1and if he had wanted, he could have sprinkled the blood of these offerings properly? Nevertheless, Rabbi Shimon teaches in the baraita that the meat of an offering that was rendered piggul is not susceptible to the ritual impurity of food. What, is it not referring to a case where he rendered it piggul during the rite of sprinkling? If so, since the offering stood to have its blood sprinkled, it is considered as though it has been sprinkled, and the offering was considered fit for consumption before he rendered it piggul ; therefore, it should be susceptible to the impurity of food. The Gemara answers: No, the baraita is referring to a case where he rendered it piggul during the rite of slaughtering, and the blood never stood to be sprinkled.
2The Gemara asks: But if he rendered it piggul during the rite of the sprinkling, what is the halakha ? Is the halakha that the meat of the offering indeed becomes susceptible to the ritual impurity of food?
3The Gemara challenges: If so, rather than continuing and teaching that if he rendered the meal offering piggul it is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, i.e., instead of contrasting the animal offering case with a case involving an meal offering, let the tanna distinguish within the case of the animal offering itself in the following way: In what case is this statement, that if one renders an offering piggul the meat is not susceptible to the impurity of food, said? It is said in a case where he rendered it piggul during the rite of slaughtering, but if he rendered it piggul during the rite of sprinkling, it is susceptible to the impurity of food.
4The Gemara answers: It was necessary for him to contrast it with a case of one who rendered a meal offering piggul in order to teach that even though he already rendered it piggul at the time of the removal of the handful, and the principle is that the removal of the handful of a meal offering is equivalent to the slaughtering of an animal offering, and an offering that was rendered piggul at the time of slaughtering is not susceptible to the impurity of food, even so, the meal offering is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, since it initially had a time that was fit for consumption, when the flour was not yet consecrated as a meal offering.
5Rav Ashi said: I related this discussion in the presence of Rav Naḥman and explained Rabbi Shimon’s opinion differently: Even if you say that the case in the baraita is one in which the meat was actually left overnight and there was time to sprinkle the blood during the day, and even if you say that he rendered the offering piggul at the time of the sprinkling of the blood rather than during the slaughtering, Rabbi Shimon does not consider those to be cases in which the offering had a time when it was fit for consumption.
6Rabbi Shimon said only that if he had wanted, he would have redeemed it, and therefore an item that stands to be redeemed is treated as if it were already redeemed. Redemption is simple and requires only a verbal statement. According to Rabbi Shimon we do not say that if he had wanted, he would have sprinkled it, i.e., that the sprinkling of the blood and similar actions that stand to take place are treated as having taken place already.
7The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Ashi’s opinion from a mishna ( Me’ila 2a): Rabbi Yehoshua states a principle about the misuse of offerings that became disqualified: With regard to any offering that had a time that it was permitted for consumption by the priests before it became disqualified, one is not liable for misusing it, and with regard to any offering that did not have a time that it was permitted for consumption by the priests before it became disqualified, one is liable for misusing it. Misuse of consecrated property applies only to offerings that are considered fully reserved for God. Once the priests are permitted to partake of the offering it is no longer categorized as consecrated property.
8Rabbi Yehoshua clarifies: And what is a disqualified offering that had a time that it was permitted for consumption by the priests? Examples of such a situation are as follows: When, after the blood was sprinkled, the meat of the offering was left overnight; or when the meat of an offering became ritually impure; or when an offering left the Temple courtyard. One is not liable for misuse in these cases, since the meat of these offerings became permitted to the priests once the blood was sprinkled and only subsequently was it disqualified.
9And what is a disqualified offering that did not have a time that it was permitted for consumption by the priests? Examples of such a situation are as follows: When, at the time that it was slaughtered, he intended to eat it, sprinkle the blood, or burn the sacrificial potions on the altar beyond its designated time or outside its designated area; or when priests who were disqualified for Temple service collected or sprinkled its blood. In these cases, since there was never a time that it was permitted for the priests to consume the meat of the offering, one is liable for the misuse of consecrated property.
