1GEMARA: With what are we dealing? If it is a case where the property of the visitor is forbidden to the ill person, even if he is sitting, this should also be permitted. If it is a case where the property of the ill person is forbidden to the visitor, even if he is standing, it should also not be permitted, as one derives benefit from entering the house. Shmuel said: Actually, it is a case where the property of the visitor is forbidden to the ill person, and it is in a place where one takes payment for visiting and sitting with an ill person and one does not take payment for visiting and standing with an ill person. Therefore, by sitting with the ill person the visitor provides him forbidden benefit by sparing him the expense of hiring another person to sit with him.
2Why was this distinction stated without qualification? There is no apparent fundamental difference between sitting and standing when visiting the ill. The Gemara answers: It teaches us this: Even in a place where one takes payment for visiting the ill, for sitting, one ought to take payment, but for standing, one ought not to take payment. And if you wish, say instead that the distinction can be explained in accordance with the statement that Rabbi Shimon ben Elyakim said elsewhere (42a), that one who is prohibited to derive benefit from another due to a rabbinic decree may not enter a field that is owned by the latter, lest he remain standing there longer than permitted. Here too, sitting is prohibited due to a rabbinic decree, lest he remain sitting there longer than is necessary to perform the mitzva of visiting the ill.
3Ulla said: Actually, it is a case where the property of the ill person is forbidden to the visitor, and where the ill person did not vow that his property would be forbidden in cases where its use enables the visitor to meet needs pertaining to his continued existence. The Gemara asks: If so, then even sitting should be permitted as well, since the vow did not prohibit use pertaining to his existential needs. The Gemara answers: Isn’t it possible to meet those needs and visit the ill while standing? Therefore, sitting is not an existential need.
4The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita : If he became ill, he enters to visit him; if his son became ill, he inquires about his son’s health in the marketplace but may not enter the house to visit him. Granted, according to Ulla, who said: It is a case where the property of the ill person is forbidden to the visitor and where the ill person did not vow that the property be forbidden in cases pertaining to his continued existence, this works out well, as he excluded his own existential needs from the vow, not his son’s existential needs.
5However, according to Shmuel, who said: It is a case where the property of the visitor is forbidden to the ill person, what is different about him and what is different about his son? Why is it prohibited for him to visit when the son is ill? The Gemara answers: Shmuel could have said to you: The mishna is referring to a case where the property of the visitor is forbidden to the ill person; the baraita is referring to a case where the property of the ill person is forbidden to the visitor.
6The Gemara asks: Why was this distinction between the mishna and the baraita stated without qualification? Rava said: With regard to Shmuel,