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    Kiddushin 8a

    Chapter 1 - HaIshah Nikneit

    גם: קידושין דף ח׳ ע״א, פרק א׳ האשה נקנית

    English translation - Kiddushin 8a

    Translation: William Davidson Edition - English. Read alongside the Aramaic below; numbers match the passages of the daf.

    1so too, an item worth money must be set, i.e., it must have a clearly defined value.

    2Rav Yosef said: From where do I say this opinion? As it is taught in a baraita with regard to redeeming a Hebrew slave: “He shall give back the price of his redemption out of the money that he was bought for” (Leviticus 25:51), which indicates: He is acquired specifically through money and he is not acquired through grain or vessels.

    3Rav Yosef explains: What are the circumstances of these grains and vessels? If we say that a Hebrew slave cannot be acquired through them at all, as money alone may be used, the Merciful One states: “He shall give back the price of his redemption,” which serves to include all modes of repayment as valid equivalents of money, i.e., an item worth money is the same as money. There is no requirement to use money in particular; it is also possible to use items with monetary value.

    4And if you say that they do not have the value of one peruta , why mention specifically grain and vessels? Even money that is not worth one peruta cannot be used for acquiring a slave. Rather, is it not speaking here about a case where the grain and vessels do have the value of one peruta , but since they lack a set value, no, a Hebrew slave cannot be redeemed with them? The comparison with money teaches that a Hebrew slave can be redeemed only with an item that has a clearly defined value, like money.

    5And the other Sage, Rabba, who maintains that appraisal is not necessary, would respond: The tanna is referring to an item worth one peruta , but he is not teaching that one cannot redeem a slave with items whose value is not set. Rather, this is what he is saying: A Hebrew slave is acquired through the mode of money, and he is not acquired through the mode of grain or vessels. And what is this mode particular to the acquisition of grain and vessels? This is referring to symbolic exchange. A slave cannot be acquired through the mode of acquisition of symbolic exchange.

    6The Gemara notes: This explanation is valid only according to those who say that grain can be acquired through the mode of exchange; but according to the opinion of Rav Naḥman, who said that produce cannot effect symbolic exchange, as this mode of acquisition applies only to vessels, what can be said? Why does the tanna mention grain if grain cannot be used in symbolic exchange? Rather, the Gemara rejects this explanation in favor of the following: Actually, this is referring to a case where the grain and utensils do not have the value of one peruta . And as for that which you said: Why mention specifically grain and vessels; even money that is not worth one peruta cannot acquire either, one could say that the tanna is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary.

    7The Gemara elaborates: It is not necessary to state with regard to money that if it has the value of one peruta , yes, one effects acquisition with it, and if not, then no, one cannot effect acquisition with it. But with regard to grain and vessels, one might say that as their benefit is readily available, i.e., one can enjoy them immediately in their current state, perhaps the slave decides and transfers ownership of himself to the master by even less than the worth of one peruta . Therefore, the tanna teaches us that an article less than the value of one peruta cannot effect acquisition notwithstanding the above reasoning.

    8Rav Yosef said: From where do I say that betrothal can be effected only with an item with a clearly defined value? As it is taught in a baraita ( Tosefta , Bekhorot 6:4), that if one says to a priest: This calf should be for the redemption of my firstborn son, or: This cloak should be for the redemption of my firstborn son, then he has said nothing. But if he said: This calf worth the value of five sela should be for the redemption of my firstborn son, or: This cloak worth the value of five sela should be for the redemption of my firstborn son, then his son is redeemed.

    9The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances with regard to this redemption with a calf or a cloak that has no clearly defined value? If we say that they are not worth five sela , is it in his power to give a priest less than the established amount? Why would it even be considered that perhaps the son is redeemed? Rather, is it not referring to a case where even though they are worth this amount, one may not redeem with them in the case of the first clause since their value is not set? This shows that there is a difference between an item that has a set value and one that does not.

    10The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No; actually, this is referring to a case where the calf or cloak is not worth five sela , and the latter clause is referring to a case where the priest accepted upon himself to value the items as though they were worth this amount, which is why the son is redeemed. This is like this incident in which Rav Kahana, who was a priest, took a cloth [ sudara ] from the house of a man obligated to perform the redemption of his firstborn son. Rav Kahana said to the man: For me, I view this cloth as though it were worth five sela .

