1You acted well when you rented. The Sages of Neharde’a wondered at this teaching: Did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say this? Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say just the opposite: Renting from a gentile is like establishing an eiruv ? What, is he not to be understood as imposing a stringency: Just as one who establishes an eiruv may do so only while it is still day, so too, one who rents a gentile’s property must do so while it is still day?
2The Gemara rejects this argument: No, his statement was intended as a leniency: Just as one who establishes an eiruv may do so even with less than the value of a peruta , so too, one who rents a gentile’s property may rent it for less than the value of a peruta . And just as the one who establishes an eiruv need not be the owner himself, but even his hired laborer or harvester may do so, so too, one who rents a gentile’s property need not rent from the landlord himself, but may rent even from his hired laborer or harvester who are acting on his behalf.
3And similarly, just as with regard to one who establishes an eiruv , the halakha is that if five people live in the same courtyard, one of them may establish an eiruv with the residents of a different courtyard on behalf of them all, so too, with regard to one who rents a gentile’s property; if five people live in the same courtyard together with a gentile, one of them may rent the gentile’s property on behalf of them all.
4Rabbi Elazar wondered at Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling that the Sages had acted well when they rented the gentile’s property on Shabbat and then they renounced their rights to that one, so that at least it would be permitted to use the courtyard. Rabbi Zeira said: What was the reason for Rabbi Elazar’s wonder? Rav Sheshet said: Can it be that such a great person as Rabbi Zeira did not know what was the source of Rabbi Elazar’s wonder? He had difficulty with a statement of his teacher, Shmuel.
5As Shmuel said: With regard to any place where the residents render it prohibited for each other to carry but where they may establish a joint eiruv if they so desire, in order to permit carrying, each may renounce his property rights for the other if they failed to establish an eiruv before Shabbat. However, in a place where the residents may establish an eiruv together but they do not render it prohibited for each other for carrying, or where they render it prohibited for each other for carrying but they may not establish an eiruv together, in such situations they may not renounce their property rights for each other.
6The Gemara clarifies the above teaching: With regard to any place where the residents render it prohibited for each other to carry but where they may establish an eiruv , they may renounce their rights for each other, such as in the case of two courtyards, one within the other. The residents of the two courtyards render each other prohibited to carry between the courtyards, but they may establish a joint eiruv in order to permit carrying. In such a case, the residents may renounce their property rights for each other if they failed to establish an eiruv before Shabbat.
7In a place where the residents may establish an eiruv together but they do not render each other prohibited to carry, they may not renounce their property rights for each other, in a case where two courtyards both opening to an alleyway that have a single opening between them. Even though the two courtyards may establish a joint eiruv and be considered a single courtyard, they do not render it prohibited for each other to carry if they did not do so, because neither needs to make use of the other. Consequently, there is no option of renouncing rights in favor of the other courtyard.
8In a place where they render each other prohibited from carrying but they may not establish an eiruv together, what does this come to include? In reference to which case did Shmuel make this statement? Wasn’t it meant to include a gentile who shares a courtyard with two Jews? The Jewish residents of the courtyard render each other prohibited from carrying in such a case, but they may not establish an eiruv due to the presence of the gentile.
9The Gemara further analyzes the case: Now, if it is referring to a situation where the gentile arrived on the previous day, i.e., before Shabbat, let him rent the property from the gentile on the previous day. Before Shabbat, both options were available: They could have either established an eiruv or one Jew could have renounced his rights in favor of the other. Therefore, it would not have been considered a situation in which they render each other prohibited to carry but cannot establish an eiruv .