10The Gemara addresses the objection to Rav Ashi’s opinion: In any event, the first clause teaches that meat of an offering that was left overnight, and meat that became impure, and meat that left the courtyard all had a time when they were permitted to the priests. What, is it not referring to a case where it was actually left overnight, i.e., both the blood and the meat of the offering, and here the case is an instance of: If he had wanted, he could have sprinkled the blood, and for that reason the mishna teaches that one is not liable for misusing it? It is considered as having had a time that it was permitted to the priests since he could have sprinkled the blood during the day, and therefore the offering is treated as if the sprinkling already happened, counter to Rav Ashi’s claim that such reasoning does not apply with regard to the sprinkling of the blood.
11The Gemara answers: No, the mishna is referring to cases where the meat left the courtyard at a time when it was fit to leave, and the meat became impure when it was fit to become impure, and was left over when it was fit to be left over, i.e., the mishna is discussing cases where these occurred after the blood was sprinkled, rendering the meat fit to be consumed by the priests. For that reason it was not subject to the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property.
12The Gemara again challenges Rav Ashi’s opinion: But according to this, what is the halakha with regard to a case where the whole offering, including the blood, was actually left overnight? Is that indeed a case where one is liable for misusing consecrated property, as the priests never had a time when it was permitted to consume the meat? If so, those statements in the mishna: Any offering that had a time that it was permitted for consumption by the priests, and any offering that did not have a time that it was permitted for consumption by the priests, are imprecise. They indicate that the critical factor is whether the meat had a time that it was potentially permitted, even if it was ultimately disqualified.
13Instead, the mishna should have stated: With regard to any offering that has, in actuality, a time that it is permitted for consumption by the priests, one is not liable for misusing it. And, similarly, with regard to any offering that does not have a time that it is permitted for consumption by the priests, one is liable for misusing it.
14It must be that Rav Ashi concedes that the mishna in Me’ila should be understood to include the case where both the blood and the meat were leftover, and that under such circumstances one is not liable for misuse of the offering due to the fact that once the blood could have been sprinkled, the offering is already considered permitted to the priests. Rav Ashi nevertheless claims that this mishna does not pose a difficulty to his understanding of Rabbi Shimon’s opinion with regard to an offering’s status as susceptible to the impurity of food. Rather, Rav Ashi says: Are you raising a contradiction between the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property and the halakhot of ritual impurity?
15These cannot be compared, as liability for misuse of consecrated property is due to the sanctity or lack of sanctity of an item, i.e., on whether it is classified as fully reserved for God. Therefore, after the sanctity of the offering has lapsed, which occurs when the blood is ready to be sprinkled, as at that point it is already regarded as permitted to the priests, how can it return and be inured in it?
16But with regard to impurity, the offering’s susceptibility to the impurity of food is due to whether it is considered food or not considered food. Therefore, in any case where if he wants to sprinkle the blood he could sprinkle it, it is only in sprinkling the blood that he grants the meat the status of food, and then it is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food. But in a case where if he wants to sprinkle the blood he cannot sprinkle it for some reason, and the offering is subsequently disqualified, he does not grant it the status of food, since it never became permitted to eat and it therefore is not susceptible to the impurity of food.
17The Gemara raises another objection from a mishna ( Karetot 23b) to Rav Ashi’s opinion that with regard to susceptibility to the impurity of food, blood that is ready to be sprinkled is not considered as if it were sprinkled: With regard to one who brings a provisional guilt offering to be sacrificed, because he is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires a sin offering (see Leviticus 5:17–19), and later it becomes known to him that he has not sinned, the status of the offering is as follows: If it became known to him that he had not sinned before the offering was slaughtered, the consecrated ram should go out and graze in the flock as a non-sacred animal, as the consecration was performed in error. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say