1the prohibition with regard to payment to a prostitute should apply to the payment retroactively. Rabbi Eliezer says: The baraita is referring to a situation when she sacrificed the payment in the Temple first, before the intercourse took place.
2The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of such a situation? If the circumstances are that he said to her: Acquire this payment from now, it is obvious that it is permitted to sacrifice it, as it is not extant as payment at the time of the intercourse, and it is merely a gift that he gave her. It would not be necessary for the baraita to state this.
3And if the circumstances are that he did not say to her: Acquire this payment from now, how can she be allowed to sacrifice it? The Merciful One states in the Torah: “And when a man shall sanctify his house to be holy to the Lord” (Leviticus 27:14), from which it is derived that just as one’s house is in his possession, so too, any item that a person wishes to consecrate must be in his possession. The prostitute cannot consecrate an animal that is not in her possession.
4Rather, the baraita is referring to a situation where he said to her: Let the animal be with you until the time of intercourse, and if you need it in the meantime, acquire it from now. The baraita teaches that in this situation she may sacrifice her payment as an offering.
5Rav Hoshaya raises a dilemma: If she consecrated it first, before the intercourse, what is the halakha ? Since the Master said that declaration to the Most High is equivalent to transfer to an ordinary person, i.e., a spoken consecration of an item to the Temple is deemed, in terms of acquisition, like the legal transfer of an item to a person, therefore, since she consecrated it by speech, is it considered tantamount to having sacrificed it, and consequently it would be permitted to sacrifice it? Or perhaps should it be reasoned that now, at the time of the intercourse, in any event, the animal is extant, i.e., it was not actually sacrificed, and therefore it is prohibited to sacrifice it?
6The Gemara suggests: Resolve the dilemma from the statement of Rabbi Eliezer, as Rabbi Eliezer says: The baraita is referring to a case where she sacrificed it first. By inference, it is referring specifically to a case where she sacrificed it; but if she merely consecrated it, then it is not permitted to sacrifice the animal, as it is considered in her possession at the time of the intercourse.
7The Gemara rejects this resolution: Rav Hoshaya raises the dilemma with regard to the statement of Rabbi Eliezer itself, asking what his intent is: Is it obvious to Rabbi Eliezer that the animal is permitted specifically in a case where she sacrificed it, but in a case where she merely consecrated it, that is not the halakha , and the payment is forbidden, because it is extant as payment at the time of the intercourse? Or perhaps does he mention specifically the case where she sacrificed it because that case is obvious to him, but with regard to the case where she consecrated it, he is uncertain whether it is permitted or not, and he therefore did not rule on the matter? The Gemara comments: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
8§ The baraita teaches: If he engaged in intercourse with her and afterward, after some time elapsed, gave her payment, her payment is permitted. The Gemara raises a contradiction from another baraita : If he engaged in intercourse with her and afterward gave her payment, even from now until three years afterward, her payment is forbidden.
9Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that Rav Ḥisda said: This is not difficult. This case, where it is forbidden, is where he said in advance: Engage in intercourse with me in exchange for this lamb. In this case the lamb is considered to be her property immediately, even if he actually gave it to her only after some time had elapsed. That case, where the animal is permitted, is where he said to her: Engage in intercourse with me in exchange for a lamb, without specifying a particular one. Since he did not specify a particular lamb as the fee, when he later gives her a lamb, it is not deemed payment.
10The Gemara asks: But when he says to her: In exchange for this lamb, what of it? Isn’t a formal act of acquisition, such as pulling the lamb, absent from the transaction? In any case she has not acquired it. The Gemara answers: The reference is to the case of a gentile prostitute, who does not acquire by pulling; gentiles acquire an item by paying money for it. And if you wish, say instead that actually, the reference is to a Jewish prostitute, and it is a case where the lamb is already standing in her courtyard. This effected the acquisition as soon as the man stated his intent to give her the lamb, in accordance with the principle that a person acquires that which is within his property.
11The Gemara challenges: If the reference is to a case where it is standing in her courtyard, that is not a case where he engaged in intercourse with her and afterward he gave her payment, since it was acquired by her before he engaged in intercourse with her. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to state this halakha with regard to a case where he rendered the lamb as designated payment [ appoteiki ] for her, i.e., a case where he said to her: If I bring you dinars from now until such and such a day, all is well, and you will return the lamb to me, but if not, take the lamb as your payment.
12§ The Gemara resumes discussion of the practice of the Sages from the school of Rabbi Yannai, who would borrow produce from the poor during the Sabbatical Year and repay them after the Sabbatical Year, and Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling that this is permitted, as it is not considered commerce with Sabbatical-Year produce. Rav Sheshet raises an objection to this ruling from a baraita : A person may say to his donkey drivers or to his laborers: Go and eat with this dinar, or: Go and drink with this dinar, and he does not need to be concerned that his workers will transgress a prohibition with the money he has given them,