1With regard to Rava’s answer to Rav Ashi, the Gemara objects: But didn’t Ulla teach in justification of his opinion: If the taking of this handful brings others, i.e., the remainder of the meal offering, into a status of piggul , by means of the intent to consume it after its appointed time, with regard to the handful itself, is it not all the more so that it should be rendered piggul by this intent? If so, the same should likewise apply in the case of an offering of lesser sanctity that was slaughtered with the intent to consume it after its appointed time, i.e., it should be rendered piggul by this intent alone, regardless of intent during sprinkling.
2The Gemara explains: This is not difficult, as in this instance, as well, Ulla did not mean that it is full-fledged piggul by intent with regard to the taking of the handful alone. Rather, he meant that a prohibited act was performed upon it which brings it to a status of piggul , but the full status of piggul is attained only if there is also an improper intent at the time of the sacrificing of the handful.
3There is a dispute in a mishna ( Zevaḥim 29b) with regard to two consecutive improper intentions. Rabbi Yehuda maintains that if there first was intent to partake of an offering or to burn the portions consumed on the altar beyond its designated time, which renders it piggul and therefore one who consumes it would be liable to receive karet , and then there was intent to perform that act outside its designated area, which merely disqualifies the offering, it is piggul . But if the order is reversed, it is merely disqualified. The Rabbis rule that in either case it is only disqualified. With that mishna in mind, Ravina said to Rav Ashi: But doesn’t Ilfa say: This disagreement applies in a case where the different intentions occurred during the performance of two different sacrificial rites?
4Ilfa elaborated: For example, if one said: I am hereby slaughtering the first one of the organs that must be severed in ritual slaughter, i.e., either the trachea or the esophagus, with the intention of consuming the offering beyond its designated time; and he then slaughtered its second organ with the intention of consuming it outside its designated area, then these halakhot apply. But if both intentions occurred in the course of one rite, e.g., during the slaughtering of the same organ, then everyone, including Rabbi Yehuda, agrees that this constitutes a mixture of intentions, and the offering is not rendered piggul . This example indicates that slaughtering alone with intent beyond its designated time renders the offering piggul , contrary to the opinion of Rav Giddel.
5Rav Ashi answered Ravina: Indeed, Rav Giddel agrees with this ruling. Although he maintains that slaughtering alone does not render an offering piggul , nevertheless, he agrees that when the blood is sprinkled afterward with piggul intent, it will be revealed whether there was piggul intent in the course of one rite or two rites. Consequently, if both intentions occurred during one sacrificial rite, everyone agrees that the offering is not piggul , despite the fact that the sprinkling was performed with piggul intent. But if the two intentions took place during two different sacrificial rites, then the question of whether it is piggul or merely disqualified is subject to the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis. Yet, the offering cannot be established as piggul until after the sprinkling.
6The Gemara raises a difficulty: But if so, with regard to a thanks offering, where it is stated that if the priest slaughtered it with the intent to partake of it or to burn the portions consumed on the altar beyond its designated time, then the loaves are sanctified (see 3b), the intention only at the time of the slaughtering should also not render the offering piggul until the blood is sprinkled. Since the mishna is apparently referring to a regular case of piggul , it must be speaking of a situation where the sprinkling was also performed with the piggul intent, which is how Ilfa explained the mishna on Zevaḥim 29b. If so, according to Rav Giddel, who maintains that slaughtering with the intent of piggul does not bring offerings of lesser sanctity into the status of being subject to the halakhot of misuse, how could the loaves be considered sanctified?
7The Gemara explains: What does the mishna mean when it says that the loaves are considered sanctified? It does not mean that they are sanctified in the sense that they are subject to the halakhot of misuse. Rather, it means that they are sanctified to the extent that they have the possibility to be disqualified, to the extent that they require burning afterward.
8The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the following baraita supports the opinion of Rav Giddel: With regard to an offering that is piggul , one who derives benefit from it is always liable for misuse of consecrated property. Does this not mean that the meat of an offering of the most sacred order is subject to the halakhot of misuse even though its blood was sprinkled with the intent to partake of it or to burn the portions consumed on the altar beyond its designated time? And if so, this supports Rav Giddel’s opinion.
9The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, one cannot cite a proof from this baraita , as it is possible that the baraita is referring to a case where the priest did not yet sprinkle the blood, and that is why the offering is subject to the halakhot of misuse. But once the blood is sprinkled with improper intent, the offering is no longer subject to the halakhot of misuse. The Gemara asks: If the baraita is dealing with a case where the priest did not yet sprinkle the blood, what is the purpose of stating it? Certainly before its blood is sprinkled the offering is included in the category of “the sacred items of the Lord,” and is subject to the halakhot of misuse.
10The Gemara suggest an alternative reason for rejecting the suggestion: Rather, the baraita is actually referring to a case where the blood was sprinkled. But nevertheless, it does not support Rav Giddel’s opinion, as when that baraita is taught, it is referring to a burnt offering. A burnt offering is always subject to the halakhot of misuse even after its blood is sprinkled, as it is never permitted to the priests in consumption. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If the ruling of the baraita is stated with regard to a burnt offering, then it is obvious that it is still subject to the halakhot of misuse, as it entirely belongs to the Most High, i.e., the entire offering is burned on the altar and none of it is consumed by the owners or priests.