1but if he took an oath, even though he subsequently paid, to whom does the thief pay double payment? To the owner of the deposit.
2Rava inferred the halakha from the wording of the latter clause. It teaches: If the bailee took an oath and did not want to pay, the thief must pay the penalty to the owner of the deposit. Rava infers from here that the reason the thief pays the owner is specifically that he did not want to pay, but if he did pay, even though he took an oath previously, to whom does the thief pay double payment? To the one in whose possession the deposit was when it was lost.
3The Gemara notes: The inference from the latter clause is difficult for the opinion of Abaye. The Gemara explains. Abaye could have said to you: This is what the latter clause of the mishna is teaching: If the bailee took an oath and did not want to pay initially before taking the oath, but rather wanted to pay only after having taken the oath, in this case to whom does the thief pay double payment? To the owner of the deposit. Similarly, the Gemara notes: The inference from the first clause is difficult for the opinion of Rava. The Gemara explains. Rava could have said to you: This is what the first clause of the mishna is teaching: If he paid, meaning he had taken an oath and did not want to stand by his oath, but instead paid in order to nullify the oath he had taken, to whom does the thief pay double payment? To the one in whose possession the deposit was when it was lost.
4§ The Gemara relates another dilemma concerning the status of a bailee and stolen deposits. If the owner of a deposit demanded from a bailee that he return their deposit, and he claimed that it had been stolen from him and took an oath to that effect; and then the thief was recognized, and the bailee demanded of the thief to pay and he admitted to having stolen it; and then the owner demanded of the thief to pay and he denied the claim, and the owner brought witnesses that he had stolen it, did the thief become exempt from double payment through his admission to the bailee, as is the halakha when one admits liability to a penalty? Does the bailee have standing vis-à-vis the thief despite having exempted himself by taking an oath to the owner, or did the thief not become exempt through his admission to the bailee?
5Rava says: If he took an oath truthfully, i.e., if it now becomes clear through the testimony of witnesses that the bailee’s oath was true, he is assumed to be someone the owner would rely on to collect the stolen item for him, and he remains a bailee. Therefore, the thief became exempt through his admission to the bailee. If his oath was taken falsely, e.g., he took an oath that the animal given as a deposit died naturally and it is now clear that his oath was false, he is assumed to be someone whom the owner would not rely on to collect the stolen item for them, and he is no longer a bailee. In this case, the thief did not become exempt through his admission to the bailee.
6Rava raises a dilemma concerning the previous ruling: If a bailee rose to take a false oath but the owner did not let him, what is the halakha ? Should he be considered as one who had taken a false oath, as that was his intention, and he is no longer a bailee; or, since he never actually took the false oath, he is still a bailee? The Gemara comments: The question shall stand unresolved. The Gemara notes that Rav Kahana would teach Rava’s question like this, as quoted above. Rav Tavyumei would teach Rava’s question differently: Rava raises a dilemma: If he actually took a false oath, what is the halakha ? Is he still a bailee or not? The Gemara comments: The question shall stand unresolved.
7The Gemara relates another dilemma concerning the status of a bailee and stolen deposits: If the owners of a deposit demanded from a bailee that he return their deposit and he paid them instead of taking an oath, and then the thief was recognized, and the owners demanded of the thief to pay and he admitted to having stolen it; and then the bailee demanded of the thief to pay and he denied the claim, and the bailee brought witnesses that he had stolen it, did the thief become exempt from double payment through his admission to the owners, as is the halakha when one admits liability to a penalty, or not?
8The Gemara explains: Do we say that the bailee can say to the owners: Once you took your money from me you removed yourselves from here and have no further connection to this deposit. Therefore, I am now considered the owner of the stolen item and the right to the double payment is mine, and the thief’s admission to you is meaningless. Or perhaps the owners can say to him: Just as you performed a service for us by paying us when you were not obligated, we performed a service for you as well. Instead of granting acquisition of the double payment to you, to enable you to be repaid we took the trouble to search after the thief. We will take what is ours, i.e., the stolen item, and you take what is yours, the money you paid us. The Gemara comments: The question shall stand unresolved.
