1The Gemara rejects this inference: What comparison can be made to orla , which is more stringent than meat in milk, as it never had a time when it was fit? Can you say the same with regard to meat in milk, which had a time when it was fit? Unlike orla fruits, which were prohibited from the beginning of their existence, both meat and milk were permitted on their own before they were cooked together. Therefore, the Gemara brings other proofs: Let leavened bread on Passover prove that this issue is not a factor, as it had a time when it was fit, before Passover, and yet it is prohibited to derive benefit from it.
2The Gemara rejects this: What comparison can be made to leavened bread on Passover, which is a stringent prohibition, as one who eats it is punished with karet ? Can you say the same with regard to one who eats meat in milk, who is not punished with karet ? The Gemara answers: Let the case of diverse kinds planted in the vineyard prove that this is not relevant, as one who violates that prohibition is not punished with karet , and yet it is prohibited to derive benefit from the resulting mixtures.
3The Gemara returns to the issue of Abaye’s statement with regard to the unique stringency of diverse kinds planted in a vineyard: And if it is so that one is flogged for deriving benefit from diverse kinds planted in a vineyard, even if one derives benefit from them in an unusual manner, we can challenge this last proof: How can one compare meat in milk to diverse kinds in a vineyard, as with regard to diverse kinds in a vineyard, one is flogged even if he derives benefit from them in an unusual manner?
4And how would Abaye respond to this question? When one draws this challenge to its logical conclusion with the phrase: Can you say, and explains in detail how the prohibition of meat in milk differs from that of diverse kinds in a vineyard, with regard to what difference would the challenge be raised? You may say that with regard to meat in milk one is flogged only for deriving benefit in the usual manner, as opposed to the halakha with regard to diverse kinds, according to which one is flogged even for deriving benefit in an unusual manner. However, is that to say that the term eating is written in the Torah with regard to meat in milk? The basis for this halakha with regard to diverse kinds in a vineyard is the lack of the term eating in the verse; however, the prohibition of meat in milk is also missing that term. Therefore, there are no grounds for this challenge: If the lack of the word eating leads to the conclusion that one is flogged even when deriving benefit in an unusual manner, logically that punishment should apply to both diverse kinds and meat in milk.
5The Gemara asks: And the other Sage, who raised this objection, holds that for this reason Isi ben Yehuda derives this aspect of the prohibition from the case of an animal carcass. Just as with regard to an animal carcass one is flogged only when deriving benefit in the usual manner, as the verse that prohibits it uses the term eating, so too, with regard to meat in milk, one is flogged only when deriving benefit in the usual manner. Despite what is written in the Gemara, the fact that one is flogged only for deriving benefit from the animal in the usual manner is not derived from the carcass of an unslaughtered animal but from tereifa , an animal with a condition that will cause it to die within twelve months. With regard to tereifa it is written: “And you shall be holy men unto Me; therefore you shall not eat any flesh that is torn of beasts in the field [ tereifa ]; you shall cast it to the dogs” (Exodus 22:30). From the fact that one may cast it to the dogs it can be derived that one may derive benefit in any manner other than the usual manner, i.e., eating.
6And Abaye holds that for this reason it did not write the term eating in the verse itself with regard to the prohibition of meat in milk: In order to say that one is flogged even when deriving benefit in an unusual manner.
7The Gemara continues. Let Isi ben Yehuda challenge: What comparison can be made to diverse kinds in a vineyard, as the forbidden produce had no time that it was fit because the prohibition came into effect as soon as the produce began to grow? Rabbi Adda bar Ahava said: Apparently, since this question was not asked, that is to say that with regard to diverse kinds in a vineyard, their roots are forbidden as well, including the seeds and saplings from which the mature plants grow. Therefore, no challenge can be raised, since they had a time when they were fit, before taking root.
8Rav Shemaya raised an objection based on what was taught in a mishna: With regard to one who transfers a perforated pot with seeds in it into a vineyard, if the size of the seeds growing in the pot increases by one two-hundredth of their previous size, such that the permitted portion is not two hundred times the forbidden, newly grown portion, then the mixture is prohibited due to the prohibition against planting diverse kinds in a vineyard. The forbidden portion is nullified only if it comprises less than one two-hundredth of the mixture. The Gemara reads precisely: If it increases, yes, it is prohibited; if it does not increase, no, it is not prohibited. Apparently, only additional growth is prohibited, and not the seeds themselves.
9Rava said: Two verses are written about this halakha , i.e., two separate terms in one verse indicate two separate prohibitions. The verse states: “You shall not sow your vineyard with two kinds of seed; lest the fullness of the seed which you have sown be forfeited together with the increase of the vineyard” (Deuteronomy 22:9). It is written: “The seed,” indicating that it is prohibited once it is planted and takes root, and it is written: “The fullness,” indicating that it is prohibited only if it has grown. How can these two terms be reconciled? If it were planted initially in the vineyard, it becomes prohibited immediately upon taking root. If it were planted elsewhere and brought into the vineyard later, such as in a perforated pot, then the following distinction applies: If its size increases in the vineyard, yes, it is prohibited; if its size does not increase, no, it is not prohibited.
10The Gemara discusses another matter pertaining to deriving benefit. Rabbi Ya’akov said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said with regard to objects from which it is prohibited to derive benefit: One may heal oneself with any substance except for wood of a tree designated for idolatry [ asheira ]. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If we say it is a case in which there is danger to a person’s life, then it is permitted to use even the wood of an asheira . And if it is a situation where there is no danger, then all the prohibited substances in the Torah also may not be used, as one may not derive benefit from them.
11The Gemara answers: Actually, it is referring to a case where there is danger, and even so, one my not derive benefit from the wood of an asheira . As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: If it is stated: “And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul,” why is it stated: “And with all your might” (Deuteronomy 6:5)? And if it is stated: “With all your might,” why is it stated: “With all your soul”? One of these statements appears to be superfluous.
12Rather, it is to tell you that if there is a person whose body is more beloved to him than his property, therefore it is stated: “With all your soul.” The verse teaches that one must be willing to sacrifice his life to sanctify God’s name. And there is a person whose property is more beloved to him than his body, therefore it is stated: “With all your might.” Rabbi Eliezer understands the phrase: “With all your might,” to mean: With all your possessions. Apparently, there are circumstances in which a person must be prepared to die rather than be healed with a prohibited substance.
13When Ravin came from the Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One may heal oneself with any substance from which one may not derive benefit, except for idolatry or forbidden sexual relations