1The Gemara answers: The tanna of that baraita relies on the phrase: “This is the law of the burnt offering [ ha’ola ]: It is that which goes up on its firewood upon the altar all night unto the morning” (Leviticus 6:2), a seemingly superfluous general phrase which is interpreted homiletically to include the halakha that any item that ascends [ ola ] upon the altar shall not descend from it, even if it was disqualified. The verse is the actual source for the halakha of the baraita , whereas the case of a private altar is cited merely in support of this ruling. Accordingly, the baraita does not contradict the opinion of Rav Shimi bar Ashi.
2§ The Gemara cites another discussion concerning the sheep of Shavuot . Rabba bar bar Ḥana taught a baraita before Rav: In a case of the two sheep of Shavuot where one slaughtered them for the sake of rams and not for their own sake, they are valid offerings, but they do not satisfy the obligation of the owner, i.e., the community, to sacrifice these offerings. Rav said to Rabba bar bar Ḥana: That is not so; rather, the sheep certainly satisfy the obligation of the community.
3Rav Ḥisda said: The statement of Rav is reasonable in a case where one thought that they were rams when he slaughtered them, and nevertheless slaughtered them for the sake of lambs. In such a case, it makes sense that they satisfy the community’s obligation since the lambs were slaughtered for the sake of lambs.
4But in a case where he thought that they were rams when he slaughtered them, and therefore slaughtered them for the sake of rams, they do not satisfy the community’s obligation, even though they were actually lambs. This is due to the fact that the erroneous uprooting of the status of an offering constitutes uprooting, despite the fact that it was done in error. But Rabba said: The erroneous uprooting of the status of an offering does not constitute uprooting.
5Rava said: We raise an objection to our own ruling concerning this halakha from that which was taught in a mishna ( Gittin 54a): In a case of priests who disqualified an offering through improper intention in the Temple, by expressing, while sacrificing the offering, the intention to eat it after the appropriate time, if they did so intentionally, they are liable to pay the value of the offering to its owner, who must now bring another offering. It follows, therefore, that if the priests did so unintentionally they are exempt. And it is taught concerning this case in a baraita : Even though they slaughtered it with improper intent unintentionally, their act of improper intention renders the offering piggul , despite the fact that they are exempt from paying damages.
6What are the circumstances in which this is the halakha ? If we say that it is referring to a case where the priest knew that the offering was a sin offering, which is eaten for only one day and one night, and nevertheless he intended the offering to be for the sake of a peace offering, which is eaten for two days and one night, and thereby his intention was that it be eaten after its appropriate time, is this considered an unintentional act by the priests? Certainly they were acting intentionally.
7Rather, is it not referring to a case where the offering was a sin offering, which is eaten for only one day and one night, and the priest thought that it was a peace offering and therefore he intended the offering to be for the sake of a peace offering, which is eaten for two days and one night, and thereby his intention was that it be eaten after its appropriate time? And with regard to this case the tanna taught: Their act of improper intention renders the offering piggul . Apparently, this proves that the erroneous uprooting of the status of an offering constitutes uprooting, contrary to the ruling of Rabba.
8Abaye said to Rava: There is no objection from this baraita , because actually it is referring to a case where the priest knew that it was a sin offering and nevertheless he intended the offering to be for the sake of a peace offering, and his uprooting was done intentionally. Nevertheless, the baraita refers to the priests as acting unintentionally because it is referring to circumstances where the priest says, i.e., he mistakenly thinks, that it is permitted to sacrifice the offering with this intent.
9Rabbi Zeira raises an objection to Rabba’s opinion that erroneous uprooting of the status of an offering does not constitute uprooting. A baraita teaches that Rabbi Shimon says: All meal offerings from which the handful was removed not for their sake are entirely valid, and have even satisfied the obligation of the owner, unlike animal offerings slaughtered not for their sake, which do not satisfy the obligation of the owner.
10This is because meal offerings are not similar to animal offerings. As, in the case of one who removes a handful from a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan for the sake of a meal offering prepared in a deep pan, its mode of preparation proves that it is a shallow- pan meal offering and not a deep-pan meal offering. Since a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan is hard and one prepared in a deep pan is soft, his intention is plainly false. Similarly, if one removes a handful from a dry meal offering, the meal offering of a sinner, which has no oil, for the sake of a meal offering mixed with oil, his intention is plainly false, as its mode of preparation proves that it is a dry meal offering.
11But with regard to animal offerings this is not so. There is one mode of slaughter for all of the offerings, one mode of collection of the blood for all of them, and one mode of sprinkling for all of them. Since the only factor that distinguishes between one type of offering and another is the intention of the individuals involved in its sacrifice, their intention is significant. Consequently, if one of the sacrificial rites is performed for the sake of the wrong type of offering, the offering does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.
12The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances to which Rabbi Shimon is referring? If we say that he is referring to a case where the priest knew that the meal offering was prepared in a shallow pan, and nevertheless he removed a handful from it for the sake of a meal offering prepared in a deep pan, then although its mode of preparation proves that it was prepared in a shallow pan, what of it? In any case he is consciously uprooting its status as a shallow-pan meal offering, changing it to a deep-pan meal offering by means of his intention when he removes the handful.
