1it is treated as a guilt offering that was disqualified and it should graze until it becomes blemished, and then it is sold, and its money that is received from the sale is allocated for communal gift offerings. Rabbi Eliezer says: It should be sacrificed in its current state, since if it does not come to atone for this sin, it will come for a different sin, as he certainly committed some sin of which he is unaware.
2If, after the provisional guilt offering was slaughtered, it became known to him that he had not sinned, the blood collected in a cup to sprinkle on the altar should be spilled into the Temple courtyard drain and the meat should be burned in the place of burning, in accordance with the halakhot of a disqualified offering.
3If the blood was already sprinkled on the altar when it became known to him that he had not sinned, the meat of the offering is eaten by the priests in the normal manner. And Rabbi Yosei says: Even if he discovered that he had not sinned while the blood was still in the cup, it is sprinkled on the altar and the meat is eaten.
4And Rava says in explanation of Rabbi Yosei’s opinion: Rabbi Yosei stated this ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says that for any blood that stands to be sprinkled on the altar, it is as if it has already been sprinkled. Therefore, once the blood is in the cup and is ready to be sprinkled, the meat is permitted as though the blood already had been sprinkled. This statement contradicts Rav Ashi’s opinion that with regard to the status of the meat as food, an offering whose blood stands to be sprinkled is not necessarily considered as though it has already been sprinkled.
5The Gemara responds: Is that the reason for Rabbi Yosei’s opinion? They say in the West, Eretz Yisrael, in the name of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina, that this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yosei: His reasoning is that he holds that a service vessel sanctifies disqualified offerings to be sacrificed on the altar ab initio , and in this case the blood was already in the service vessel.
6Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana: Since Rabbi Shimon said that for any blood that stands to be sprinkled on the altar it is as if it has already been sprinkled, and for any item that stands to be burned it is as if it is already burned, why does he hold, as the Gemara mentioned previously (101b), that meat from an offering that is leftover, and the meat of a red heifer that is not yet burned on its pyre, are both susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, since there was a time that they were fit for consumption by the priests? They are merely dust, as they stand to be burned, and therefore should no longer retain the status of food. Rav Kahana said to Rav Ashi in response: Nevertheless, regard for the sanctity of sacred property renders them susceptible to the impurity of food.
7Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Granted that the regard for the sanctity of sacred property is effective in order to disqualify the meat itself if it becomes impure, but is it also considered impure to the extent that one counts first- and second- degree with regard to it, as indicated by the language: Susceptible to the ritual impurity of food? Accordingly, if the meat came into contact with a primary source of impurity, it would have first-degree impurity and it would subsequently transfer second-degree impurity to an item that comes into contact with it.
8If that were the case, one could resolve the dilemma that Reish Lakish raises: With regard to a dry portion of flour taken from one of the meal offerings that has not come into contact with a liquid and is therefore susceptible to impurity due only to regard for its sanctity, does one count first- and second- degree impurity with it, or does one not count first- and second- degree impurity with it? Since Reish Lakish’s inquiry is unresolved, presumably the same uncertainty applies here.
9The Gemara responds: When Reish Lakish raises the dilemma, it is with regard to the status of the dry mass of the meal offering by Torah law, as consecrated items are burned only when rendered impure by Torah law. When we said that leftover meat and the meat of the red heifer are susceptible to the impurity of food, we were inquiring about the status of the leftover meat and of the red heifer by rabbinic law, and therefore nothing can be derived from the dilemma raised by Reish Lakish.
10MISHNA: In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan, and he brought a meal offering prepared in a deep pan instead; or if he said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering prepared in a deep pan, and he brought a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan instead, the meal offering that he brought, he brought as a voluntary meal offering, but he has not fulfilled his obligation that he undertook with his vow and he must therefore bring another meal offering.
11If he said: This tenth of an ephah of flour is a meal offering to bring in a shallow pan, and he brought it prepared in a deep pan instead; or if he said: This tenth of an ephah of flour is a meal offering to bring in a deep pan, and he brought a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan, this offering is not valid, because he did not fulfill what he had stated concerning that tenth of an ephah of flour.
