1then the additional one-fifth is considered a new principal obligation. The robber pays an additional one-fifth payment apart from the additional one-fifth payment about which he had taken a false oath. If he then takes a false oath concerning the second one-fifth payment, he is assessed an additional one-fifth payment for that oath, until the principal, i.e., the additional one-fifth payment about which he has most recently taken the false oath, is reduced to less than the value of one peruta .
2And such is the halakha with regard to a deposit, as it is stated: “If anyone sins, and commits a trespass against the Lord, and he defrauds his counterpart with regard to a deposit, or with regard to a pledge, or with regard to a robbery, or if he exploited his counterpart; or he has found that which was lost, and deals falsely with it, and swears to a lie …he shall restore it in full, and shall add the fifth part more to it” (Leviticus 5:21–24). This one must pay the principal and an additional one-fifth payment, and bring a guilt-offering.
3GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if a robber took a false oath that he did not rob, he must travel even as far as Media in order to repay the robbery victim. This indicates that if he takes an oath to the robbery victim, yes, he is required to go to any length to repay his obligation, but if he did not take an oath to him, no, he does not have to do so. Whose opinion is this? It is not the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon and not the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as it is taught in a mishna ( Yevamot 118b): If one robbed one of five people and he does not know which of them he robbed, and each one of the five says: He robbed me, the robber places the stolen item between them and withdraws from them; this is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: This is not the way to spare him from transgression. He is not considered to have returned the stolen item until he pays the value of the stolen item to each and every one of the five.
4The Gemara clarifies: In accordance with whose opinion is the mishna written? If one suggests that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, it is not so, because even though the robber took a false oath that he did not rob, Rabbi Tarfon says: He places the stolen item between them and withdraws; it is not his responsibility to ensure that it reaches the robbery victim. If one suggests that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, it is also not so, because even though the robber did not necessarily take a false oath, Rabbi Akiva says: He is not considered to have returned the stolen item until he pays the value of the stolen item to each and every one of the five, while the mishna rules that his obligation is contingent upon his having taken the false oath.
5The Gemara answers: Actually, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and when Rabbi Akiva says that the robber is not considered to have returned the stolen item until he pays the value of the stolen item to each and every one of the five, it is only in a case where the robber took a false oath that Rabbi Akiva says this. What is the reason? As the verse states with regard to one who takes a false oath concerning a financial obligation: “Unto him to whom it appertains shall he give it, on the day of his being guilty” (Leviticus 5:24). The halakha that the guilty party must make a rigorous effort to return what he owes is stated in the case of one who took a false oath, and Rabbi Akiva would state his ruling only in that case.
6The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Tarfon rule that a robber who took a false oath is not required to pay all claimants, being that the verse indicates otherwise? The Gemara answers: Even though he took a false oath and by Torah law is obligated to return the stolen item to the robbery victim, the Sages instituted an ordinance allowing him to place it between the five possible victims, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: The Sages instituted a great ordinance stating that if the expense required to return a stolen item to the victim is greater than the principal, the robber may pay the principal and the additional one-fifth payment to the court, and he then brings his guilt-offering and achieves atonement for himself. This ordinance would apply here as well, as the expense required to pay all five claimants is greater than the principal.
7The Gemara asks: And doesn’t Rabbi Akiva agree that the Sages instituted this ordinance? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva holds that when the Sages instituted the ordinance, they did so only for cases where the robber knows whom he robbed, as in such cases he is definitely returning the money to its owner by depositing it with the court, who will convey it to the robbery victim. But in the case of one who robbed one of five people, where he does not know whom he robbed, and where, by merely placing the stolen item between the five of them the money is not returned to its owner, the Sages did not institute an ordinance.
8Rav Huna bar Yehuda raises an objection to the explanation that Rabbi Akiva stated his opinion specifically in a case where the robber took an oath. The baraita in the Tosefta ( Yevamot 14:2) states that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva did not disagree with regard to one who purchased an item from one of five people and does not know from which of them he purchased it, as both agree that in this case he places the money of the purchase between them and withdraws. Since the purchaser has not transgressed, he is not penalized by being required to suffer the loss of paying each of them. With regard to what did they disagree? They disagree with regard to one who robbed one of five people, and he does not know from which of them he robbed the item, as Rabbi Tarfon says: He places the stolen item between them and withdraws, and Rabbi Akiva says: He has no remedy, i.e., he has not fulfilled his obligation to return the stolen item, until he pays the value of the stolen item to each and every one of them.
9Rav Huna bar Yehuda states his objection: And if it enters your mind that Rabbi Akiva stated his ruling specifically with regard to one who took a false oath, what is the difference to me if he purchased an item from another, and what is the difference to me if he robbed him? In either case he has transgressed the prohibition against taking a false oath denying his obligation, and he should be penalized by being required to ensure that the one to whom he owes the money receives it.
10And Rava raises another objection to the explanation that Rabbi Akiva stated his opinion specifically in a case where the robber took an oath. There was an incident involving a certain pious man who purchased an item from one of two people, and he did not know from which of them he purchased the item, and he came before Rabbi Tarfon for a ruling. Rabbi Tarfon said to him: Place the money of your purchase between them and withdraw. He then came before Rabbi Akiva, who said to him: You have no remedy until you pay each and every one, i.e., both of them. And if it enters your mind that Rabbi Akiva stated his ruling specifically where the purchaser took a false oath, does a pious man take a false oath? It seems from this incident that Rabbi Akiva rules he must pay all potential owners regardless of whether or not he took a false oath.
11And if you would say that perhaps he took a false oath and later became a pious man, but isn’t there a tradition that anywhere that we say: There was an incident involving a certain pious man, the pious man is either Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava or Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Elai, and Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava and Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Elai, were both pious men from the beginning.
12Due to these objections, the Gemara offers an alternative explanation. Rather, the mishna here is actually in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, and Rabbi Tarfon concedes that a robber must pay every potential owner in a case where he took a false oath, as is the case in the mishna here. What is the reason? As the verse states: “Unto him to whom it appertains shall he give it, in the day of his being guilty” (Leviticus 5:24). This verse, which requires one to go to any length to return money owed, is referring specifically to one who takes a false oath concerning his financial obligation. And Rabbi Akiva, who said in the mishna in tractate Yevamot that a robber must pay all potential owners even though he did not take a false oath, agrees that the verse is referring specifically to one who takes a false oath, but holds that the Sages penalize the robber by obligating him to pay them all in any event.
13The Gemara questions this explanation of the mishna: But if the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, after all, the mere fact that it is a case where he took a false oath is not sufficient to obligate him to pay the additional one-fifth and to bring a guilt-offering if it is a case where he did not also admit that he took a false oath and owes the money. Therefore, why would the mishna here specifically state: And he took a false oath? Even without taking the false oath, the robber should also be obligated to pursue the owner as a result of his having admitted his obligation. As it is taught in a baraita : Rabbi Tarfon concedes that in a case where a robber says to two people: I robbed one of you of one hundred dinars and I do not know which of you it was, he gives one hundred dinars to this person and one hundred dinars to that person,