Berakhot 23a

RATHER, EVERYONE AGREES HE RETURNS TO THE BEGINNING - The Gemara here is dealing with someone who is involved in a mitzvoh and paused while in middle of the mitzvoh for as long as it would take to complete the mitzvoh. There has been a major pause in middle of the mitzvoh. Do we say that the beginning of the mitzvoh and the end do not connect together as one long mitzvoh or perhaps the length of time over which one extends the performance of the mitzvoh makes no difference? The Gemara suggested that perhaps Rav Chisda and Rav Hamnuno are arguing this issue. The Gemara concludes that both would agree that if one paused for sufficient time to complete the mitzvoh he would have to repeat the entire mitzvoh, but here they argue about a different issue. Whether one who started his prayer when he felt the urge to urinate is eligible to pray or not. Note, that when the Gemara said all agree that one who pauses long enough to complete sh’moneh esray does have to start at the beginning again, the Gemara could just as easily have said that all agree that when one pauses long enough to complete sh’moneh esray he does not need to repeat the prayer again and may continue from where he stopped. Generally, when the Gemara assumes one side of an argument when it could have just as easily mentioned the other side and say that all agree that he does not have to start again, it is an indication that the Gemara favors that opinion as halochoh. Tosfos will elaborate on this point. And it is true that the Gemara could have set up its answer by saying that all agree that one need not return to the beginning. Since the Gemara does not set up its answer in this way, we see from this that the halochoh is that one must return to the beginning. Tosfos offers another proof to his conclusion that the halochoh is that one must return to the beginning. And so too, later (24b) R’ Abuhu says that one must return to the beginning. Tosfos will now show that there are contradictions to this conclusion. And this is bewildering for in Maseches Rosh Hashonoh (34b) R’ Yochonon says that if one heard nine blasts of the shofor extended over nine hours of the day, even though there obviously had to be a pause much greater than the time usually required to blow nine t’keeos, he has fulfilled his obligation. We see that those t’keeos that were blown over nine hours combine to complete a mitvoh even though he paused for sufficient time to do all of them, the nine t’keeos. Tosfos offers a second Gemara that indicates that even though there was a major pause during the mitzvoh, one fulfills his obligation. And so too, in Megiloh (18b) the Gemara also says: Rav said the halochoh is not like Rav Muno who says that if one paused long enough to complete the Megiloh, he must return to the beginning. Because the Gemara says there, in reference to a dispute among the amoraim about what Rav’s opinion was, take hold of Rav Baiboi who says that Rav said the halochoh is not like Rav Muno, in your hand. We now have two Gemaras that indicate that when one pauses long enough to complete a mitzvoh he must return to the beginning. Our Gemara here and the Gemara on 24b where R’ Abuhu says the same. We have two Gemaras that indicate the exact opposite. The Gemara in Rosh Hashonoh 34b, that discusses blowing the shofor over an extended period and the Gemara in Megiloh 18b that speaks of reading the Megiloh with a major interruption. How can we reconcile these contradictory Gemaros? And the prince of Coucy says that we can differentiate, between the contradictory Gemaras. For here in our Gemara in regard to one who urinated while praying who cannot recite sh’ma while urinating. His ceasing to recite the sh’ma is an interruption because he was not allowed to continue reading. So too, later (24b) where the Gemara is speaking about R’ Abuhu who was walking through filthy alleyways, there where he was not allowed to continue reciting sh’ma while in those alleyways, all agree that he must return to the beginning of sh’ma, since he was required to stop his recital of the sh’ma. However, when the person is eligible, such as by the Gemara discussing a pause while reading the Megiloh and the blowing of the shofor, all agree that he need not return to the beginning, rather, he returns to the place where he stopped. Since there was no need to pause, his voluntary pausing does not constitute an interruption. Tosfos suggest another solution to the contradictory Gemaras. Our original argument was that the Gemara here could just as easily have said that all agree that after an interruption one need not return to the beginning, and the issue would be if when he started praying while he had the urge to urinate, is he eligible to pray or not. Rabainu Yehudoh disagrees with the idea that the Gemara could just as easily have said that all agree that one need not return to the beginning. And Rabainu Yehudoh explained that here the Gemara could not have possibly said that all agree that one who paused for sufficient time to complete the mitzvoh need not return to the beginning, and that their disagreement would be when he did not pause for a long time, and the issue would be if it is considered an interruption because he was not eligible to pray. Because all would agree that he is considered eligible to recite the sh’ma even though he had the urge to urinate when he started praying and he knew that he would not be able to complete the sh’moneh esray, since the rule is that he never returns to the beginning of his prayer when he pauses during prayer for longer than it takes to complete the prayer, no other pausing for whatever reason, such as urine dribbling on his legs is considered an interruption. However, if the Gemara could have said so, that all agree that one who pauses in middle of shmoneh esray need not return to the beginning he certainly would have said it. Hence, there is no proof from our Gemara that it holds that the halochoh is that one who pauses long enough to complete a mitzvoh must return to the beginning of that mitzvoh.

WE ARE CONCERNED LEST HE WILL DEFECATE WITH THEM ON - IT IS FORBIDDEN. Rovo says that one may not wear t’filin when urinating in an established latrine because we are concerned that he may defecate while adorned with the t’filin. Tosfos points out that this concern is only true in an established latrine where people usually go to defecate. And specifically in an established latrine we are concerned that he might defecate while adorned with the t’filin, but in a temporary latrine, where it is not usual to defecate it is permitted to urinate while adorned with the t’filin and we are not concerned that he might defecate while wearing t’filin. And that which we learned in a Braiso that one may not urinate while wearing them even in a temporary latrine, is not a contradiction to what we have just said, that is specifically speaking about when one is holding the t’filin in his hands as he urinates, because then we are concerned that he might rub away the droplets of urine if they dripped on his clothing, with the t’filin in his hands. That is certainly an inappropriate thing to do. Or perhaps he may touch his male organ, which is certainly inappropriate while holding t’filin in one’s hand. However, when one is wearing t’filin there is no concern that he might rub away the droplets with the t’filin because they are not in his hand and therefore, in a temporary latrine where there is no concern that he might defecate while wearing t’filin, he may urinate.

SMALL SEALED VESSELS PROTECT [EVEN INSIDE] A TENT OVER A CORPSE - Rav Ashee is proving that a vessel that has less than a tefach of space is also considered a vessel and t’filin can be placed in such a vessel. They are then thought of as being in a separate area and then can be placed on the floor. He proves his point from the fact that an earthenware vessel, even less than a tefach, that is enclosed with a lid protects food that is in it from becoming tomay. This proves that theses small vessels are legally capable of separating that which is in them from the surrounding area. There is another way of viewing this phenomenon. One can argue that the reason the food inside does not become tomay is because it is as if it is totally surrounded by material that cannot be penetrated by tumoh. An earthenware vessel does not become tomay from the outside. If so, it may be that a vessel that is smaller than a tefach is not considered a vessel at all, but as far as tuimoh is concerned the earthenware material that is wrapped around it prevents tumoh from penetrating. However, this reasoning would not allow us to put t’filin on the floor. Wrapping the t’filin in a wrapper does not separate the t’filin from the surrounding area; it is only being in a vessel that can accomplish such a separation. Tosfos needs to show that even in as far as tumoh is concerned, it is the fact that the food is in a vessel that saves it from becoming tomay, not the fact that it is wrapped in material that resists the penetration of tumoh. And we are compelled to say that the reason a vessel protects food from becoming tomay is because of the airspace of the vessel. For if there was no airspace in the vessel they would not protect from tumoh at all. For if there was no airspace in the vessel and the material of the vessels was wrapped around the food like a wrapper that would be the equivalent of food that was kneaded with mire that do become tomay when in the tent of a corpse. It is clear that it is not the earthen material that protects the food from becoming tomay, because we see that when we have the material wrapped around the food in a non-vessel form, the food does become tomay. It is the element of being in a vessel that protects the food from becoming tomay. We can now understand Rav Ashee’s proof from the food that is protected from tumoh by being in a vessel. Since it is because it is in a vessel that it is protected from tumoh, so too, the t’filin when placed in a vessel are separate from the surrounding area and they may be placed on the floor.