1MISHNA: After the birth of an offspring by caesarean section, the mother does not observe seven or fourteen days of impurity and thirty-three or sixty-six days of purity for male and female offspring, respectively, and she is not obligated to bring for it the offering brought by a woman after childbirth. Rabbi Shimon says: The halakhic status of that offspring is like that of an offspring born in a standard birth.
2All women become ritually impure with the flow of blood from the uterus into the outer chamber, i.e., the vagina, although it did not leave the woman’s body, as it is stated: “And her issue in her flesh shall be blood, she shall be in her menstruation seven days” (Leviticus 15:19), indicating that even if her menstrual blood remains in her flesh, she becomes impure. But one who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [ zav ] and one who experiences a seminal emission do not become ritually impure until their emission of impurity emerges outside the body.
3If a priest was partaking of teruma , the portion of the produce designated for the priest, and sensed a quaking of his limbs indicating that a seminal emission was imminent, he should firmly hold his penis to prevent the emission from leaving his body, and swallow the teruma while ritually pure. And the emission of a zav and a seminal emission impart impurity in any amount, even like the size of a mustard seed or even smaller than that.
4GEMARA: The mishna cites a dispute as to whether or not a birth by caesarean section is considered a birth with regard to the halakhot pertaining to childbirth. Rabbi Mani bar Patish said: What is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that it is not considered a birth? It is because the verse states: “If a woman emitted seed and gave birth to a male, then she shall be impure seven days…And when the days of her purification are fulfilled, for a son, or for a daughter, she shall bring a lamb of the first year for a burnt offering, and a pigeon or a dove for a sin offering” (Leviticus 12:2–6). It is derived from here that the halakhot mentioned in that passage do not apply unless she gives birth through the place where she emits seed.
5The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Shimon interpret the term “emitted seed”? The Gemara answers: That word serves to teach that even if she gave birth only to a fluid that resembles the seed that she emitted, i.e., the fetus died and entirely decomposed and dissolved before emerging, its mother is ritually impure due to childbirth.
6The Gemara further asks: And Rabbi Shimon, what is the reason for his opinion that the halakhot of childbirth apply in the case of a caesarean section? Reish Lakish said that it is because the verse states: “But if she gives birth to a female” (Leviticus 12:5). The term “she gives birth” is superfluous in the context of the passage, as it was mentioned previously, and it therefore serves to include the birth of an offspring by caesarean section.
7The Gemara asks: And what do the Rabbis derive from this superfluous expression? The Gemara answers: In their opinion, that expression is necessary to include the birth of a child whose sexual organs are indeterminate [ tumtum ] or a hermaphrodite. As it might enter your mind to say that as the words “male” (Leviticus 12:2) and “female” (Leviticus 12:5) are written in the passage, these halakhot apply only to a definite male and a definite female, but not to a tumtum or a hermaphrodite. Therefore, the term “she gives birth” teaches us that it is the birth itself, not the sex of the offspring, that matters.
8The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Shimon derive that these halakhot apply to a tumtum and a hermaphrodite? The Gemara answers: He derives it from that which bar Livai teaches, as bar Livai teaches a baraita that discusses the verse: “And when the days of her purity are fulfilled, for a son, or for a daughter” (Leviticus 12:6). Since the verse uses the terms “son” and “daughter,” rather than male and female, it is derived from the term “for a son” that these halakhot apply to a son in any case, even if his masculinity is not definite. Similarly, the term “for a daughter” teaches that these halakhot apply to a daughter in any case, even if her femininity is not definite.
9The Gemara asks: And what do the Rabbis derive from the terms “for a son” and “for a daughter”? The Gemara answers: In their opinion, that term is necessary to obligate the mother to bring an offering for each and every son to whom she gives birth, rather than one offering after having given birth to several sons; and likewise to obligate her to bring an offering for each and every daughter to whom she gives birth.
10The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Shimon derive this halakha ? The Gemara answers that he derives it from a baraita that a tanna taught before Rav Sheshet: The verse states: “This is the law for one who gives birth, whether to a male or a female” (Leviticus 12:7). This teaches that a woman brings a single offering for many offspring born within a short time, e.g., after a multiple birth. One might have thought that she may bring an offering for her childbirth and an offering for an irregular discharge of blood from the uterus [ ziva ], in a case where she is required to bring one, as one, i.e., that she may fulfill her two obligations with a single offering.
11The Gemara interrupts the baraita to raise a difficulty: But how could it possibly enter your mind that a woman may bring one offering for two obligations? In the case of a woman after childbirth who consumed blood, or a woman after childbirth who ate forbidden fat, is one offering sufficient for her? One who eats blood or forbidden fat is obligated to bring a sin offering for atonement (see Leviticus 7:25–27). There is no reason to think that a woman after childbirth, who is required to bring a sin offering for a reason other than her childbirth, may bring one offering for both obligations. Similarly, there are no grounds for suggesting that a single offering might suffice for both childbirth and ziva .
