1MISHNA: In the case of one who robs another of food and feeds it to his children, or who left a stolen item to them and then died, the children are exempt from paying the victim of the robbery after their father’s death. But if the stolen item was something that serves as a legal guarantee of a loan, the heirs are obligated to pay.
2GEMARA: Rav Ḥisda says: If one robbed another, and the owners of the stolen item have not yet despaired of retrieving it, and another person came, took it from the robber and ate it, if the owner wishes he may collect from this one, i.e., the first robber, and if he wishes he may collect from that one, i.e., the second robber. What is the reason that he may collect from whomever he chooses? It is because as long as the owners did not despair of retrieving it, it remains the possession of its owner, so that when the second robber stole it from the first, he was in fact stealing from the original owner. Nevertheless, since the first robber was already obligated to return the item, his obligation remains in force and the owner may demand payment from him if he wishes.
3The Gemara questions this opinion based on what we learned in the mishna: In the case of one who robs another of food and feeds it to his children, or one who left a stolen item to them as an inheritance, the children are exempt from paying the victim of the robbery after their father’s death. This appears to be a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, who holds that one who steals from a thief is obligated to pay the owner. The Gemara answers: Rav Ḥisda could have said to you: When that mishna is taught, it is addressing a case where it is after the owners had already despaired of retrieving the item, whereas Rav Ḥisda was referring to a case where the owners had not yet despaired.
4§ The mishna stated that if one left a stolen item to his children as an inheritance, the children are exempt from paying the owner. Rami bar Ḥama said: That is to say that the domain of an heir is comparable to the domain of a purchaser. Just as an item that is purchased leaves the domain of the seller, an item that is inherited leaves the domain of the deceased and is considered the property of the heir. Since the owner has despaired of retrieving the item and the item has changed domains, it is entirely the property of the new owner, and he is exempt from payment.
5Rava disagreed and said that the domain of an heir is not comparable to the domain of a purchaser. Consequently, the item has not undergone a complete change of ownership and the heir would be required to return it. And as for the explanation of the mishna, here we are dealing with a case where they had already consumed the stolen goods, so there is nothing to return to the owner.
6The Gemara questions the opinion of Rava: From the fact that the latter clause teaches: If it was something that serves as a legal guarantee, and is, therefore, an existing commodity, the heirs are obligated to pay, it may be inferred that in the first clause we are also dealing with a stolen item that is extant. This is contrary to Rava’s statement that the mishna is discussing stolen goods that have been consumed. The Gemara answers: Rava could have said to you that this is what the mishna is saying: If their father left them guaranteed property, i.e., land, they are obligated to pay from that property, even if the stolen item is not extant.
7The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi teach Rabbi Shimon, his son, that this mishna is not referring only to something that may actually serve as a legal guarantee, i.e., land? Rather, it is referring even to a cow that he plows with, or a donkey that he drives by directing it from behind, which the heirs are obligated to return because of the honor of their father. This indicates that the mishna is referring to stolen property that is extant, and not to land.
8Rather, Rava said: When I die, Rabbi Oshaya will come toward me from his place in heaven in order to greet me, as I explain the mishna in accordance with his opinion and thereby honor him. As Rabbi Oshaya taught in a baraita : In a case of one who robs another and feeds the stolen goods to his children, the latter are exempt from paying the owner. If he left a stolen item to them as an inheritance, if the stolen item is extant, the heirs are obligated to return it to the owner; if it is not extant, they are exempt. If their father left them guaranteed property, i.e., land, they are obligated to pay the owner. Rava explains the mishna as being consistent with the baraita of Rabbi Oshaya, although this explanation is not consistent with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s interpretation.
9The Gemara analyzes the baraita of Rabbi Oshaya. The Master said in the baraita that if the stolen item is not extant, the heirs are exempt from payment. Let us say that this baraita is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, who says that heirs are obligated to pay for stolen goods that they consumed. The Gemara answers: Rav Ḥisda could have said to you that when that baraita is taught, it is referring to a case where it is after the owners had already despaired of retrieving the item, whereas Rav Ḥisda was referring to a case in which the owners had not yet despaired.
10The Gemara continues: The Master said in the baraita that if the stolen item is extant, the heirs are obligated to pay. Let us say that this baraita is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rami bar Ḥama, since according to his understanding, the heirs should be exempt from payment because the stolen item is considered to have changed ownership when they inherited it. The Gemara answers: Rami bar Ḥama could have said to you that when that baraita is taught,