1And it is not necessary to state this according to the one who said that the congregation brings the offering, as in that case the matter, that the court reversed its ruling, is publicized among the congregation. But even according to the one who said that the court brings the offering, where the matter is not publicized that the court reversed its ruling, if he had asked, they would have told him that the court reversed its ruling. Therefore, it could be said that he associated his action with himself and did not associate it with the court, and he is liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering.
2Rabbi Yosei bar Avin, and some say Rabbi Yosei bar Zevida, says: There is an analogy to illustrate the opinion of Sumakhos. To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to a person who brings his atonement offering during twilight, which is a time when there is uncertainty whether it is day or night, and there is uncertainty whether the offering atoned for him while it is still day, and the atonement was effective, and there is uncertainty whether it atoned for him after nightfall, and the atonement was not effective. The halakha is that he does not bring a provisional guilt-offering. Although typically one is liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering in a case where there is uncertainty whether he performed a transgression for which he is liable to bring a sin-offering, in this case, since the uncertainty relates to twilight, which is an uncertainty that can never be resolved, it is not a typical uncertainty and one is not liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering.
3And it is not necessary to state this according to the one who said that the court brings the offering, which is the case when the matter is not publicized that the court reversed its ruling; but it can be stated even according to the one who said that the congregation brings the offering, which is the case when the matter is publicized that the court reversed its ruling, and if he had asked we would have said to him that the court reversed its ruling. This is because here, in a case where there is uncertainty whether it atoned for him while it is still day and there is uncertainty whether it atoned for him after nightfall, if he asks he would not find a person whom he could ask.
4§ The mishna teaches that ben Azzai said to Rabbi Akiva: In what way is this person who went overseas different from one who sits in his house? Rabbi Akiva said to him: The difference is that with regard to one who sits in his house it would have been possible for him to hear of the court’s reversal, but with regard to that person who went overseas, it would not have been possible for him to hear of the court’s reversal. The Gemara asks: Rabbi Akiva said well to ben Azzai. How did a scholar of the caliber of ben Azzai fail to understand that distinction?
5Rava said: The reference is not to one who already went to a country overseas; rather, it is a case of one who set out on the way but has not yet left his city in which there is a practical difference between them. According to ben Azzai he is liable, as it is in his home city where he is located at this time and there is no difference between him and one who is sitting in his house. According to Rabbi Akiva he is exempt, as he has already set out on his way. Even though he is still in his home city, he is preoccupied with his travels and his status is like one who has already gone overseas.
6§ The mishna teaches: In a case where the judges of the court issued an erroneous ruling to abolish the entire essence of the mitzva, that is not a valid ruling, and the court is exempt from bringing an offering. The Sages taught: The verse states: “And the matter is hidden from the eyes of the congregation” (Leviticus 4:13), from which it is derived that there is liability only when a single matter is hidden but not in a case where they will abolish the entire mitzva. How so? If the court said: There is no prohibition against engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman written in the Torah, or there is no prohibition against performing prohibited labor on Shabbat written in the Torah, or there is no prohibition against engaging in idol worship written in the Torah, one might have thought that the judges would be liable. Therefore, the verse states: “And the matter is hidden,” and not that the entire mitzva will be hidden. Accordingly, if the judges issued that ruling, they are exempt from bringing an offering.
7But if the judges said: There is a prohibition against engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman written in the Torah, but one who engages in intercourse with a woman who observes a clean day for a day she experiences a discharge is exempt; or if they said: There is a prohibition against performing prohibited labor on Shabbat written in the Torah, but one who carries out objects from the private domain to the public domain is exempt; or if they said: There is a prohibition against engaging in idol worship written in the Torah, but one who bows to the idol but did not sacrifice an offering is exempt, one might have thought that the judges would be exempt. Therefore, the verse states: “And the matter is hidden,” from which it is derived that there is liability only for a matter, a single detail, but not for the entire essence. In this case, since they ruled to abolish only a detail of the mitzva, the judges are liable.
8The Gemara analyzes the latter clause of the baraita . The Master said: One might have thought that the judges would be exempt. The Gemara asks: But if in a case of sustaining a portion of the mitzva and nullifying a portion of the mitzva the judges are exempt, and in a case of abolishing the entire essence of the mitzva the judges are exempt, as explained in the first clause of the baraita , in what case would they be liable? The Gemara answers: This is what is difficult for the tanna : Say that the term “matter” is referring to the entire matter, and the judges are liable even if they ruled to abolish the entire mitzva. Therefore, the verse states: “And the matter is hidden [ venelam davar ].”
9The Gemara asks: From where is this inferred? Ulla said: Read into the verse as though the letter mem , the last letter in the word venelam , is also appended to the beginning of the word davar , resulting in the phrase: Venelam middavar , meaning: Part of the matter is hidden, from which it is derived that there is liability for nullification of part of the matter, and not for abolishing the entire matter.
10Ḥizkiyya said that the verse states: “And they performed one of all the mitzvot” (Leviticus 4:13), from which it is inferred that one is liable for nullification for a portion of all the mitzvot and not for nullification of all the mitzvot. The Gemara asks: The term mitzvot is plural, which indicates at least two. If that is the source, there should be liability even if the judges issue a ruling abolishing the entire essence of one mitzva, as one mitzva is a portion of two mitzvot. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Although the word is vocalized in the plural, as mitzvot, the word mitzvat is written, without a second vav , as though it were in the singular.
