1One mention of karet in the verse: “That approaches the sacred items,” is for a generalization, and one mention in the verse: “Of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings,” is for a detail. This detail serves to include all items consecrated to the altar, in accordance with the hermeneutical principle that any matter that was included in a generalization but was explicitly specified to teach a certain halakha was intended to teach not just about itself but about the entire generalization. And one mention of karet in the verse: “And when anyone shall touch any impure item,” serves to include items whose typical manner is such that they are not to be eaten, e.g., wood and frankincense, and teaches that one who eats even these items is liable to receive karet .
2The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says in the mishna with regard to items whose typical manner is such that they are not to be eaten, that one is not liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition against eating consecrated items in a state of ritual impurity, what does this last mention of karet serve to include? The Gemara answers that it serves to include the sin offerings whose blood is presented inside the Sanctuary.
3The Gemara explains why this inclusion is necessary. It might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Shimon says that concerning any offering whose blood is not presented on the external altar like that of a peace offering, one is not liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul , one should likewise not be liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of ritual impurity. Therefore, the additional mention of karet teaches us that one who is impure is in fact liable for eating these sin offerings brought inside the Sanctuary.
4§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon stated a ruling in which he deems one liable for eating in a state of ritual impurity an item whose typical manner is such that one eats it, but not for eating the wood, the frankincense, or the incense, whose typical manner is such that one does not eat it. The Rabbis disagree and deem him liable in all these cases. It was stated that two pairs of amora’im disagreed with regard to this issue; one pair is Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, and the other pair is Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina. The two different opinions that follow were respectively stated by one of this pair and one of that pair.
5One says: The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon is with regard to the impurity of meat, i.e., the item that is eaten is impure. The Rabbis maintain that one who eats impure wood or frankincense is flogged, as derived from the two mentions of flesh in the verse: “And the meat that touches any impure item shall not be eaten; it shall be burned with fire. And as for the meat, everyone who is pure may eat of it” (Leviticus 7:19). But if one ate wood or frankincense in a state of impurity of the body, everyone agrees that he is not flogged.
6And one says: As there is a dispute with regard to this case, when the item eaten is impure, so is there a dispute with regard to that case, when the one eating the wood or frankincense is impure. What is the reason for this opinion? Since one reads with regard to these inedible items: “And the flesh that touches any impure item” (Leviticus 7:19), as this phrase serves to include even items such as wood and frankincense in the prohibition against eating them when they are impure, one likewise reads with regard to them the next verse: “But the person that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings… having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:20), which discusses one in a state of impurity who eats consecrated items.
7The Gemara notes: Rav Tavyumei teaches the discussion in this preceding manner, whereas Rav Kahana teaches it in this alternative manner: One of this pair of amora’im and one of that pair disagreed with regard to the latter clause in the mishna, i.e., the meaning of Rabbi Shimon’s statement. One says that Rabbi Shimon’s dispute with the Rabbis is with regard to the impurity of the body, as he maintains that an impure individual who eats wood or frankincense is exempt. But with regard to the impurity of flesh, i.e., these items themselves, everyone agrees that one is flogged. And one says: As there is a dispute with regard to this case, so is there a dispute with regard to that case, i.e., Rabbi Shimon holds that one is exempt in both cases.
8Rava said: It stands to reason that the correct interpretation is like the one who says: As there is a dispute with regard to this case, so is there a dispute with regard to that case. What is the reason? Since one does not read with regard to these inedible items: “Having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off,” as according to both alternative explanations Rabbi Shimon deems exempt one who eats these items when he is in a state of impurity, similarly one does not read with regard to them the previous verse: “And the flesh that touches any impure item shall not be eaten.”
9The Gemara raises a difficulty: But doesn’t the Master say that the term: “And as for the flesh,” in the same verse, serves to include wood and frankincense? This indicates that even these items can become ritually impure, and the prohibition against eating consecrated items that are impure applies to them. The Gemara answers: This is referring merely to disqualification, i.e., this inclusion applies by rabbinic law, and the verse is cited in mere support.
10MISHNA: The slaughtered offering is slaughtered for the sake of six matters, and one must have all of these matters in mind: For the sake of the particular type of offering being sacrificed; for the sake of the one who sacrifices the offering; for the sake of God; for the sake of consumption by the fires of the altar; for the sake of the aroma; for the sake of the pleasing of God, i.e., in fulfillment of God’s will; and, in the cases of a sin offering and a guilt offering, for the sake of atonement for the sin.
11Rabbi Yosei says: Even in the case of one who did not have in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of any one of these, the offering is valid, as it is a stipulation of the court that he should not state any intent ab initio . This is necessary because the intent follows only the one performing the sacrificial rite, and therefore if the one who slaughters the animal is not careful and states the wrong intent, the offering would be disqualified through his improper intent.
12GEMARA: Rav Yehuda says that Rav says with regard to the verse: “A burnt offering, an offering made by fire, of a pleasing aroma to the Lord” (Leviticus 1:9), the term “a burnt offering” means that one must intend that it be for the sake of a burnt offering, to the exclusion of one who sacrifices a burnt offering for the sake of a peace offering, which one may not do. The mention of fires, i.e., the term “an offering made by fire,” teaches that the offering must be sacrificed for the sake of complete consumption by the fires of the altar, to the exclusion of one who intends that its portions should only be roasted on the fire, as one may not do so.
13Rav continues to expound the verse. The term “aroma” indicates that the offering must be sacrificed for the sake of the aroma, to the exclusion of limbs that one first roasted and afterward took them up to the altar, which he may not do. As Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: With regard to limbs that one first roasted and afterward took them up to the altar, they do not constitute fulfillment of the requirement that the offering must be sacrificed for the sake of the aroma.
14The term “pleasing” means for the sake of pleasing God’s spirit, i.e., that the offering should be accepted by God. Finally, the expression “to the Lord” indicates that it should be for the sake of the One Who spoke and the world came into being.
15Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: With regard to a sin offering that one slaughtered with intent that the slaughter be for the sake of a burnt offering, it is disqualified. As explained (2a), a sin offering that was slaughtered for the sake of another offering is entirely disqualified. But if he intended the slaughter to be for the sake of a non-sacred animal, it is valid. Rabbi Elazar says: What is the reason of Rav? The verse states: “And they shall not profane the sacred items of the children of Israel” (Leviticus 22:15). This teaches that consecrated items, i.e., the intent to slaughter an offering for the sake of another type of offering, profane consecrated items, but the intent to slaughter an offering for the sake of a non-sacred animal does not profane consecrated items.
16Rabba raises an objection from the mishna: Rabbi Yosei says: Even in the case of one who did not have in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of any one of these, the offering is fit, as it is a stipulation of the court that one not state any intent ab initio . Rabba infers from this that the reason the offering is valid and it effects acceptance is that he did not have in mind any intent at all. But if he had in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of a non-sacred animal, it is disqualified.
17Abaye said to Rabba: Perhaps Rabbi Yosei means the following: If he did not have in mind any intent at all, the offering is valid and it effects acceptance, but if he had in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of a non-sacred animal, the offering is valid, but it does not effect acceptance, as it is a flawed offering. Rav’s statement can be understood in a similar fashion.
18Rabbi Elazar says: Indeed, a sin offering that one intentionally slaughtered for the sake of a non-sacred animal is valid, as stated by Rav. But if he slaughtered it as a non-sacred animal, actually thinking that it was non-sacred, it is disqualified, as when he slaughtered it, he did not intend to perform a sacrificial rite. This is like the dilemma that Shmuel raised before Rav Huna: