1the illumination of the eastern horizon permits the new crop.
2The Gemara notes: And this statement of Reish Lakish was not stated explicitly; rather, it was stated by inference, i.e., it is evident from a different statement of Reish Lakish that this is his opinion. As we learned in a mishna (68b): One may not bring a meal offering, the first fruits, or the meal offering brought with the libations accompanying an animal offering, from the new crop, prior to the sacrifice of the omer . The Gemara interrupts its citation of the mishna to add that the reason is that we require that an offering be “from the well-watered pastures of Israel,” i.e., it must be brought from that which is permitted to the Jewish people, and the new crop has not yet been permitted to them. The mishna concludes: And if he brought these offerings from the new crop they are unfit.
3The mishna continues: After the omer but prior to the two loaves one may not bring those offerings from the new crop. The Gemara explains that this is because the two loaves are called first fruits, and therefore they should precede all other offerings from the new crop. The mishna adds: But if he brought those offerings from the new crop, they are fit.
4And Rav Yitzḥak says that Reish Lakish says: The Sages taught that a meal offering that was brought from the new crop before the omer meal offering is disqualified only if it was brought on the fourteenth or on the fifteenth of Nisan. But if it was on the sixteenth, then even if he brought it prior to the omer meal offering, it is valid. He continues: And this statement poses a difficulty for me: Why should meal offerings be valid when sacrificed on the sixteenth if they were sacrificed before the omer meal offering? Let them be considered like offerings whose time has not yet arrived. The Gemara comments: Apparently, Reish Lakish holds that the illumination of the eastern horizon permits the new crop.
5§ The Gemara previously cited the opinion of Rav that an omer meal offering from which a handful was removed not for its own sake is disqualified. The Gemara also cited the opinion of Reish Lakish that this meal offering is valid but another omer meal offering is necessary to permit the new crop for consumption. And Rava says: With regard to an omer meal offering from which the priest removed a handful not for its own sake, it is valid and its remainder is consumed, and it does not require another omer meal offering to permit it for consumption. The reason is that improper intent is effective [ mo’elet ] to disqualify an offering only when it is expressed by one who is fit for the Temple service, and with regard to an item that is fit for the Temple service, and in a place that is fit for the Temple service.
6Rava elaborates: The condition that improper intent disqualifies only when expressed by one who is fit for the Temple service serves to exclude the intent of a blemished priest, who is disqualified from performing the Temple service. The condition that it disqualifies only when expressed with regard to an item that is fit for the Temple service serves to exclude the omer meal offering, which is generally unfit for the Temple service, as it is a novelty, in that it is brought from barley whereas most meal offerings are brought from wheat. And finally, the condition that it disqualifies only when expressed in a place that is fit for the Temple service serves to exclude sacrificial rites that were performed with improper intent while the altar was damaged. At such a time improper intent does not disqualify an offering, and therefore if the altar is repaired on the same day, the offering may be sacrificed upon the altar.
7§ The Gemara discusses the prohibition against sacrificing an item that is prohibited to the Jewish people. The Sages taught in a baraita : It is derived from a passage in the Torah that discusses burnt offerings: “You shall bring your offering from the cattle, even from the herd or from the flock” (Leviticus 1:2), that certain animals are prohibited for sacrifice upon the altar (see Temura 28a). When it states later, in the next verse: “If his offering is a burnt offering of the herd” (Leviticus 1:3), this is difficult, as there is no need for the verse to state this, as it was already written earlier. Rather, this serves to exclude an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [ tereifa ] from being brought as an offering.
8The baraita questions the need for this derivation: But could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference? And if a blemished animal, which is permitted to an ordinary person [ lehedyot ] for consumption, is nevertheless prohibited as an offering for the Most High (see Leviticus 22:19), then certainly with regard to a tereifa , which is forbidden to an ordinary person for consumption (see Exodus 22:30), is it not logical that it is prohibited for the Most High? The baraita responds: Fat [ ḥelev ] and blood prove that this a fortiori inference is not valid, as they are forbidden to an ordinary person and yet they are permitted for the Most High.
