1MISHNA: Everyone takes vows of valuation and is thereby obligated to donate to the Temple treasury the value fixed by the Torah (see Leviticus 27:3–7) for the age and sex of the person valuated. And similarly, everyone is valuated, and therefore one who vowed to donate his fixed value is obligated to pay. Likewise, everyone vows to donate to the Temple treasury the assessment of a person, based on his market value to be sold as a slave, and is thereby obligated to pay; and everyone is the object of a vow if others vowed to donate his assessment. This includes priests, Levites and Israelites, women, and Canaanite slaves.
2A tumtum , whose sexual organs are concealed, and a hermaphrodite [ androginos ], vow, and are the object of a vow, and take vows of valuation, but they are not valuated. Consequently, if one says, with regard to a tumtum : The valuation of so-and-so is incumbent upon me to donate to the Temple treasury, he is not obligated to pay anything, as only a definite male or a definite female are valuated.
3A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor are the object of a vow and are valuated, but neither vow to donate the assessment of a person nor take a vow of valuation, because they lack the presumed mental competence to make a commitment.
4GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is added by the mishna’s statement: Everyone [ hakol ] takes vows of valuation? When a principle is stated in a mishna, it serves to include a particular case that it does not mention explicitly in its halakha . Which case is included by the broad statement here? The Gemara answers: The mishna teaches it to add a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood [ mufla samukh le’ish ], i.e., during the year before a minor reaches majority.
5The Gemara similarly asks: What is added by the statement: And everyone is valuated? The Gemara answers: The mishna serves to add a repulsive man and one afflicted with boils, who have no market value.
6The Gemara explains why this addition is necessary: It might enter your mind to say that as it is written in the verse: “A vow of persons to the Lord, according to your valuation” (Leviticus 27:2), which juxtaposes one who is valuated to one who is the object of a vow, anyone who is included in the category of assessments, i.e., if he vows to pay his assessment he must pay it to the Temple, is also included in the category of valuations. But anyone who is not included in the category of assessments is not included in the category of valuations. Since these people, a repulsive man and one afflicted with boils, are not subject to assessment, as they have no market value, perhaps they are also not subject to valuation.
7Therefore, the mishna teaches us that these too are subject to valuation, as the same verse also states: “Persons [ nefashot ],” indicating anyone who has any amount of life [ nefesh ] is subject to valuation.
8The Gemara further asks: What is added by the mishna’s statement: Everyone vows to donate the assessment of a person? The Gemara answers: Actually, this statement is not necessary, but it is mentioned because the continuation: And everyone is the object of a vow, was necessary.
9The Gemara inquires: What, then, is added by the clause: And everyone is the object of a vow? If one were to suggest that this serves to add a tumtum and a hermaphrodite, that cannot be correct, as they are explicitly taught in the mishna itself. And if one were to suggest that it serves to add a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, they too are explicitly taught in the mishna.
10And if you say that this clause serves to add the halakha that a child who is less than a month old, who is not subject to valuation, is nevertheless subject to assessment, this too is explicitly taught in a mishna (5a). And if one were to say that it serves to add a gentile, that is also explicitly taught in a mishna (5b). The Gemara answers: Actually, the phrase: And everyone is the object of a vow, is mentioned in the mishna in order to add a child who is less than a month old, and the mishna teaches this halakha in general terms and then explains it in detail later.
11§ The Gemara inquires about similar general expressions that appear in other mishnayot . What is added by the mishna ( Menaḥot 93a): Everyone who brings an offering places hands on the head of the animal? The Gemara answers: This clause serves to add that an heir places hands on the offering of the deceased, and the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that an heir does not place his hands on an offering he inherited.
12The Gemara asks: What is added by the ruling of the mishna ( Temura 2a): Everyone substitutes a non-sacred animal for a consecrated animal? The Gemara answers: Here too, the mishna serves to add that an heir substitutes a non-sacred animal for his father’s consecrated animal, i.e., the non-sacred animal also becomes sanctified. And this mishna is also not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as he maintains that an heir cannot substitute a non-sacred animal for the consecrated animal he inherited.
13The Gemara cites the source for these two opinions of Rabbi Yehuda. As it is taught in a baraita : An heir places hands on his father’s offering, and an heir can effect substitution for an offering inherited from his father. Rabbi Yehuda says: An heir does not place hands and an heir cannot effect substitution.
14The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? With regard to placing of hands, he expounds the term: “His offering” (Leviticus 3:2), as teaching that one places his hands only on his own offering, but not on his father’s offering. And with regard to the ruling that an heir cannot effect substitution, Rabbi Yehuda derives the halakha of the initial stage of consecration, i.e., substitution, in which a previously non-sacred animal is consecrated, from the final stage of consecration, the act of placing hands, which is performed upon an already-consecrated animal immediately before it is slaughtered: Just as with regard to the final stage of consecration, an heir does not place hands, so too, with regard to the initial stage of consecration, an heir cannot effect substitution.
15And from where do the Rabbis derive their opinion? The verse states: “If he shall substitute [ hamer yamir ] animal for animal” (Leviticus 27:10), with the doubled form of hamer yamir serving to include the heir as one capable of effecting substitution. And the Rabbis derive the final stage of consecration, i.e., the placing of hands, from the initial stage of consecration, i.e., substitution: Just as with regard to the initial stage of consecration an heir can effect substitution, so too, with regard to the final stage of consecration, an heir can place hands.
16The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, what do they do with this term: “His offering,” from which Rabbi Yehuda derives that an heir does not place his hands? The Gemara explains how the Rabbis expound each mention of the term, which appears three times (Leviticus 3:2, 7, 12). One instance of “his offering” teaches that one places hands only on one’s own offering, but not on the offering of a gentile. Another instance of “his offering” teaches that one places hands only on one’s own offering, but not on the offering of another person. The third instance of “his offering” serves to include all the owners of a jointly owned offering in the requirement of placing hands, i.e., they are all required to place their hands on the offering.
17The Gemara clarifies: And how does Rabbi Yehuda respond to this claim? The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yehuda does not hold that one of the mentions serves to include all owners of a jointly owned offering in the requirement of placing hands. Rather, one of the owners places his hands on the offering on behalf of the entire group. Consequently, he is left with one spare mention of “his offering,” from which he derives that an heir does not place his hands. The Gemara adds: Alternatively, one can say that Rabbi Yehuda holds that one of the mentions serves to include owners of a jointly owned offering,