1and she miscarried her fetus into the river, but she does not know whether or not the fetus was fully formed, she brings the offering of a woman after childbirth, i.e., a burnt offering and a sin offering. And the sin offering, which is a bird, is eaten after the nape of its neck has been severed, in the manner of a regular bird sin offering. This is the halakha despite the uncertainty, i.e., this fetus might not have been fully formed, in which case the woman is not obligated to bring this offering, and a bird that is not an offering may not be eaten if its nape was severed.
2Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi explains the reasoning behind this ruling: One must follow the majority of pregnant women, and most pregnant women give birth to full-fledged offspring. If so, this is another case involving an uncertainty where the Sages established the halakha as a certainty based on the majority. Furthermore, this case involves the ritual impurity of a woman. Why then did Rabbi Yoḥanan list only three cases of this kind?
3The Gemara answers: We say that only cases taught in the Mishna or a baraita are included in this list, whereas we do not say that those derived from an amoraic halakhic statement, e.g., the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, are included.
4The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to this explanation: But when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said that Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina raises an objection against the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi from a baraita that deals with an unsure woman, i.e., one who does not know when she gave birth. Ravin added: And I do not know what his objection was from that baraita .
5The Gemara discusses Ravin’s statement: What, is it not correct to say that Ravin meant that this baraita is not a refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi but actually provides support for that opinion? If so, that would mean that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s opinion is effectively taught in a baraita as well, and therefore according to the above consideration Rabbi Yoḥanan should have included it in his list.
6The Gemara answers: This is not necessarily the correct inference, as perhaps Ravin meant simply that the ruling of this baraita is neither a refutation nor a support for the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi.
7§ When Rabbi Yoḥanan says that in three places where there is uncertainty the Sages followed the majority and established the halakha as though it involved a certainty, he is clearly indicating that some cases are excluded from this category. The Gemara asks: Rabbi Yoḥanan says this to exclude what?
8If we say that he says this to exclude an uncertain case where on the one hand there is a majority that indicates the woman should be deemed ritually impure and on the other hand there is a presumptive status along with it that opposes that majority, which is why the uncertainty is not treated as a certainty, and therefore one does not burn teruma due to contact with that impurity, this cannot be the case. The reason is that Rabbi Yoḥanan already said it on another occasion, with regard to other cases of ritual impurity, that if the consideration of a majority indicates that an item should be impure while its presumptive status indicates that it should be pure, it is not considered definitely impure.
9The Gemara cites the source for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion in this regard. As we learned in a mishna ( Teharot 3:8): If a ritually impure child is found alongside ritually pure started dough that has not yet risen, and he has risen dough in his hand that may have been removed from the larger portion of started dough, Rabbi Meir deems the started dough pure, since there is no proof the child touched it, as he might have been given the piece by someone else. And the Rabbis deem it impure, as they assume that he touched the started dough. The child is presumed to be impure, because it is the norm of a child to handle items.
10And we say with regard to this dispute: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir? He holds that a majority of children handle items that are within reach, in this case the dough, and a minority do not handle items within reach, and this dough retains a presumptive status of purity, since its impurity has not been definitively determined. Therefore, one should append the fact that the minority of children do not handle items within reach to the presumptive status of purity of the dough, and the force of the majority of children who handle items within reach is weakened. Therefore, the dough is considered pure.
11And the Rabbis contend that in a case where the majority is followed, the minority is considered like it does not exist. And consequently, there is a conflict between the determining factors of the majority of impure children who handle items within reach and the presumptive status of purity of the dough. Therefore, the majority takes precedence.
12And Reish Lakish says in the name of Rabbi Oshaya: This halakha of a child is an example of a presumption, that children handle items within reach, over which teruma is burned, as the Rabbis hold that it is sufficiently certain that the dough has become impure to allow it to be burned. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This is not a presumption over which teruma is burned. Rather, the dough is left aside, and can be neither eaten nor burned, due to the uncertainty whether it is impure. In this context, Rabbi Yoḥanan has already stated that when a majority is contradicted by a presumption, the status of uncertainty applies. Therefore, there was no need for him to specify the three cases he mentioned in order to exclude situations of this kind.
13Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement that there are only three cases in which uncertainty is treated as certainty is meant to exclude a specific situation involving a majority, as discussed by Rabbi Yehuda. As we learned in a mishna (21a): In the case of a woman who miscarries an amorphous piece of flesh, if there is blood that emerges with it, the woman is ritually impure with the impurity of a menstruating woman. And if not, she is pure, as she is neither a menstruating woman nor a woman after childbirth. Rabbi Yehuda says: In both this case, where blood emerged, and that case, where no blood emerged, the woman is impure with the impurity of a menstruating woman, as there was certainly undetected blood that emerged with the flesh.
14And Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: Rabbi Yehuda deemed the woman impure, despite the fact that no blood emerged, only in the case of a piece of flesh that has the color of one of the four types of ritually impure blood, as stated in the mishna below (19a). But if it has the color of other types of blood, the woman is pure. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If a woman miscarries a piece of flesh that has the color of one of the four types of ritually impure blood, all, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, agree that she is impure. And likewise, if the piece has the color of other types of blood, all agree that she is pure. The Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda disagree only with regard to a case where the woman miscarried an amorphous piece of flesh,