1is to the exclusion of the opinion of Rabbi Yosei in the mishna, who prohibits any number of laymen to deem a firstborn animal permitted. The ruling that a group of three laymen may dissolve a vow in a place where there is no Sage is to the exclusion of the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught in a baraita : Dissolution of vows requires a court of three. Rabbi Yehuda says: This is the halakha only if at least one of them is a Sage. If no Sage is available, laymen may not dissolve a vow.
2Rav Ḥiyya bar Amram stated above that a group of three may dissolve a vow in a place where there is no Sage. This indicates that if there is a Sage, he alone may dissolve a vow. The Gemara asks: Who, for example, is considered such a Sage? Rav Naḥman said: For example, one such as me. The baraita further stated that Rabbi Yehuda says: At least one of the three laymen must be a Sage. The Gemara asks: Should one conclude by inference that those other two members can be anyone, even complete ignoramuses? Ravina said in explanation: Each member of the group must be one to whom the halakhot of vows is explained and he is able to comprehend them.
3§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yosei says: Even if there is a court of twenty-three Sages there, it may be slaughtered only on the basis of the ruling of an expert. Rav Ḥananel says that Rav says: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. The Gemara challenges: This is obvious, as there is a principle that in a dispute between an individual Sage and many Sages, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the many Sages. The Gemara answers: Rav’s statement is necessary, lest you say that Rabbi Yosei is an exception to the principle, as his reasoning [ nimmuko ] is with him, i.e., his logic is sound. Rav Ḥananel therefore teaches us that this is not so, and the halakha does not follow his opinion.
4Earlier (36b), the Gemara cited a ruling, which was issued either by Rav or Shmuel, that three regular Jews may deem a firstborn animal permitted in a place where there is no expert, in contrast to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. The Gemara suggests: Resolve that dilemma from this statement in the name of Rav, that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. It can be inferred from here that that first, uncertain ruling was stated in the name of Shmuel. As, if it was stated in the name of Rav, why do I need two identical rulings?
5The Gemara answers: This is insufficient proof, as it is possible that Rav did not issue two identical rulings. Rather, one ruling was stated from the other, by inference. Rav issued only one of these statements explicitly; the other was reported by his students in his name based on an inference from what he had said.
6MISHNA: In the case of one who slaughters a firstborn animal and sells its meat, and it was discovered that he did not initially show it to one of the Sages, the halakha is that it was actually prohibited to derive any benefit from the meat. In that case, what the buyers ate, they ate, and the Sages penalized the seller in that he must return the money to them, which they paid for the meat that they ate. And with regard to that which they did not eat, that meat must be buried, and he must return the money that they paid for the meat that they did not eat.
7And likewise, in the case of one who slaughters a cow and sells it, and it was discovered that it is a tereifa , what the buyers ate, they ate, and what they did not eat, they must return the meat to the seller, who may sell it to a gentile or feed it to the dogs, and he must return the money to the buyers. If the buyers sold it to gentiles or cast it to the dogs, they pay the seller the value of a tereifa , which is less than the value of kosher meat, and the seller refunds the balance to the buyers.
8GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita : In a case where one sells meat to another and it was discovered that it is the meat of a firstborn animal, which was not deemed permitted for consumption by an expert, or if one sells produce to another and it was discovered that it is untithed produce, or if one sells wine to another and it turns out that it is wine that was used for a libation in idol worship, the halakha is that what the purchasers ate, they ate, and the seller reimburses them all their money.
9Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says, qualifying this ruling: If he sold them items from which one is generally repulsed, he must reimburse them all their money, as they are presumed to not have derived benefit from the consumption of such items. But if he sold them items from which one is not generally repulsed, he deducts for them the value of the benefit from those items and reimburses them the balance. And the following are items from which one is generally repulsed: Carcasses and tereifot , repugnant creatures, and creeping animals. And the following are items from which one is generally not repulsed: Firstborn animals, untithed produce, and wine used for a libation in idol worship.
10The Gemara asks: Why does the seller deduct the value of the meat of a firstborn animal eaten by the purchaser and reimburse him the difference? Let the purchaser say to the seller: What loss have I caused you by eating the meat? Had you not sold it to me, you would have had no rights to partake of it, as this is an unblemished firstborn animal from which deriving benefit is prohibited.
11The Gemara answers: No, this ruling is necessary in a case where he sold him a cut of meat from an area on the animal that contained a blemish, but the seller had not yet brought the animal to be examined and deemed permitted by a Sage. In that instance, the seller can say to the purchaser: Had you not eaten the meat, I would have shown the animal to a Sage and he would have deemed it permitted to me. The Gemara notes that this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda (28a), who permits a firstborn animal to be examined and deemed permitted even after it has been slaughtered.
12The Gemara adds that with regard to untithed produce, although one could claim that the purchaser did not cause a loss to the seller, as untithed produce is prohibited for consumption, the seller can say to the purchaser: Had you not eaten my produce, I would have remedied it, i.e., separated its tithes, and eaten it. Similarly, with regard to wine used for a libation in idol worship, which is also prohibited to be consumed, this is referring to a seller who sold it in a mixture of permitted wine. In this case, had the purchaser not consumed the wine mixture, the seller could have derived benefit from it, in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
13As we learned in a mishna ( Avoda Zara 74a): In the case of wine used for a libation in idol worship that fell into a wine cistern, it is prohibited to derive benefit from all the wine in the cistern, even if the volume of the wine used for a libation was small in comparison to the volume of the rest of the wine in the cistern. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: All of the wine in the cistern may be sold to a gentile, and the money paid for it is permitted, except for the value of the wine used for a libation that is in it.
14MISHNA: For these blemishes, one may slaughter the firstborn animal outside the Temple: If the firstborn’s ear was damaged and lacking from the cartilage [ haḥasḥus ], but not if the skin was damaged; and likewise, if the ear was split, although it is not lacking; or if the ear was pierced with a hole the size of a bitter vetch, which is a type of legume; or if it was an ear that is desiccated. What is a desiccated ear that is considered a blemish? It is any ear that if it is pierced it does not discharge a drop of blood. Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam says: Desiccated means that the ear is so dry that it will crumble if one touches it.
15GEMARA: With regard to the blemishes mentioned in this mishna and in the subsequent mishnayot , the Gemara asks: Why is it permitted to slaughter and eat a firstborn that sustained these blemishes? Only a lame animal and a blind animal are written in the verse that discusses this halakha . That verse states: “And if there be any blemish therein, lameness, or blindness, any ill blemish whatsoever, you shall not sacrifice it to the Lord your God. You shall eat it within your gates” (Deuteronomy 15:21–22).
16The Gemara answers: It is also written in the beginning of the verse: “If there be any blemish therein,” which indicates that other blemishes are also included. The Gemara asks: But why not say that the phrase “if there be any blemish therein” is a generalization, while “lameness, or blindness” is a detail. According to the principles of midrashic exegesis, if a generalization and a detail are mentioned, the generalization includes only that which is specified in the detail. Therefore, it should be concluded that in the event of lameness and blindness, yes, one may slaughter the firstborn, but in the event of another matter, one may not slaughter it.
17The Gemara answers: By subsequently stating: “Any ill blemish,” it then generalized again. Consequently, it is a generalization and a detail and a generalization, represented in the phrases “any blemish,” “lameness or blindness,” and “any ill blemish,” and according to the principles of midrashic exegesis, you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail. Just as the items mentioned in the detail, i.e., in the phrase “lameness or blindness,” are clearly defined as blemishes that are exposed and do not regenerate, so too, all blemishes that are exposed and do not regenerate are considered blemishes with regard to a firstborn.
18The Gemara suggests: But say instead that just as the items mentioned in the detail, i.e., in the phrase “lameness or blindness,” are clearly defined as blemishes that are exposed and that cause an animal to desist from its normal labor, and they are blemishes that do not regenerate, so too, all blemishes that are exposed and that cause an animal to desist from its labor and do not regenerate are included in this halakha . If so, a blemish that does not fit these criteria would not render the firstborn permitted to be slaughtered. Why then did we learn in the mishna that if the firstborn’s ear was damaged and lacking from the cartilage, but not if it is lacking from the skin, it is considered a blemish, despite the fact that this does not cause the animal to desist from its labor?
19The Gemara answers: The word “any” in “any ill blemish” is an amplification, and it includes even blemishes that are different from those defined by the detail. The Gemara challenges: If so, blemishes that are hidden should also be included. Why then did we learn in the mishna (39a) that animals with external gums that were damaged and lacking or that were scratched [ veshenigmemu ] and likewise animals with internal gums that were entirely extracted are considered blemished?