1If a debtor paid a hint of interest and petitions the court to have it returned to him, it is not repossessed from the creditor by the judges of the court. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even fixed interest is not repossessed by the judges. Abaye holds that transgressions are effective, and the interest now belongs to the creditor and cannot be repossessed, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. Therefore, the judges do not appropriate it. Rava holds that transgressions are not effective, and the creditor is in unlawful possession of the interest. Therefore, the judges repossess it, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar.
2Rav Aḥa said to Rav Ashi: There, in the dispute concerning fixed interest, do Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree with regard to logical reasoning, i.e., the principle of whether transgressions are effective? Not so; rather, they disagree there with regard to the interpretation of the verses, as Rabbi Yitzḥak said: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yoḥanan? The verse states: “[He] has given forth upon interest, and has taken increase; shall he then live? He shall not live; he has done all these abominations; he shall be put to death; his blood shall be upon him” (Ezekiel 18:13). Apparently, a usurer is subject to divine punishment for his life, but the interest is not subject to returning. This is the source for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.
3Rav Aḥa bar Adda said that the source for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan is from here: “Take no interest of him or increase, but fear your God, that your brother may live with you. You shall not give him your money upon interest, nor give him your provisions for increase; I am the Lord” (Leviticus 25:36–38). In effect, God is saying: I have made a usurer subject to punishment for insufficient fear of Me, but the interest is not subject to returning.
4Rava said that the source for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan is from here: “Has lent at advance interest, or exacted accrued interest; shall he live? He shall not live! He has done all these abominations; he shall be put to death; his blood shall be upon him” (Ezekiel 18:13). And an earlier verse states: “If he fathers a son that is a robber, a shedder of blood” (Ezekiel 18:10). Usurers are thereby juxtaposed to shedders of blood, i.e., murderers: Just as the sins of shedders of blood cannot be undone, so too, the sins of usurers cannot be undone.
5And Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Elazar? As the verse states: “Take no interest of him or increase; but fear your God, that your brother may live with you” (Leviticus 25:36). The verse teaches that one must return the interest to the debtor so that he will be able to live together with you.
6The Gemara asks: But if this matter is not a consequence of the dispute of Abaye and Rava, with regard to what case do Abaye and Rava disagree? The Gemara answers: There is perhaps no practical dispute between them, and they disagree only with regard to the theoretical question of whether deviation from what is stated in the Torah is effective. According to the opinion of Abaye, if there is no verse teaching otherwise, a transgression is presumed to be effective. According to the opinion of Rava, it is presumed to be not effective. They, therefore, disagree as to which halakhot reflect the rule and which are exceptions.
7§ The Gemara presents an alternative version of the answer to this question: In accordance with the answers we answered above, Abaye and Rava disagree with regard to fixed interest. According to the opinion of Abaye that transgressions are effective, the creditor does not need to return the interest, as he has acquired it. But according to the opinion of Rava that transgressions are not effective, the creditor must return the interest, as it still belongs to the debtor.
8The Gemara objects: But Abaye also holds that we repossess fixed interest by the authority of the judges, as Abaye said: In the event that this one, who was collecting a debt from another, demanded that he pay four dinars as interest, and the debtor gave to the creditor, in his store, a cloak that was worth five dinars in place of the four dinars of interest, the halakha is that when we repossess the interest from the creditor, we repossess only four dinars from him. And as for that additional one dinar, one presumes the debtor gave it to him as a gift. And Rava said: We repossess all five dinars from him. What is the reason? All of it came into his possession by virtue of a payment of interest. In any event, it is clear that Abaye holds that fixed interest is repossessed by the court.
9The Gemara concludes as earlier: Rather, there may be no practical dispute between them, as when Abaye and Rava disagree, it is only with regard to the theoretical question of whether deviation from what is stated in the Torah is effective.
10§ The Gemara returns to the topic of blemished animals. The Sages taught in a baraita : Why must the verse state: “But whatever has a blemish, you shall not offer; for it shall not be acceptable for you” (Leviticus 22:20)? If it serves to teach that you may not slaughter a blemished animal as a sacrifice even if it has been consecrated, that is already stated below, later on in the passage, as the Gemara will soon explain. Rather, why must the verse state that you may not offer a blemished animal? This serves to teach that you may not consecrate it. From here, the Sages stated ( Tosefta 1:10): One who consecrates blemished animals for sacrifice on the altar violates five separate categories of prohibition.
11He is liable for violating the prohibitions: You may not offer a blemished animal as an offering, i.e., you may not consecrate it; you may not slaughter it; and for the prohibition: You may not sprinkle its blood; and for the prohibition: You may not burn all of it on the altar; and for the prohibition: You may not burn part of it. The Sages said in the name of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda: One also violates a prohibition against the collection of the blood.
