1The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This case, where the vow does not take effect, is where one said: This offering [ ha korban ], and that case, where the vow does take effect, is where one said: The offering [ hakorban ]. What is the reason that the vow does not take effect when he says this offering [ ha korban ]? It is because he is saying that he is taking a vow by the life of this offering, which is not a valid way to express a vow.
2The mishna teaches that if one says: That which I will not eat of yours is lakorban , which indicates la korban , it is not an offering, Rabbi Meir prohibits him from eating food belonging to the other individual. This is because his statement indicates that what he does eat shall be considered an offering. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it true that Rabbi Meir does not hold that from a negative statement you can infer a positive statement? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Abba said: It is as though he said: It shall be for an offering [ lekorban ], and therefore I will not eat that which is yours.
3MISHNA: One who says to another: It is konam for me for my mouth to speak with you, or: It is konam for me for my hand to work with you, or: It is konam for me for my foot to walk with you, it is prohibited for him to speak with, work with, or walk with the other individual.
4GEMARA: The Gemara raises a contradiction from the following baraita : There is a stricture that applies to oaths beyond the strictures that apply to vows, and there is a stricture that applies to vows beyond the strictures that apply to oaths. The stricture that applies to vows is that vows take effect with regard to a mitzva as they do with regard to optional activities, which is not the case with regard to oaths, as one cannot take an oath to neglect a mitzva. And the stricture that applies to oaths is that oaths take effect upon a matter that has substance and a matter that does not have substance, which is not the case with regard to vows, which take effect only upon a matter that has substance. This contradicts the mishna, which states that a vow can apply to speech or actions, which are not physical items that have concrete substance.
5Rav Yehuda said: The mishna is referring to one who says: My mouth shall be forbidden with regard to my speech, or: My hands shall be forbidden with regard to their work, or: My feet should be forbidden with regard to their walking. In these cases the vow applies to a limb, which is a concrete item, and therefore it takes effect. The Gemara comments: The language of the mishna is also precise according to this interpretation, as it teaches: For my mouth to speak with you, and it does not teach: That which I speak with you. This indicates that he imposed the vow upon his mouth and not upon the act of speaking.
6MISHNA: And these are the vows in which the one who takes the vow attempts to create a prohibition on an item by associating it with an item in an ineffective manner, rendering the vow void and leaving the item permitted: If one says: That which I will eat of yours will be non-sacred [ ḥullin ]; or: That which I will eat of yours will be like pig meat; or: Like an object of idol worship; or: Like the hides of animal offerings whose hearts were removed as a form of idol worship, and it is therefore prohibited to derive benefit from those animals; or: Like animal carcasses and animals with a wound that will cause them to die within twelve months [ tereifot ]; or: Like non-kosher repugnant creatures and non-kosher creeping animals; or: Like the ḥalla of Aaron, the first priest, or like his teruma ; in all these cases, the food is permitted. Although none of these items may be eaten, they are forbidden by Torah law, not by means of a vow. Therefore, it is impossible to extend their prohibition to other items by means of a vow that associates them with those items.
7With regard to a man who says to his wife: You are hereby to me like my mother, i.e., deriving benefit from you should be forbidden to me like engaging in sexual intercourse with my mother, dissolution is broached with him by suggesting a different extenuation, i.e., a halakhic authority suggests other, extenuating circumstances that enable the dissolution of the vow. Although this vow does not take effect either, as engaging in sexual intercourse with one’s mother is prohibited by Torah law, by rabbinic law this is treated like an actual vow and requires dissolution by a halakhic authority, so that he will not take genuine vows lightly.
8GEMARA: It may be inferred from the first case in the mishna that the reason the vow does not take effect is that he said: That which I will eat of yours will be ḥullin ; but if he said: That which I will eat of yours will be laḥullin , that indicates that he is saying: It will not [ la ] be non-sacred [ ḥullin ], but rather like an offering, which is a vow that takes effect.
9Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? If it is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, isn’t he of the opinion that one does not say: From