1And Rava said: Everyone holds that anywhere that one says: Had I known that father was among you I would have said: So-and-so and so-and-so are prohibited to partake and father is permitted to do so, then all are permitted to partake. They disagree only in a case where one says: Had I known that father was among you I would have said: All of you are prohibited from partaking except for father.
2The rationale of the dispute is the following: Beit Shammai hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said: If one initially makes one declaration and immediately afterward makes a conflicting declaration, hold him accountable for the first expression. Since he initially said: All of you are prohibited from partaking, this expression is the effective one and they are all prohibited from doing so. The addition of the words: Except for father, is viewed as a clarification of the previous expression, simply indicating that his father is not included in the prohibition.
3And by contrast, Beit Hillel hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said: A person is held accountable even for the conclusion of his statement, and the second formulation is the primary one. Therefore, the fact that one altered his formulation to exclude his father from the prohibition means that the vow is partially canceled, and a vow that is partially dissolved is dissolved completely.
4Rav Pappa raised an objection to Rava from the following mishna (66a): In what case did Rabbi Akiva say that a vow which was partially dissolved is dissolved completely? For example, if one said: The property of all of you is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, if benefit from one of them was permitted for whatever reason, benefit from all of them is permitted. However, if one said: The property of this one and of that one is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, then if benefit from the first one was permitted for whatever reason, benefit from all of them is permitted, but if benefit from the last one was permitted, benefit from the last one alone is permitted and benefit from all the others is forbidden.
5Rav Pappa explains his objection: Rabba stated that when one qualifies his words by saying: I would have said all of you are prohibited from partaking except father, then all agree that everyone except his father is prohibited from doing so, but that when he adds to his words by saying: I would have said that so-and-so and so-and-so are prohibited from partaking and father is permitted to do so, there is a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. Granted, according to the opinion of Rabba, he establishes Rabbi Akiva’s first clause, where benefit from all is permitted, as a case where he retracts and says: I meant to say that the property of this one and of that one, but not that of so-and-so, is konam for me, which accords with the opinion of Beit Hillel.
6And the last clause of the mishna, in which benefit from the last one alone is permitted, but benefit from all the others remains forbidden, is a case where he retracts and says: The property of all of you is konam for me except for that of one of you. According to the opinion of Rabba, both Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel would agree that in this case the one who stated the vow is permitted to benefit only from the one excluded from the vow.
7But according to you, Rava, who holds that if he said: I would have said that so-and-so and so-and-so are prohibited to partake and father is permitted to do so, all concede that everyone is permitted to partake, and that the dispute pertains to when one says: I would have said that all of you are prohibited to partake except for father, granted, he establishes the first clause of Rabbi Akiva’s statement as a case where he retracts and says: The property of all of you is konam for me except for that of father, and benefit from all is permitted, in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.