12The Gemara interjects: The Master said above: If one suggests that the prohibition in Leviticus 22:20 teaches that you may not slaughter a blemished animal as an offering, that is already stated below, later on in the passage. The Gemara asks: Where is it stated? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita : Why must the verse state: “Blind, or broken, or maimed, or having a cyst, or scabbed, or scurvy, you shall not offer” (Leviticus 22:22)? If this serves to teach that you may not consecrate them, that is already stated above, in verse 20. Rather, why must the verse state that you may not offer these animals? This serves to teach that you may not slaughter them if they have been consecrated.
13The baraita continues: The verse states: “Nor make an offering by fire of them upon the altar unto the Lord” (Leviticus 22:22). These words teach that one may not burn a blemished animal in the fires of the altar. I have derived only that it is prohibited to burn all of the animal. From where is it derived that it is prohibited to burn some portions of the animal? The verse states: “Of them,” which prohibits the burning of even part of them.
14From where is it derived that sprinkling the blood of a blemished animal is prohibited? The verse states: “Upon the altar,” thereby indicating that one may not sacrifice any part of it, even its blood, on the altar. The verse continues: “Unto the Lord,” which serves to include the scapegoat of Yom Kippur in this prohibition, that it may not be blemished even though it is not sacrificed on the altar.
15The Gemara interjects: And does the term: “Unto the Lord,” serve to include the scapegoat? But isn’t it taught in a baraita : The Torah condemns one who slaughters an offering outside the Temple “and has not brought it unto the door of the Tent of Meeting, to present it as an offering unto the Lord” (Leviticus 17:4)? If the verse had stated only “offering,” I would derive that one is liable even for slaughtering animals consecrated for Temple maintenance outside the Temple, for they are also called an offering, as it is stated: “And we have brought the Lord’s offering, what every man has found: Articles of gold” (Numbers 31:50).
16Therefore, the verse states: “And has not brought it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:4). This teaches that one is liable only for sacrificing an animal fit to be sacrificed within the entrance of the Tent of Meeting or the Temple due to the prohibition of slaughtering offerings outside the Temple. But one is not liable for sacrificing an animal not fit to be sacrificed within the entrance of the Tent of Meeting due to the prohibition of slaughtering offerings outside the Temple.
17I might exclude these animals consecrated for Temple maintenance, but not exclude the red heifer of purification, whose ashes are used to purge the impurity imparted by a corpse, and the scapegoat, despite the fact that neither are sacrificed on the altar, as they are unblemished and therefore fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting. Therefore, the verse states: “Unto the Lord,” to teach that one is liable only for those animals that are exclusively the Lord’s as offerings. These, the red heifer of purification and the scapegoat, are excluded, as they are not exclusively the Lord’s as offerings, but rather they serve unique ritual functions. In any event, the term “unto the Lord” is interpreted as excluding, rather than including, the scapegoat.
18Rava said: There, in the baraita discussing offerings slaughtered outside the Temple, the halakha is derived from the context of the verse. The verse states: “And has not brought it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:4), which serves to include any unblemished animal. Therefore, the following term: “Unto the Lord,” serves to exclude certain exceptions to the rule. Here, where the verse states “fire” (Leviticus 22:22), which serves to exclude animals not burned on the altar from the prohibition, the term: “Unto the Lord,” serves to include exceptions to that principle.
19The Gemara objects: The baraita indicates that the reason why a blemished animal may not be brought as the scapegoat is that the verse writes: “Unto the Lord.” One may infer that had the verse not included the scapegoat by employing the term: “Unto the Lord,” I would say that it is permitted to sacrifice a blemished scapegoat. Now, of the two goats of the Yom Kippur service, one is selected as the scapegoat and one as an offering by lottery. As a rule, the lottery can establish the animals in their respective roles only if each is fit for either role. Given that a blemished animal cannot be sacrificed as an offering, it cannot be designated as the scapegoat either. The term “unto the Lord” therefore seems unnecessary.
20Rav Yosef said: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita ? It is in accordance with the opinion of Ḥanan the Egyptian, who said that if the scapegoat dies before being sent to the wilderness, even if the other goat has already been slaughtered and its blood collected in the cup, the slaughtered goat is nevertheless a fit offering, and the priest brings another goat and pairs it with the slaughtered goat to serve as the scapegoat. This new scapegoat is thereby designated without a lottery, and one might therefore suppose it can be blemished. The term “unto the Lord” is therefore needed to teach that it must be unblemished.
21The Gemara challenges: Granted that you learn from the statement of Ḥanan the Egyptian that he holds that there is no deferral of the second goat once it has already been slaughtered. But do you learn from him that the new scapegoat need not be designated by a lottery? Perhaps the priest brings two potential scapegoats and performs a lottery to decide between them. Therefore, the question again arises: What need is there for the term “unto the Lord”?
22Rather, Rav Yosef said: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita ? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught in a baraita : If one of the two goats dies, the priest brings another goat without another lottery; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. It is this scapegoat that, absent the term “unto the Lord,” could have been blemished.
23Rava said: No, the term in the verse is necessary for a case where the scapegoat became blemished on that day of Yom Kippur, after it had been designated, and then the priest desacralized it by transferring its sanctity onto another blemished goat.