12In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring one meal offering of two tenths of an ephah in one vessel, and he divided it and brought it in two vessels, removing a handful from each; or if he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring two tenths of an ephah for two meal offerings in two vessels, and he brought one meal offering of two tenths of an ephah in one vessel and removed one handful from it, then the meal offering that he brought, he brought as a voluntary meal offering, but he has not fulfilled his obligation.
13If he says: These two tenths of an ephah before me are a meal offering in one vessel, and he divided them and brought them in two vessels, removing a handful from each; or if he says: These tenths of an ephah are two meal offerings in two vessels, and he brought them in one vessel, both of these offerings are not valid, because in both cases he deviated from the number of handfuls that he vowed to remove.
14In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering of two tenths of an ephah in one vessel, and he divided them and brought them in two vessels, and others said to him: You vowed to bring a meal offering in one vessel, then if he sacrificed the two tenths of an ephah in two vessels they are not valid even as voluntary meal offerings, and he must bring another meal offering to fulfill his obligation. His failure to respond and explain that it was not his intention to fulfill his vow with this offering indicates that he does intend to fulfill his vow with it. Since he deviated from his vow, the offering is not valid. If he sacrificed the two tenths of an ephah in one vessel after he was reminded, it is valid, as he fulfilled his vow.
15Likewise, in a case where one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring two meal offerings totaling two tenths of an ephah in two vessels, and he brought it all in one vessel, and others said to him: You vowed to bring meal offerings in two vessels, then if he sacrificed the two tenths of an ephah in two vessels as he had originally vowed, they are valid. If he placed it all in one vessel, its halakhic status is like that of two meal offerings that were intermingled prior to removal of the handfuls. Therefore, if one can remove a handful from each meal offering in and of itself, they are valid. If not, they are not valid, as the Gemara explained on 23a.
16GEMARA: The mishna cites cases where one vowed to bring a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan and instead brought one prepared in a deep pan and vice versa, as well as cases where one vowed to bring two tenths of an ephah in one vessel and instead brought them in two vessels and vice versa. In all these cases, the offering is accepted but he has not fulfilled his obligation. The Gemara comments: And it is necessary for the mishna to mention both types of changes from the initial vow.
17It is necessary because had the tanna taught us only this first case, one might think that perhaps this individual does not fulfill his obligation because he said: In a shallow pan, and he brought it instead in a deep pan. But here, where he changes the number of offerings but both this, the offering specified in his vow, and that, the offering that he actually brought, are in a shallow pan, or both this and that are in a deep pan, I would say that he has indeed fulfilled his vow, as the difference in number of offerings brought is not significant. Therefore, the tanna taught the second case as well, to teach that the change in the number is in fact significant.
18And conversely, had the tanna taught us only this case, where there was a discrepancy between the number of offerings he vowed to bring and the number he actually brought, one might think that he does not fulfill his obligation only because he divided the two tenths of an ephah that were supposed to be brought together. But there, where he changed the type of pan but did not divide the flour to be used, I would say that it is not a case where he failed to fulfill his obligation. Therefore, it was necessary for the tanna to teach that where he changes the type of pan, he does not, in fact, fulfill his obligation.
19§ The Sages taught in a baraita a case similar to that of the mishna: If one brings a meal offering somewhat different from that which he vowed to bring, then the one that he brought, he brought as a voluntary meal offering, but he has not fulfilled his vow. Rabbi Shimon says: He has even fulfilled his vow, as Rabbi Shimon maintains that the type of pan or the number of offerings is not significant.
20§ The mishna teaches that if he says: This tenth of an ephah of flour is a meal offering to bring in a shallow pan, and he brought a meal offering prepared in a deep pan instead, it is not valid. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that in this case the service vessel does not consecrate the flour, since he brought it in a different service vessel than he had vowed? Therefore, the meal offering is still non-sacred and can be used. The Gemara answers that the baraita should be understood according to that which Abaye says: Under such circumstances, the service vessel does not sanctify them with regard to being sacrificed on the altar, but it does sanctify them in order to become disqualified.
21And Abaye says an additional comment about the previous case: The Sages taught in the mishna that in the case of a change in the type of meal offering, the meal offering is not valid