispute in the baraita is with regard to a situation where the damage occurred at the time of the person’s fall.
15The Gemara asks: But after the fall, according to this statement, what is the halakha ? Does everyone agree that the owner of the jug is exempt from liability? But isn’t there Rabbi Meir, who deems him liable, since he did not remove the shards? Rather, what is the halakha ? Does everyone agree that he is liable? But aren’t there the Rabbis, who deem him exempt?
16The Gemara answers: Rather, what is the explanation of the phrase: At the time of the person’s fall? It means even at the time of the person’s fall, and it teaches us that the dispute is referring to a situation where the damage occurred after the fall and also to a situation where it occurred at the time of the fall, in accordance with Abaye’s explanation of the mishna.