12Rather, the statement of the baraita should be revised, as follows: One might have thought that a woman may bring an offering for a childbirth that occurred before the completion of her term of postpartum purity, and for a second childbirth that happened after the completion of that period, as one, i.e., she may fulfill her two obligations with a single offering. Therefore, the verse states: “This is the law for one who gives birth” (Leviticus 12:7), indicating that each birth, unless it occurred within the period of purity following another birth, requires its own offering. The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis respond to this derivation? The Gemara answers that in their opinion, even though it is written: “This is the law,” it was still necessary for the verse to state: “For a son, or for a daughter.”
13The Gemara explains: Had the Torah stated only the verse: “This is the law,” it might enter your mind to say that one offering does not suffice for two births that occurred as a result of two pregnancies, as the second one was a miscarriage whose conception occurred during the woman’s period of purity following the first birth. But if both births occurred as a result of one pregnancy, such as in the case of Yehuda and Ḥizkiyya, the twin sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya, who were born three months apart (see 27a), I would say that one offering for both births is sufficient for her. Therefore, the verse “for a son, or for a daughter” teaches us otherwise.
14§ Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that childbirth by caesarean section has the halakhic status of regular childbirth, concedes in the case of consecrated animals that if one attempts to consecrate an animal born by caesarean section, it is not consecrated. What is the reason for this opinion? He derives it by means of a verbal analogy from the word birth that is written with regard to consecrated animals (see Leviticus 22:27), and the word birth that is written in connection with a firstborn animal (see Deuteronomy 15:19). Just as there, in the case of the firstborn, the halakhot apply specifically to one who “opens the womb” (Exodus 13:15), so too here, in the case of consecrated animals, the halakhot apply only to one who opens the womb.
15The Gemara objects: And let Rabbi Shimon derive a different conclusion by a similar verbal analogy, as the word birth is written with regard to consecrated animals, and the word birth is also written with regard to a person, i.e., a woman who gives birth (see Leviticus 12:2): Just as there, in the case of humans, childbirth by caesarean section has the status of childbirth according to Rabbi Shimon, so too here, in the case of consecrated animals, an animal born by caesarean section is considered the same as an animal born via a natural birth.
16The Gemara answers: It is more reasonable for Rabbi Shimon to derive the halakha of a consecrated animal from a firstborn animal, rather than from the halakha of childbirth, as it is written with regard to a consecrated animal: “Its mother” (Leviticus 22:27), and it is likewise written with regard to a firstborn animal: “Its mother” (Exodus 22:29). The Gemara objects: On the contrary, he should derive it from human births, as that would be a derivation of the halakha concerning consecrated animals that are ordinary, i.e., not firstborns, from the halakha concerning human births of children that are ordinary, and not firstborns.
17The Gemara adopts a different line of reasoning: Rather, Rabbi Shimon should derive it from a firstborn animal, as they both share the following five characteristics: In both cases it is written: “its mother”; both are cases of a sacrificial animal; both are subject to piggul , the disqualification of an offering through improper intent during its sacrificial rites; both are subject to notar , the disqualification of sacrificial meat after a prescribed time; and finally, both are subject to disqualification by becoming ritually impure. By contrast, humans do not share any of these characteristics.
18The Gemara objects: On the contrary, he should derive it from human births, as both cases share the following four characteristics: They are both instances of ordinary, non-firstborn offspring; they both apply to the offspring of either sex, and are not exclusively males; they are both dealing with offspring that are not automatically sacred at birth; and they both apply to offspring that are not a gift to a priest, but belong to an individual non-priest. By contrast, firstborn animals do not share any of these characteristics. The Gemara answers that the comparison to firstborn animals is preferable to the comparison to human childbirth because these shared characteristics are more numerous. The comparison to consecrated animals includes five shared characteristics, whereas the comparison to human births involves only four.
19Rav Ḥiyya, son of Rav Huna, said in the name of Rava: A baraita is taught which supports the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Rabbi Yehuda says: “This is the law of the burnt offering; that is the burnt offering that goes up on the pyre upon the altar” (Leviticus 6:2). It is derived from this verse that the halakha is that if a part of a disqualified offering is taken up to the altar it should be burned there, rather than taken down, despite its unfit status. There are three expressions which indicate exclusion in this verse: The term “this is,” which indicates this one and not another one; the term “that is,” indicating that one and not another one; and the term “the burnt offering” instead of “a burnt offering.”