1The Gemara proceeds to analyze the Tosefta : The Master said above: The courtyard of a gentile is like the pen of an animal, which implies that the residence of a gentile is not considered a significant residence. But didn’t we learn otherwise in the mishna: One who resides with a gentile in the same courtyard this person prohibits him from carrying? This implies that a gentile’s residence is in fact of significance.
2The Gemara answers: That is not difficult. This halakha in the mishna is referring to a situation where the gentile is present, and therefore carrying is prohibited, whereas that halakha in the Tosefta refers to a situation where he is not present, and therefore carrying is permitted.
3The Gemara poses a question: What does Rabbi Meir hold? If he holds that a residence without its owners is still considered a residence, and it is prohibited to carry in the courtyard even when the owner is away, then even a gentile in absentia should likewise render it prohibited for carrying. And if he holds that a residence without its owners is not considered a residence, then even a Jew who is away should also not render it prohibited for carrying.
4The Gemara answers: Actually, he holds that a residence without its owners is not considered a residence, but nevertheless, he draws a distinction between a Jew and a gentile. In the case of a Jew, who renders it prohibited to carry for those who dwell in the same courtyard when he is present in his residence, the Sages decreed with regard to him that even when he is not present, his residence renders it prohibited for them to carry as though he were present.
5However, with regard to a gentile, who even when he is present does not fundamentally render it prohibited to carry, but only due to a rabbinic decree that was issued lest the Jew learn from the gentile’s ways, no further decree was necessary. Thus, when he is present, the gentile renders it prohibited to carry; but when he is not present, he does not render it prohibited to carry.
6The Gemara asks: And when the gentile is not present, does he really not render it prohibited for carrying? Didn’t we learn elsewhere in a mishna: With regard to one who left his house without establishing an eiruv and went to spend Shabbat in a different town, whether he was a gentile or a Jew, he renders it prohibited for the other residents of his courtyard to carry objects from their houses to the courtyard and vice versa. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. This indicates that according to Rabbi Meir, a gentile renders it prohibited to carry in the courtyard even if he is not present.
7The Gemara answers: There, it is referring to a situation where the person who left his house without establishing an eiruv intends to return on that same day, on Shabbat. Since upon his return he will render it prohibited for others to carry in the courtyard, the decree is applied even before he returns home. However, if he left his house intending to return after the conclusion of Shabbat, he does not render it prohibited to carry, in absentia.
8Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha in this dispute is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. And Rav Huna said: This is not an established halakha to be issued publicly; rather, the custom is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, i.e., a Sage would rule according to his opinion for those who come to ask. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The people are accustomed to conduct themselves in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. Accordingly, a Sage would not issue such a ruling even to those who inquire, but if someone acts leniently in accordance with his opinion, he would not object.
9Abaye said to Rav Yosef, his teacher: We maintain that the teaching of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov measures a kav, but is clean, meaning that it is small in quantity but clear and complete, and that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion in all instances. Moreover, with regard to our issue, Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, and therefore there is no doubt about the matter.
10However, what is the halakha with regard to whether a disciple may issue a ruling according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov in his teacher’s place of jurisdiction, i.e., in a place where he is the recognized authority? Although it is usually prohibited to do so, perhaps such an evident and well-known principle such as this does not fall into the category of rulings that a disciple may not issue in his teacher’s territory.
11Rav Yosef said to Abaye: Even when Rav Ḥisda was asked about the permissibility of cooking an egg in kutaḥ , a dairy dish, throughout the years of Rav Huna’s life, he refused to issue a ruling. Rav Ḥisda was a disciple of Rav Huna, and a disciple may not issue a ruling in his teacher’s place of jurisdiction about even the simplest of matters.
12Rabbi Ya’akov bar Abba said to Abaye: With regard to matters such as those detailed in Megillat Ta’anit , which is written and laid on the shelf for all to access and offers a list of the days on which fasting is prohibited, what is the halakha concerning whether or not a disciple may rule about these matters in his teacher’s place of jurisdiction? Abaye said to him: Rav Yosef said as follows: Even when Rav Ḥisda was asked about the permissibility of cooking an egg in kutaḥ throughout the years of Rav Huna’s life, he refused to issue a ruling.
13The Gemara relates that Rav Ḥisda nonetheless issued halakhic rulings in the town of Kafri during the years of Rav Huna’s life, as he was not actually in his teacher’s place.