13Rather, is it not referring to a case where the priest thought it was a meal offering prepared in a deep pan and therefore removed a handful for the sake of a meal offering prepared in a deep pan, but he was mistaken, as it was actually a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan? It is specifically here, in this case, that Rabbi Shimon rules that the offering remains valid, since its mode of preparation proves that it is a shallow-pan meal offering, which indicates that in general, erroneous uprooting of the status of an offering constitutes uprooting, contrary the ruling of Rabba.
14Abaye said to Rabbi Zeira, in response to his objection: This objection to Rabba’s opinion is inconclusive, because one can explain that the baraita is actually referring to a case where the priest knew that the meal offering was prepared in a shallow pan, and nevertheless he removed a handful for the sake of a meal offering prepared in a deep pan.
15And with regard to that which you said in your question: Although its mode of preparation proves that it is prepared in a shallow pan, what of it, i.e., since he is consciously uprooting its identity, how can it satisfy its owner’s obligation? Abaye answers that Rava conforms to his line of reasoning, as Rava says: The Merciful One disqualifies an offering due to improper intent that is not recognizably false, i.e., when the physical properties of the offering itself do not prove that the intent is mistaken. The Merciful One does not disqualify an offering due to improper intent that is recognizably false. Consequently, if one removes a handful from a shallow-pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering, even if he did so consciously, the offering remains valid and satisfies the owner’s obligation.
16MISHNA: Failure to sacrifice the daily offerings does not prevent sacrifice of the additional offerings, and likewise, failure to sacrifice the additional offerings does not prevent sacrifice of the daily offerings. And failure to sacrifice some of the additional offerings on a day when more than one is sacrificed, e.g., if it was both Shabbat and the New Moon, does not prevent sacrifice of the other additional offerings. If the priests did not sacrifice a lamb in the morning as the daily offering, nevertheless, they should sacrifice a lamb in the afternoon as the daily offering, as failure to sacrifice one daily offering does not prevent sacrifice of the other. In all of these cases, if they failed to sacrifice one offering, they should still sacrifice the other.
17Rabbi Shimon said: When does this halakha apply? It applies at a time when the failure to sacrifice the daily morning offering was because they were prevented from sacrificing it due to circumstances beyond their control or they failed to sacrifice it unwittingly. But if the priests acted intentionally and did not sacrifice a lamb in the morning as the daily offering, they should not sacrifice a lamb in the afternoon as the daily offering.
18Incense was burned twice a day, half a measure in the morning and half a measure in the afternoon. If they did not burn the half-measure of incense in the morning, they should burn the half-measure in the afternoon.
19Rabbi Shimon said: And in such a case, the entire measure was sacrificed in the afternoon. The reason for the difference between the daily offerings and the incense is that the daily service on a new golden altar is initiated only with the burning of the incense of the spices in the afternoon, at which time they would burn a full measure. And the daily service on a new altar of the burnt offering, on which the daily offerings were sacrificed, is initiated only with the daily morning offering. And use of a new Table was initiated only with the arrangement of the shewbread on Shabbat, and use of a new Candelabrum was initiated only with the kindling of its seven lamps in the afternoon.
20GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the daily offerings and the additional offerings each do not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva with the other. Concerning this, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin raised a dilemma before Rav Ḥisda: In the case of a community that did not have the resources to sacrifice both the daily offerings and the additional offerings, which of them takes precedence over the other?
21The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances to which Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin is referring? If we say that he is referring to a case where the choice is between the daily offerings of that day and the additional offerings of that same day, it is obvious that the daily offerings are given preference, as the sacrifice of the daily offerings is more frequent than the sacrifice of the additional offerings, which are sacrificed only on special occasions, and the daily offerings are also sanctified.
22Rather, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin must be referring to a case where they have enough animals for the daily offerings of today and also for either the daily offerings for tomorrow or the additional offerings for today. In such a case, are the daily offerings given preference since their sacrifice is more frequent? Or perhaps the additional offerings are given preference because they are considered more sanctified because they are sacrificed on a holy day.
23Rav Ḥisda said to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin: The resolution to this dilemma can be derived from that which you learned in the mishna: Failure to sacrifice the daily offerings does not prevent sacrifice of the additional offerings, and likewise, failure to sacrifice the additional offerings does not prevent sacrifice of the daily offerings. And failure to sacrifice some of the additional offerings does not prevent sacrifice of the other additional offerings.
24What are the circumstances to which the mishna is referring? If we say that it is referring to a case where the Temple treasury has all of the animals necessary for both offerings, and the only question is in terms of sacrificing one before the other, isn’t it taught in a baraita : From where is it derived that no sacrifice should precede the sacrifice of the daily offering of morning? The baraita continues: It is derived from that which the verse states: “And the fire upon the altar shall be kept burning thereby, it shall not go out; and the priest shall kindle wood on it every morning; and he shall lay the burnt offering in order on it, and shall cause the fats of the peace offering to go up in smoke upon it” (Leviticus 6:5).
25And Rava says in explanation of this derivation in the baraita that the term “the burnt offering,” with the definite article, is referring to the first burnt offering of the day, which is the daily offering. Consequently, one may not sacrifice the additional offerings before the daily offering.