    11Rav Ashi said: We said that it is possible to redeem one’s son in this manner only when the priest is an individual such as Rav Kahana, who is a great man and is required to wear a cloth on his head. It was common practice for important people to wear a scarf on their heads. But with regard to everyone else, i.e., those who do not wear these cloths and cannot say it is worth that amount to them, no, they may not perform the redemption of the firstborn son in this manner. The Gemara cites a proof that a distinguished individual who needs a cloth will pay a large amount for one. This is like this incident in which Mar bar Rav Ashi bought a cloth from Rabba’s mother from Kovei for thirteen dinars, despite the fact that it was worth ten, because he needed a cloth.

    12§ Rabbi Elazar says: If a man said to a woman: Be betrothed to me with one hundred dinars, and he gave her one dinar out of the one hundred, she is betrothed immediately and he must subsequently complete the payment of the remainder of the amount he promised her. What is the reason for this? Since he said to her: Be betrothed to me with one hundred dinars, and yet he gave her only one dinar, he is like one who said to her: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I will give you one hundred dinars. In other words, he betroths her now with one dinar on the condition he will pay the remaining ninety-nine in the future. The betrothal therefore takes effect immediately, and he owes her the rest of the one hundred dinars.

    13The Gemara adds: And this is in accordance with the opinion that Rav Huna says that Rav says: With regard to anyone who states a provision employing the phrase: On the condition, it is tantamount to his stipulating that the agreement take effect retroactively from now. An agreement stipulated by means of the phrase: On the condition, takes effect immediately. This is not like an ordinary agreement, which takes effect only after the condition has been fulfilled.

    14The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita ( Tosefta 2:10). If a man says to a woman: Be betrothed to me with one hundred dinars, and while he was counting the money, one of them wanted to retract the betrothal, it is in the power of either of them to do so even when only the last dinar remains to be given. This indicates that the betrothal does not take effect until the entire one hundred dinars has been paid.

    15The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? This is a case where he says to the woman: Be betrothed to me with this one hundred dinars. In this case the entire one hundred dinars, not just the first dinar, constitutes the betrothal money. The Gemara raises a difficulty with this answer: From the fact that the latter clause of the baraita uses the expression: With this one hundred dinars, it can be inferred that the first clause is dealing with an unspecified one hundred dinars.

    16As it is taught in the latter clause of that baraita , if he said to a woman: Be betrothed to me with this one hundred dinars, and it was found to be one hundred dinars less a dinar, or if it included a dinar of copper instead of silver, she is not betrothed. If one of the dinars was found to be a flawed dinar, i.e., it was a silver dinar but it was so worn that it would not be universally accepted, she is betrothed, and he must exchange that dinar for a different one. Since the latter clause of the baraita emphasizes the term: This one hundred dinars, evidently the first clause of the baraita must be referring to an unspecified one hundred dinars.

    17The Gemara rejects this opinion: No; one can say that the first clause and the latter clause are both referring to a case where he said: With this one hundred dinars, and the latter clause is explaining the first clause, as follows: If one of them wishes to retract the betrothal, it is in the power of either of them to do so even when only the last dinar remains to be given. How so? This is referring to a case where he said to her: With this one hundred dinars.

    18The Gemara comments: And so too, it is reasonable to explain the baraita this way, as, if it enters your mind that the first clause is referring to an unspecified one hundred dinars, consider the following: Now if it is not a betrothal in a case involving an unspecified one hundred dinars, and she can retract her agreement to the betrothal, is it necessary to say that she can retract it when he says: With this one hundred dinars? If that were the correct interpretation of the first clause, the ruling in the last clause would be unnecessary.

    19The Gemara rejects this proof: If it is due to that reason, there is no conclusive argument, i.e., the proof of the argument is inconclusive. The reason is that one could say that the tanna taught the latter clause to reveal the meaning of the first clause. The function of the latter clause is not to teach a novel halakha , but to preempt a mistaken reading of the first clause. The latter clause was stated so that you should not mistakenly say that the first clause is referring only to a situation when he said: With this one hundred dinars, but in a case of an unspecified one hundred dinars, it would be a betrothal. Therefore, the tanna taught in the latter clause: With this one hundred dinars, which teaches by inference that the first clause is referring to an unspecified one hundred dinars, and even so it is not a betrothal. Although this proof is rejected, the Gemara remains with its explanation that the first clause is referring to a case where he said to her: With this one hundred dinars.