11Rav Ashi said: The tanna derives a verbal analogy, learning the meaning of the term “matter” written in the context of the erroneous ruling from the term “matter” written in the context of the rebellious elder. As it is written with regard to the rebellious elder: “If there shall be a matter [ davar ] too hard for you…You shall not turn aside from the matter [ haddavar ] that they shall declare unto you, to the right nor to the left” (Deuteronomy 17:8–11). Just as one becomes a rebellious elder only when his dispute with the Sages is with regard to a portion of the matter and not an entire matter, so too, with regard to an erroneous ruling of the court, the error of the judges must be with regard to a portion of the matter and not the entire essence of the matter.
12§ Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: A court is not liable to bring an offering unless it issues an erroneous ruling concerning a matter with which the Sadducees do not agree. The Sadducees do not accept the Oral Torah, and they interpret the Written Torah literally. The court is liable only for a matter that is not explicitly written in the Torah or that does not clearly stem from that which is written in the Torah. But with regard to an erroneous ruling concerning a matter with which the Sadducees agree, the judges are exempt. What is the reasoning for this exemption? It is a topic that you could go learn in a children’s school. Since the matter the judges ruled upon is so obvious, their ruling simply exhibits ignorance, and is not deemed a ruling.
13The Gemara cites proof against the statement of Rav Yehuda, citing Shmuel. We learned in the mishna: The judges are liable if they said: There is a prohibition against engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman written in the Torah, but one who engages in intercourse with a woman who observes a clean day for a day she experiences a discharge is exempt. The Gemara asks: And why should they be liable in that case? The halakha of a woman who observes a day for a day that she experiences a discharge is written in the Torah with regard to a woman who experiences a discharge of blood during the eleven-day interval between menstrual periods: “And she shall count for herself” (Leviticus 15:28); this teaches that she counts one clean day for one day that she experiences a discharge. Since it is written in the Torah, even the Sadducees would agree.
14The Gemara answers: The judges did not issue an erroneous ruling with regard to the halakha of a woman who observes a day for a day. Rather, the mishna is discussing a case where they said: The initial stage of intercourse [ ha’ara’a ] is permitted with a menstruating woman; it is the completion of the act of intercourse that is prohibited. The Gemara asks: That halakha is also written: “He has uncovered [ he’era ] her fount” (Leviticus 20:18), indicating that the first stage of intercourse with a menstruating woman is also prohibited.
15The Gemara says: Rather, it is a case where they said: Intercourse with her in the typical manner is prohibited, but intercourse in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse, is permitted. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it written: “The manners in which one lies with a woman” (Leviticus 18:22), in the plural, indicating that both intercourse in a typical manner and intercourse in an atypical manner are manners in which one lies with a woman?
16The Gemara says: Rather, it is a case where they said: With regard to intercourse in a typical manner, even the initial stage of intercourse is forbidden. With regard to intercourse in an atypical manner, it is completion of the act of intercourse that is forbidden, but the initial stage of intercourse is permitted. The Gemara asks: If so, then even in a case where they issued a ruling permitting the initial stage of intercourse in an atypical manner in the case of a menstruating woman, the judges should also be liable. Why does the mishna cite the case specifically with regard to a woman who observes a day for a day?
17The Gemara says: Rather, actually, the reference is to a ruling permitting the initial stage of intercourse in a typical manner, and the judges said: In the case of the prohibition of the initial stage of intercourse, it is with regard to an afflicted woman, who experienced the discharge of blood during her menstrual period, that it is written, not with regard to one who experiences the discharge during the eleven days between the end of one menstrual period and the expected start of another. And if you wish, say instead that they said: A woman assumes the status of a zava , i.e., one who experiences a discharge of blood for three consecutive days during those eleven days, only if she experienced the discharge during the day, not at night, as it is written: “All the days of her discharge” (Leviticus 15:26).
18The Gemara offers proof against the statement of Rav Yehuda by citing Shmuel. We learned in the mishna: The judges are liable if they said: There is a prohibition against performing prohibited labor on Shabbat written in the Torah, but one who carries out objects from the private domain to the public domain is exempt. The Gemara asks: And why should they be liable in that case? With regard to carrying out into the public domain, isn’t it written: “Neither carry a burden out of your houses on Shabbat” (Jeremiah 17:22), and the Sadducees agree to that prohibition.
19The Gemara answers: It is a case where the judges said: It is carrying an object out to the public domain that is prohibited, but carrying an object into the private domain is permitted. And if you wish, say instead that the judges said: It is carrying an object out to the public domain and carrying an object into the private domain that is prohibited. But passing or throwing an object from domain to domain is permitted.
20The Gemara cites proof against the statement of Rav Yehuda, citing Shmuel. We learned in the mishna: The judges are liable if they said: There is a prohibition against engaging in idol worship written in the Torah, but one who bows to the idol but did not sacrifice an offering is exempt. The Gemara asks: And why should they be liable in that case? With regard to one who bows to an idol, isn’t it written in the Torah, as it is written: “You shall not bow to another god” (Exodus 34:14)?
21The Gemara answers that the reference is to a case where the judges said: When bowing is forbidden is when it represents the typical manner of worship of that idol. But when bowing is not its typical manner of worship, it is permitted. And if you wish, say instead that the reference is to a case where the judges said: With regard to bowing itself, it is when it is performed in its typical manner that it is prohibited. What is the typical manner of bowing? It is bowing that has in its performance extension of the arms and legs, as it was practiced in the Temple. But bowing that does not have in its performance extension of the arms and legs is permitted.