1In such a case, even though a different Jew took possession of the convert’s property, the one who acquires it renders carrying prohibited. If, however, he died after nightfall, even though a different Jew did not take possession of his property, it, i.e., carrying, is not prohibited, for carrying had already been permitted on that Shabbat.
2The Gemara raises a difficulty: The baraita itself is difficult. You first said: If the convert died while it was still day, even though a different Jew took possession of his property, the latter renders carrying prohibited, which implies that it is not necessary to say so where another Jew did not take possession of the property, for in such a case it is certainly prohibited. But this is incorrect. On the contrary, in a case where a different person did not take possession of the property, it is certainly not prohibited, for in such a case the convert’s property is ownerless and there is nobody to render carrying in the courtyard prohibited.
3Rav Pappa said: Say that the baraita should read as follows: Even though a different Jew did not take possession of it. The Gemara raises a difficulty: How can it be corrected in this manner? But doesn’t it teach: Even though he took possession of it?
4The Gemara answers: This is what the baraita is saying: If the convert died while it was still day, then even though a different Jew did not take possession of the property while it was still day but only after nightfall, since he had the possibility of taking possession of it while it was still day, the person who acquires it renders carrying prohibited. If, however, the convert died after nightfall, even though a different Jew did not take possession of his property, it does not render it prohibited to carry.
5The Gemara now considers the next clause of the baraita , which states: If the convert died after nightfall, even though a different Jew did not take possession of his property, carrying is not prohibited. This implies that it is not necessary to say so where another Jew did take possession of the property, for in such a case it is certainly not prohibited. But, on the contrary, where a different person takes possession of the property, he renders carrying prohibited.
6Rav Pappa said: Say that the baraita should read as follows: Even though a different Jew took possession of it. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But didn’t the baraita teach: Even though he did not take possession of it? The Gemara explains: This is what the baraita is saying: If the convert died after nightfall, even though a different Jew took possession of his property after nightfall, since he did not have the possibility of taking possession of it while it was still day, he does not render carrying prohibited.
7After explaining the baraita , the Gemara proceeds to clarify the issue at hand: In any event, the first clause is teaching that the person who acquires the convert’s property renders carrying prohibited; but why does he render carrying prohibited? Let him renounce his rights in the domain like an heir. The implication then is that he does not have the option of renunciation, in contrast to the opinion of Rav Naḥman.
8Rav Naḥman replied: What is the meaning of the word prohibits that it teaches here? It means he renders carrying prohibited until he renounces his rights, but renunciation is effective.
9Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Who is the tanna of the problematic baraitot that imply that an heir cannot renounce rights, and from which objections were brought against Rav Naḥman? It is Beit Shammai, who say that there is no renunciation of rights on Shabbat at all, even for the owner of the property. As we learned in the mishna: When may one give away rights in a domain? Beit Shammai say: While it is still day. And Beit Hillel say: Even after nightfall.
10With regard to this dispute itself, Ulla said: What is the reason of Beit Hillel that one may renounce rights even after nightfall? This should be considered an act of acquisition, which is prohibited on Shabbat. He explains: It is comparable to one who says: Turn toward the high-quality ones. If a person sets aside teruma from another person’s produce without the latter’s knowledge, and when the owner finds out he says: Why did you set aside this produce? Turn toward the high-quality ones, i.e., you should have gone to find better produce to use as teruma , then the teruma that was separated is considered teruma , provided there was indeed quality produce in that place. The reason is that the owner has demonstrated his retroactive acquiescence to the other person’s setting aside of teruma . Therefore, the latter is considered his agent for this purpose. The same applies to our issue. If a person intended to permit both himself and others to carry in a courtyard by means of establishing an eiruv but forgot to do so, by renouncing his rights after nightfall, he retroactively makes plain his desire that his domain should be mingled with that of his neighbors. What he then does on Shabbat is not a complete action, but merely a demonstration of his intentions.
11Abaye said: This explanation is unsatisfactory, as when a gentile dies on Shabbat, what connection is there to the concept: Turn toward the high-quality ones? When a gentile dies on Shabbat, his Jewish neighbors may renounce their rights in the courtyard to each other and thus render carrying in the courtyard permitted, even though such renunciation would have been ineffective prior to his passing. Consequently, it cannot be said that it works retroactively.
12Rather, the Gemara rejects Ulla’s explanation and states that here they disagree over the following: Beit Shammai hold that renunciation of a domain is equivalent to acquisition of a domain, and acquisition of a domain is prohibited on Shabbat. And Beit Hillel hold that it is merely withdrawal from a domain, and withdrawal from a domain seems well on Shabbat, i.e., it is permitted. As such, there is no reason to prohibit renunciation as a form of acquisition, which is prohibited as a part of a decree against conducting commerce on Shabbat.
13MISHNA: If a homeowner was in partnership with his neighbors, with this one in wine and with that one in wine, they need not establish an eiruv , for due to their authentic partnership they are considered to be one household, and no further partnership is required.
14If, however, he was in partnership with this one in wine and with that one in oil, they must establish an eiruv . As they are not partners in the same item, they are not all considered one partnership. Rabbi Shimon says: In both this case and that case, i.e., even if he partners with his neighbors in different items, they need not establish an eiruv .
15GEMARA: Rav said: The halakha that one who is in partnership in wine with both his neighbors need not establish an eiruv applies only if their wine is in one vessel. Rava said: The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: If he was in partnership with this one in wine and with the other one in oil, they must establish an eiruv . Granted, if you say that the first clause of the mishna deals with one vessel, and the latter clause deals with two vessels, one of wine and one of oil, it is well. But, if you say that the first clause of the mishna speaks of two vessels, and the latter clause also speaks of two vessels, what difference is it to me if it is wine and wine or wine and oil? The halakha should be the same in both cases.
16Abaye said to him: This is no proof, and the first clause can be referring to a case where the wine was in separate vessels as well. The difference is that wine and wine is suitable for mixing together, and therefore can be considered a single unit even if divided into two containers. Wine and oil, however, are not suitable for mixing.
17We learned in the mishna: Rabbi Shimon says: In both this case, where they are partners in wine alone, and that case, where the partnerships are in wine and oil, they need not establish an eiruv . The Gemara poses a question: Did he say this even if the partnership is with this one in wine and with the other one in oil? But these are not suitable for mixing. Rabba said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a courtyard positioned between two alleyways, and Rabbi Shimon follows his usual line of reasoning.
18As we learned in a mishna: Rabbi Shimon said: To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to the case of three courtyards that open into one another and also open into a public domain. If the two outer courtyards each established an eiruv with the middle one, it is permitted for residents of the middle one to carry with the two outer ones, and it is permitted for residents of the two outer ones to carry with the middle one. However, it is prohibited for the residents of the two outer courtyards to carry with each other, as they did not establish an eiruv with each other. This teaches that the residents of one courtyard can establish an eiruv with a courtyard on each side, and need not choose between them. Here too, the residents of the courtyard can participate in an eiruv with both alleyways, one by means of wine and the other by means of oil.
19Abaye said to him: Are the cases really comparable? There it teaches: It is prohibited for the residents of the two outer courtyards to carry with each other, whereas here it teaches: They need not establish an eiruv , indicating that it is permitted for residents of all three domains to carry with each other.
20The Gemara explains: What is the subject of the phrase they need not establish an eiruv ? It refers to the neighbors together with the homeowner, i.e., the residents of the courtyards that open into each of the alleyways with the resident of the courtyard in the middle. But with regard to the neighbors with each other, i.e., if the residents of the two alleyways wish to be permitted to carry with each other, they must establish an eiruv and place it in the middle courtyard.