    20Rav Ashi said: It is unnecessary to explain that the first clause of the baraita is referring to a case where he said: With this one hundred dinars, as a situation where he was counting the money is different. The reason is that she has the entirety of the one hundred dinars in mind, and therefore she will not be content with some of the money. His continuous action indicates that they both expect that he will give her the entire one hundred dinars, and consequently both parties can retract their agreement until he finishes counting.

    21The Gemara further analyzes the baraita : What are the circumstances of this copper dinar mentioned here? If she knows that it is a copper dinar, she knew and accepted this coin as a dinar. If so, she cannot later retract her betrothal. The Gemara answers: No; it is necessary in a case where he gave her this dinar at night and at the time she did not see that it was copper. Alternatively, it was found among the other dinars, and she did not notice that one of them one was copper.

    22The Gemara further asks: What are the circumstances of this flawed dinar, also mentioned in the baraita ? If it cannot be spent, i.e., it cannot pass as a silver dinar, this is exactly like a copper dinar, as it too is not worth a full dinar. Rav Pappa said: This is referring to a case where the dinar can be spent with difficulty, i.e., it is difficult, but not impossible, to find someone who will accept it.

    23§ Rava says that Rav Naḥman says: If one said to a woman: Be betrothed to me with one hundred dinars, and instead of giving it to her he gave her collateral for the money, she is not betrothed.

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    Rashi

    "Who was a great man" - and he didn't go out with his head uncovered.

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    קידושין ח עמוד א

    1אף שוה כסף נמי דקייץ׃

    2אמר רב יוסף: מנא אמינא לה, דתניא: (ויקרא כה, נא) ״מכסף מקנתו״ בכסף הוא נקנה, ואינו נקנה בתבואה וכלים.

    3האי תבואה וכלים היכי דמי? אילימא דלא מקנו בהו כלל, (ויקרא כה, נא) ישיב גאולתו אמר רחמנא לרבות שוה כסף ככסף;׃

    4ואי דלית בהו שוה פרוטה, מאי איריא תבואה וכלים, אפי' כסף נמי! אלא לאו דאית בהו שוה פרוטה, וכיון דלא קייצי לא?

    5ואידך, ה"ק בתורת כסף הוא נקנה, ואין נקנה בתורת תבואה וכלים, ומאי נינהו חליפין.

    6ולרב נחמן, דאמר: פירות לא עבדי חליפין, מאי איכא למימר? אלא, לעולם דלית בהו שוה פרוטה. ודקאמרת ״מאי איריא תבואה, וכלים אפי' כסף נמי״, לא מיבעיא קאמר:

    7לא מיבעיא כסף, דאי אית ביה שוה פרוטה אין, אי לא לא, אבל תבואה וכלים, אימא מדמקרבא הנאתייהו, גמר ומקני נפשיה, קא משמע לן.

    8אמר רב יוסף: מנא אמינא לה, דתניא: ״עגל זה לפדיון בני״, ״טלית זה לפדיון בני״ לא אמר כלום. ״עגל זה בחמש סלעים לפדיון בני״, ״טלית זו בחמש סלעים לפדיון בני״ בנו פדוי.

    9האי פדיון, היכי דמי? אילימא דלא שוי, כל כמיניה? אלא לאו אף על גב דשוי, וכיון דלא קייצי לא?

    10לא, לעולם דלא שוי, וכגון דקביל כהן עילויה. כי הא דרב כהנא שקיל סודרא מבי פדיון הבן, אמר ליה: לדידי חזי לי חמש סלעים.

    11אמר רב אשי: לא אמרן אלא כגון רב כהנא, דגברא רבה הוא ומבעי ליה סודרא ארישיה, אבל כולי עלמא לא. כי הא דמר בר רב אשי זבן סודרא מאימיה דרבה מקובי שוי עשרה בתליסר.

    12אמר רבי אלעזר: ״התקדשי לי במנה״, ונתן לה דינר הרי זו מקודשת, וישלים. מאי טעמא? כיון דאמר לה ״מנה״ ויהב לה דינר, כמאן דאמר לה: ״על מנת״ דמי.

    13ואמר רב הונא אמר רב: כל האומר ע"מ כאומר ״מעכשיו״ דמי.

    14מיתיבי: ״התקדשי לי במנה״, והיה מונה והולך, ורצה אחד מהן לחזור אפילו בדינר האחרון הרשות בידו.

    15הכא במאי עסקינן, דאמר ״במנה זו הא מדסיפא ״במנה זו רישא במנה סתם׃

    16דקא תני סיפא אמר: לה ״התקדשי לי במנה״, זו ונמצא מנה חסר דינר או דינר של נחשת אינה מקודשת, דינר רע הרי זו מקודשת ויחליף׃

    17לא רישא וסיפא דאמר במנה זו ופרושי קא מפרש רצה אחד מהן לחזור אפי' בדינר האחרון הרשות בידו כיצד כגון דאמר לה במנה זו׃

    18והכי נמי מסתברא דאי ס"ד רישא במנה סתם השתא במנה סתם לא הוו קידושי במנה זו מיבעיא׃

    19אי משום הא לא איריא תנא סיפא לגלוי רישא שלא תאמר רישא במנה זו אבל במנה סתם הוו קידושין תנא סיפא במנה זו מכלל דרישא במנה סתם ואפילו הכי לא הוו קידושין׃

    20רב אשי אמר מונה והולך שאני דדעתה אכוליה׃

    21האי דינר של נחשת היכי דמי אי דידעה ביה הא סברה וקבלה לא צריכא דיהביה ניהליה בליליא אי נמי דאשתכח ליה ביני זוזי׃

    22האי דינר רע היכי דמי אי דלא נפיק היינו דינר של נחשת אמר רב פפא כגון דנפיק על ידי הדחק:

    23אמר רבא אמר רב נחמן אמר לה התקדשי לי במנה והניח לה משכון עליה אינה מקודשת׃

    Tosafot

    "So too something worth money needs to have a fixed, known value" - As for what we say later in Kiddushin 12a: "A man betrothed [a wife] with bundles of tow cotton. Rav Shimi bar Hiyya said and examined it—if it was worth a perutah, yes [the betrothal was effective]; if it was not, no". It seems like [Rav Shimi bar Hiyya] does not agree with Rav Yosef [since he allows the evaluation after the fact, while Rav Yosef requires the evaluation beforehand].

    "What is it? Symbolic exchange (halifin)." A Hebrew slave can't be acquired through halifin and can't acquire himself through halifin, since the reason he can acquire with money is derived from this verse of "kesef miknato" later (on Kiddushin 14b). But a Canaanite slave can be acquired with halifin, as it teaches in the chapter Ha-Sholeah (Gittin 39b) regarding [the slaveowner] who took his hat and threw it at her and said to her: "Acquire this and acquire yourself", and it is implied there that his act did nothing because it was an item [the hat] belonging to the one who acquired [the slaveowner]. However, if it were an item of the acquirer [the slave], then she would have acquired [herself] through the laws of halifin, not the laws of money. This is also how Rabbenu Hananel explains it there.

    "From where do I know this? As it is taught in a baraita: This calf..." He is bringing evidence according to the first version [of the sugya, where Rav Yosef agrees that one does not need an evaluation if he said "It is worth the minimum amount", which there is a perutah but here is 5 selaim. We know that he doesn't need an evaluation because, according to this baraita, all he has to do is to announce that the calf is worth 5 selaim and that is enough, because, like the silk which is obviously worth a perutah, the calf is clearly worth more than 5 selaim. The previous "From where do I know this?" of Rav Yosef at the top of the daf was within the world of "They also disagree if he said it was worth the minimum amount", so Tosafot is clarifying for us that we have returned to the earlier version of the mahloket].(See the Meharsha for his comments on the difficulty of this Tosafot and to resolve it in another way).

    "Rav Kahana took a turban [as payment] for redemption of a firstborn son". This implies that Rav Kahana was a kohen. Problem: At the end of Elu Ovrin (Pesahim 49a) it imples that he was not a kohen, since he said, "If I hadn't married a kohenet, I would have not been exiled"! Solution: There were 2 Rav Kahanas. Alternative solution: It was because of his wife that he could purchase [i.e. redeem the firstborn son], as we find in chapter Ha-Zaro'a (Hullin 132a) "Rav Kahana eats [terumah] because of his wife".

    "But for general people—no" - Problem: Why doesn't this work!? Is it worse than a gift with the understanding that you need to return it, that we say earlier (in Kiddushin 6b) that it is an effective gift!? Solution: Yes indeed it is worse, for there (in 6b) it was a significant thing that was the gift [a maneh], even though it was given with the understanding that it should be returned. But here, regarding redemption, the turban wasn't worth 5 selaim and so when he gave it to him he did not fulfil his obligation of giving [whereas had he given him a maneh, 25 selaim, then he would have fulfilled the technical giving requirement even though he had to return it afterwards].

    "Since it wouldn't be kiddushin with a nonspecific maneh, we need [to learn the case with] a specific maneh!?" Problem: Perhaps this is what it is teaching us: A specific maneh, even though she didn't change her mind [like in the reisha], it wouldn't be kiddushin because it turned out to be lacking [less than the promised maneh, and therefore the seifa is in fact necessary because otherwise we wouldn't know about the case where she didn't change her mind]! Solution: You can learn this from the reisha since, [there,] with a nonspecific maneh, she is able to change her mind and we don't say that he should complete [the maneh]—therefore, the kiddushin does not take effect at all until he completes [the maneh, in other words the main point of the reisha is that he hasn't paid yet, not that she is able to change her mind]. So too if he said to her "With this specific maneh" and it turned out to be lacking, the kiddushin did not take effect and even the completion was not effective, for she was not expecting him to pay her anything other than the maneh that he showed to her and it was lacking. [Therefore we can derive the law of the seifa on a specific maneh from the law of the reisha on a nonspecific maneh and the seifa is indeed unnecessary, the Gemara's resolution up to here works (though will be subsequently rejected).]

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    Rashba

    טלית זה בה' סלעים לפדיון בני - פירוש לדעת רב יוסף טלית זו שנישום בחמש סלעים, דאילו באומר טלית זו חמש סלעים לא קרי ליה רב יוסף קיץ.

    אמר רב אשי לא אמרן אלא רב כהנא דגברא רבה הוא ומיבעי ליה סודרא אבל כולי עלמא לא. משמע מהכא דכולי עלמא ואפילו צורבא מרבנן דוקא בה' סלעים או בשווייהן ממש, אבל רב כהנא דגברא רבה הוא ודומה לומר הוא דיכולין לומר לדידי שוה לי, לפי שדרכן של גדולים להתיקר במה שהן צריכין לו, וכדקאמר כי הא דמר בר רב אשי זבין סודרא מאמיה דרבא מקובי שוה עשה בתליסר, לומר שאין כאן הערמה דשוה הוא לו ממש. אבל הרמב"ם (פי"א מהל' ביכורים ה"ז) כתב דכל כהן יכול לומר לדידי שוה לי, ואפשר לומר דהא דאמר רב אשי לא אמרן אלא רב כהנא בטלית דוקא קאמר, שאין דרכן של בני אדם להתיקר בו, אלא תלמידי חכמים, שאין הולכין בגלוי הראש כלל, אלא בטלית נאה כטליתן של תלמידי חכמים, אבל בשאר דברים, כל האדם שוה, והכל אומרים לדידי שוה לי, דאפשר דהכין הוא, ואין כאן הערמה של כלום, וצריך עיון.

    אמר ר' אלעזר התקדשי לי במנה ונתן לה דינר מקודשת וישלים מאי טעמא כיון דאמר לה מנה ויהיב לה דינה כמאן דאמר לה על מנת דמי. וכתב הראב"ד ודוקא דיהיב לה דינר, אבל יהיב לה כוליה מנה חסר דינר, לא, דכסיפא לה מילתא למתבעיה כדאמרינן בפר' דלקמן (קידושין מז, א).

    ואמר רב הונא אמר רב כל האומר על מנת כאומר מעכשיו דמי - יש מדקדקין מכאן דבעל מנת אינו צריך לתנאי כפול ולהן קודם ללאו דהא הכא סתמא יהי לה. אלא דאנן הוא דקאמרינן דכמאן דאמר לה על מנת דמי וכן דעת רבינו אלפסי, וכבר הארכתי בזה בפרק מי שאחזו (גיטין עה, א) בסייעתא דשמיא.

    השתא במנה סתם לא הוו קדושי במנה זו מיבעיא - פירש רש"י ז"ל במנה זה ונמצא חסר דהשתא לא קבלה מיבעיא דמציא הדר. ולפי פירושו נמצא חסר דינר דאינה מקודשת בשחזרה בה. ואינו מחוור, דבשנמצא חסר דינר אינה מקודשת כלל, דהא התקדשי במנה זו קאמר לה ואין כאן מנה, דומיא דאמר לה שוה חמשין ואינו שוה חמשין, דאע"פ שרצה לשלם לה אינה מקודשת. ויש לומר דשאני שיראי בדלא שוה דאי אפשר להוסיף בגופו, אבל מנה אם חסר דינר ראוי להוסיף בו ולהשלים עליו הדינר. ונראה דהזקיקו לרבינו ז"ל לפרש כן הא דאמרינן פירושי קא מפרש רצה אחד מהם לחזור בו הרשות בידו, כיצד כגון דאמר לה מנה זה, דאלמא רישא דקתני רצה אחד מהם לחזור בו הרשות בידו, בשהיה מנה חסר היא, ואפילו הכי קתני רצה לחזור דמשמע דצריכין לחזור בהן. ועוד מדקאמר הכי נמי מסתברא דאי סלקא דעתך רישא במנה סתם השתא במנה סתם לא הוו קדושי במנה זה מיבעיא, אלמא רישא וסיפא בחד דינא קא מיירי, דאי אמרת רישא בדינא דחזרה וסיפא בדין קדושין בטלים מעצמן, מאי קאמר, הא ודאי אצטריך לאשמועינן הני תרתי גווני דהאי דינא לחוד והאי דינא לחוד. ומסתברא דהכי פירושו פירושי קא מפרש כיצד כגון דאמר לה מנה זה ומנה שלם בידו, והיה מונה והולך ונמצא כולו מנה (בידה) [בידו] חסר דינר (לומר), שעדיין לא הספיק למנות וליתן לה, רצה אחד מהם לחזור הרשות בידו, אבל אם היה מנה שבידו חסר דינר, ואמר לה התקדשי לי במנה זה, אינה מקודשת כלל. והכי נמי מסתברא הכי קאמר, דמרישא דקתני דבמנה סתם יכולין לחזור בהם עד שישלים כוליה מנה, שמעינן דכל שכן כשאמר לה מנה זה ונמצא מנה חסר דינר שאינה מקודשת כלל, דמה טעם אמרו במנה סתם דיכולין לחזור בו, דבכוליה מנה דוקא מיקדשא, ולאו על מנת שאתן לך מנה קאמר, אם כן כל שכן כשאמר לה מנה זה שבאותו מנה דוקא הוא מקדשה, וכשנמצא מנה חסר דינר אינה מקודשת, ואפילו לכשישלים. וכן שנויה בתוספתא (פ"ב, י) התקדשי לי במנה זה ונמצא חסר דינר אינה מקודשת, היה בו דינר רע יחליף, היה מונה ומשליך לתוך ידה ראשון ראשון יכולה היא שתחזור בה עד שעה שיגמור, וכתבה רבינו אלפסי בהלכות, ומדברי ר"ח גם כן נראה שהוא מפרש דלאו כולה סיפא פירוש דרישא, אלא מנה זה בלבד, דסיפא הוי פירושא דרישא, כלומר כיצד כגון דאמר לה מנה זה, ואחר כך השמיענו דין אחר, דהיינו שנמצא בו דינר רע או שהוא חסר דינר, ונכון הוא, וזה לשון הרב ז"ל פרושי קא מפרש והכי קתני. רצה אחד מהם לחזור אפילו בדינר אחרון הרשות בידו, כיצד כגון דאמר התקדשי לי במנה זה וכן אם נמצא מנה חסר דינר וכו'.

    רב אשי אמר מונה והולך שאני דדעתיה אכוליה מנה - כלומר לעולם במנה סתם, ואפילו הכי כיון דמונה והולך דעתה להתקדש בכוליה מנה ולקבלו כולו מחמת קדושין ולא מחמת תנאי, ודר' אלעזר כשלא היה מונה והולך, אבל אמר מה זה אפילו בשאינו מונה והולך אינה מקודשת, עד שיתן כוליה מנה, ואם רצה אחד מהן לחזור הרשות בידו. אבל הרב אלפסי כתב והני מילי דאמר מנה סתם, אבל אמר מנה זה והיה מונה והולך ורצה אחד מהן לחזור בו אפילו בדינר האחרון הרשות בידו.

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    Kiddushin 8a

    Kiddushin 8a. The full printed text of this folio side - 23 numbered segments, about 474 words - with the classic commentaries printed on the page.

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    Edition: Wikisource Talmud Bavli · Wording checked against the source on 07/09/2026