9The baraita rejects this suggestion: What is notable about fat and blood? They are notable in that they come from an item that is generally permitted, i.e., the animal from which they come is itself permitted for consumption. Will you say the same with regard to a tereifa , which is entirely forbidden for eating, and therefore should not be permitted for the Most High?
10The baraita responds: The pinching of bird offerings will prove that one cannot derive by means of an a fortiori inference that a tereifa is disqualified. As a bird killed by the pinching of its nape is also entirely forbidden, and yet although it is forbidden for consumption to an ordinary person, as it is rendered a carcass, it is nevertheless permitted for the Most High, as bird offerings are killed by the pinching of their napes. The verse is therefore necessary to disqualify a tereifa .
11The baraita rejects this suggestion as well: What is notable about pinching? It is notable in that its sanctity prohibits it, i.e., only at the time when it becomes sanctified for the altar does it become prohibited for consumption to an ordinary person, which is at the time of its pinching. But before this time it is not yet prohibited to an ordinary person for consumption. This is not the case with regard to a tereifa , as its sanctity does not prohibit it for consumption, since it is always prohibited to eat it. Accordingly, by logical inference alone one can arrive at the conclusion that a tereifa should not be permitted for the Most High.
12The baraita concludes with a statement that will soon be explained: And if you have responded, i.e., if you succeeded in rejecting the a fortiori inference, then when the verse states later: “Of the herd” (Leviticus 1:3), as there is no need for the verse to state this phrase, it serves to exclude a tereifa .
13The Gemara asks: What response is alluded to by the statement: If you have responded? The conclusion of the baraita had indicated that the a fortiori inference must be accepted. The Gemara cites several suggestions, for which it provides the following mnemonic: Rekiaḥ , Mar , Adda , Leshisheih . These terms allude to the names of some of the Sages mentioned in the following discussion: Rav; Rabbi Akiva; Rav Aḥa; Mar, son of Ravina; Rav Adda; and Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi.
14Rav said that this is the response: The halakha that a tereifa is unfit for sacrifice must be derived from a verse because it may be said that the omer meal offering proves that the halakha concerning a tereifa cannot be derived by the a fortiori inference, as the omer is prohibited for consumption to an ordinary person, since it comes from the new crop, and yet it is permitted as an offering for the Most High. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: What is notable about the omer meal offering? It is notable in that the omer renders the new crop permitted for consumption, whereas a tereifa does not render anything permitted.
15The Gemara responds: Although the omer meal offering generally renders the new crop permitted, the omer brought during a Sabbatical Year does not render the crop permitted, as it is prohibited to plant during the Sabbatical Year, and consequently there is no new crop for the omer offering to permit. The Gemara counters this suggestion: The omer meal offering brought during a Sabbatical Year also renders something permitted, as it permits produce that grew without being purposely planted [ sefiḥin ] during the Sabbatical Year. The Gemara responds: Nevertheless, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that sefiḥin are prohibited during the Sabbatical Year, the omer meal offering brought during a Sabbatical Year does not render the new crop permitted for consumption, and yet it is permitted for the Most High. A verse is therefore necessary to derive that a tereifa may not be sacrificed.
16Rav Aḥa bar Abba said to Rav Ashi: According to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva as well, let us refute the statement of Rav, as what is notable about the omer meal offering? It is notable in that the omer permits the new crop for consumption outside of Eretz Yisrael, where the prohibitions of the Sabbatical Year do not apply.
17And even according to the one who says that the consumption of produce from the new crop grown outside of Eretz Yisrael is not prohibited by Torah law, Rav’s statement can be refuted in another manner: What is notable about the omer meal offering? It is notable in that the omer comes to permit a prohibition that applies to a substance that was previously within it, i.e., the burning upon the altar of a handful from the omer meal offering renders the remainder of the meal offering permitted to the priests, whereas a tereifa is entirely forbidden.
18Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: This is not a refutation, as, if that is so, then with regard to a tereifa as well, you should sacrifice it and you will thereby permit a prohibition that applies to a substance that was previously within it, and its meat will become permitted to the priests for consumption. Therefore, a verse is needed to exclude a tereifa . Rather, one can refute the statement of Rav like this: What is notable about the omer meal offering? It is notable in that its mitzva is in this manner, i.e., the Torah requires the omer meal offering to be brought from the new crop in order to permit the new crop for consumption. By contrast, there is no mitzva to sacrifice specifically a tereifa .
19Reish Lakish said that this is the response alluded to at the end of the baraita : The halakha that a tereifa is unfit for sacrifice must be derived from a verse because it can be said that the one who prepares the incense proves that the halakha concerning a tereifa may not be derived by the a fortiori inference, as this is prohibited to an ordinary person, and is nevertheless permitted for the Most High. The Gemara questions the terminology of Reish Lakish: But the one who prepares the incense is a person. How can it be said that a person is prohibited to an ordinary person?
20Rather, Reish Lakish meant that the preparation of the incense proves it, as it is prohibited to prepare the incense mixture for use by an ordinary person (see Exodus 30:37), and yet it is permitted to do so for the Most High. The Gemara refutes this claim: What is notable about preparation of the incense? It is notable in that its mitzva is in this manner. By contrast, there is no mitzva to sacrifice specifically a tereifa .
21Mar, son of Ravina, said that this is the response of the baraita : The halakha that a tereifa is unfit for sacrifice must be derived from a verse because it can be said that Shabbat proves that the halakha concerning a tereifa cannot be derived by the a fortiori inference, as it is prohibited for an ordinary person to perform labor on Shabbat, and yet the labor involved in the Temple service is permitted on Shabbat for the Most High. Without the verse, one might similarly conclude that a tereifa is permitted for the Most High despite the fact that it is prohibited for consumption.
22The Gemara rejects this: What is notable about Shabbat? It is notable in that the general prohibition against labor on Shabbat was permitted with regard to an ordinary person in the case of circumcision, as the mitzva of circumcision must be performed in its proper time, even on Shabbat, despite the fact that the act of circumcision is generally prohibited on Shabbat.
23The Gemara asks: Is that to say that circumcision is considered a requirement of an ordinary person, whose performance was exempted from the general prohibition against labor on Shabbat for one’s private needs? Circumcision is a mitzva. Rather, the statement of Mar, son of Ravina, can be refuted like this: What is notable about Shabbat? It is notable in that its mitzva is in this manner, i.e., the Torah requires that offerings be brought on Shabbat. By contrast, there is no mitzva to sacrifice specifically a tereifa .
24Rav Adda bar Abba said that this is the response mentioned in the baraita : The halakha that a tereifa is unfit for sacrifice must be derived from a verse because it can be said that the prohibition against diverse kinds proves that the halakha of a tereifa cannot be derived from the a fortiori inference, as it is prohibited for an ordinary person to wear garments sewn from a mixture of diverse kinds (Deuteronomy 22:11), and yet such garments are permitted for the Most High, as the belt of the priestly vestments was fashioned from a mixture of diverse kinds.
25The Gemara rejects this: What is notable about the prohibition against diverse kinds? It is notable in that the general prohibition against wearing a garment sewn from diverse kinds was permitted in the case of an ordinary person with regard to ritual fringes, as a string of sky-blue wool must be placed on a four-cornered garment even if that garment is made from linen. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that ritual fringes are considered a requirement of an ordinary person, whose performance was exempted from the general prohibition concerning diverse kinds with regard to one’s private needs? Placing ritual fringes on a garment is a mitzva. Rather, the claim of Rav Adda bar Abba can be refuted like this: