1It does not need to be said that when he asks for the item without specification one may sell white wheat to him, and it does not need to be said that when he asks for it with specification one may not sell it to him, as he expressly stated that he will use it for idol worship. Rather, when the mishna says that he asks without specification, this is referring to a case where the gentile says that he wishes to buy wheat, in which case it is permitted to sell to him. If so, the case when he asks with specification is one where he says that he wants white wheat, which is an item used in idol worship, and the mishna teaches that it is prohibited to sell this to him.
2By inference, this means that in the case of a rooster, referred to earlier in the mishna, even if the gentile requests without specification, i.e., without saying that he wants a white one, it is not permitted to sell it to him. This conclusion contradicts the opinion of Rabbi Zeira. The Gemara rejects this argument: Say in response that actually, without specification is referring to a case where the gentile says that he wants to purchase white wheat, and with specification is referring to a case where he says that he needs it for idol worship.
3And as for the objection that this ruling is superfluous, in fact it is necessary for the mishna to state the halakha in a case where he specified that he would use the item for idol worship. The Gemara elaborates: It might enter your mind to say that this man does not really need the wheat for his idol worship. Rather, he is deeply attached to idol worship, and he thought that just as that man, i.e., he himself, is so attached to it, everyone else is also attached to idol worship. Therefore, he reasoned: I will say this, that I intend to use the item for idol worship, so that they will give it to me. Consequently, it is necessary for the mishna to teach us that if he says that he intends to use the item for idol worship it is prohibited to sell it to him, as he might be telling the truth.
4§ Rav Ashi raised a dilemma: If a gentile asks the merchants: Who has a damaged white rooster, what is the halakha with regard to whether it is permitted to sell him an unblemished white rooster? Do we say that from the fact that he says that he wants a damaged rooster, it may be inferred that he does not need it for idol worship, as gentiles do not sacrifice defective animals, and therefore it is permitted? Or perhaps he is only employing artifice. In other words, he knows that a Jew will not sell him an undamaged white rooster upon request, and as it is unlikely that someone has a damaged white rooster to sell him, he hopes that he will receive an undamaged one. If so, it is prohibited to sell him a white rooster.
5If you say that this gentile is employing artifice, and it is prohibited, in a case where he said: Who has a white rooster, who has a white rooster; and they brought him a black rooster and he took it, or in a case where they bought him a red one and he took it, what is the halakha with regard to whether it is permitted to sell him a white rooster? Do we say: Since they brought him a black rooster and he took it, or they bought him a red one and he took it, evidently he does not need the rooster for idol worship? Or perhaps, here too he is employing artifice? The Gemara comments: These dilemmas shall stand unresolved.
6§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Meir says: It is prohibited to sell even a good palm tree and ḥatzav to gentiles. Rav Ḥisda said to Avimei: It is learned as a tradition that the tractate Avoda Zara of our forefather Abraham contained four hundred chapters, and we have learned only five chapters in our tractate Avoda Zara , and we do not even know the meaning of what we are saying.
7Avimei asked him: And what in the mishna here poses a difficulty for you? He replied: I do not understand the mishna which teaches the following: Rabbi Meir says: It is prohibited to sell even a good palm tree, ḥatzav , and naklas to gentiles. It may be inferred from here that it is a good palm tree that one does not sell to gentiles, but one may sell a bad palm tree. But didn’t we learn in another mishna (19b) that one may not sell to gentiles anything that is attached to the ground? Avimei said to him: What is the meaning of: A good palm tree? It means the detached fruit of a good palm tree. And similarly, Rav Huna says: The mishna means the fruit of a good palm tree.
8The Gemara explains the meaning of other terms that appear in the mishna. Ḥatzav is a type of date known as kashba . With regard to the meaning of naklas , the Gemara relates: When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Ḥama bar Yosef said that it is referring to koreyatei . Abaye said to Rav Dimi: We learned in the mishna naklas , and we did not know what it is, and now you have said that it means koreyatei , and we do not know what that is either. How have you helped us? Rav Dimi said to him: I have in fact helped you, as when you go there, to Eretz Yisrael, and say to them naklas , and they do not know what it means, say to them koreyatei , and they will know what it is, and they will show it to you.
9MISHNA: In a place where the residents were accustomed to sell small domesticated animals to gentiles, one may sell them. In a place where they were not accustomed to sell them, one may not sell them. But in every place, one may not sell them large livestock, calves, or foals, whether these animals are whole or damaged. The Sages prohibited these sales lest a Jew’s animal perform labor for the gentile on Shabbat in violation of an explicit Torah prohibition, as explained in the Gemara. Rabbi Yehuda permits the sale of a damaged animal because it is incapable of performing labor, and ben Beteira permits the sale of a horse for riding, because riding a horse on Shabbat is not prohibited by Torah law.
10GEMARA: The mishna teaches that one may not sell small domesticated animals to gentiles if it is not the accepted practice. The Gemara infers: That is to say that there is no prohibition involved; rather, there is a custom not to sell small domesticated animals. Therefore, where the practice is to prohibit the sale, that is what is practiced, and where the practice is to permit the sale, that is what is practiced.
11And the Gemara raises a contradiction from the mishna on 22a: One may not keep an animal in the inns of gentiles, because they are suspected of engaging in bestiality. If so, it should be prohibited in all places to sell animals to gentiles, as one is thereby placing a stumbling block before the blind. Rav says: The halakha of the mishna there, with regard to keeping an animal in a gentile inn, is contingent on the halakha of the mishna here. If it is a place where the Sages permitted one to sell animals to gentiles, it must be that the gentiles of that location are not suspected of engaging in bestiality. Therefore, the Sages permitted one to leave the animal in seclusion with the gentile at the inn. Conversely, in a place where the Sages prohibited one from leaving the animal in seclusion with the gentile at the inn, because the gentiles there are suspected of engaging in bestiality, they also prohibited one from selling animals to gentiles there.