9§ It was stated: If an animal given as a deposit was stolen in circumstances beyond the control of the bailee, who is therefore exempt from liability regardless of whether he was paid, and the thief was recognized, Abaye says: If he is an unpaid bailee, then if he so desires he can choose to enter into judgment with the thief, i.e., the bailee will pay the owner and then get reimbursed by the thief; and if he so desires he can take an oath that he was not responsible and the owner can demand his money from the thief. If he is a paid bailee he enters into judgment with the thief and does not have the option to take an oath to become exempt, as the responsibility to collect payment from the thief is part of his duty as a paid bailee. Rava says: Whether this unpaid bailee or that paid bailee enters into judgment with the thief, he does not have the option to take an oath.
10The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that Rava disagrees with the ruling of Rav Huna bar Avin? As Rav Huna bar Avin sent this ruling: If an animal given as a deposit was stolen in circumstances beyond the control of the bailee and the thief was recognized, if he is an unpaid bailee, then if he so desires he can choose to enter into judgment with the thief; and if he so desires he can take an oath that he was not responsible, and the owner can demand his money from the thief. And if he is a paid bailee, then he enters into judgment with the thief and does not have the option to take an oath.
11The Gemara responds: Rava could have said to you: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where it happened that first the bailee took an oath, before the thief was recognized. The Gemara questions this explanation: But Rav Huna bar Avin says: If he so desires he can choose to enter into judgment with the thief; and if he so desires he can take an oath that he was not responsible, indicating that the bailee had not yet taken an oath. The Gemara answers: Rather, this is what Rav Huna bar Avin is saying: Having first taken an oath before the thief was recognized, if an unpaid bailee so desires he can remain with his oath and not pay the owner, and if he so desires he can choose to enter into judgment with the thief.
12Rabba Zuti raises the dilemma like this: If an animal given as a deposit was stolen in circumstances beyond the control of the bailee, and the thief returned the animal to the place from where he had stolen it, and it is now in the house of the bailee, and it then died through the bailee’s negligence, what is the halakha ? Do we say that once it was stolen in circumstances beyond the bailee’s control his guardianship is completed and he has no more responsibility for the animal, even for subsequent negligence? Or perhaps once it was returned, it returned to his guardianship, and an unpaid bailee is liable for loss resulting from negligence? The Gemara comments: The question shall stand unresolved.
13MISHNA: If the owner asked the bailee: Where is my deposit? And the bailee said to him: It was lost. And the owner said: I administer an oath to you, and the bailee said: Amen, therefore accepting the oath; and the witnesses testify about the bailee that he consumed it, then he must pay the principal. If the bailee admitted on his own that he had taken a false oath, then he must pay the principal and the additional one-fifth payment, and bring a guilt-offering.
14If the owner asked the bailee: Where is my deposit, and the bailee said to him: It was stolen; and the owner said: I administer an oath to you, and the bailee said: Amen, therefore accepting the oath; and the witnesses testify about the bailee that he stole it, he must pay the payment of double the principal. If the bailee admitted on his own that he had taken a false oath, then he must pay the principal, the additional one-fifth payment, and bring a guilt-offering.
15The mishna continues: In the case of one who robs his father and the father demands that he return the stolen item, and he takes an oath to his father that he did not rob him; and then the father dies; and then the son admits that he robbed him and took a false oath, necessitating the return of the principal and the giving of the additional one-fifth payment to his father’s heirs, of which he is either one of several or the only one; what should he do? This son pays the principal and the additional one-fifth payment to his father’s sons or brothers, and brings a guilt-offering and does not keep his own share. And if he does not want to forfeit his share or where he does not have sufficient funds to pay the other heirs while forfeiting his share, he borrows money in the amount of the value of the stolen item and the creditors come and are repaid in part from his share in the stolen item.
16In the case of one who says to his son in a vow: It is forbidden like an offering [ konam ], and for that reason you may not derive benefit from my property, if the father then dies the son inherits from him, because it is no longer the father’s property once he dies.